Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

135. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 15, 1979

SUBJECT

• Additional FY 80 FMS Credits for Southeast Asia

At Tab A is a memorandum from Harold Brown,² recommending that you authorize State and Defense to support Congressional initiatives to add increases in FMS credits for Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Shortly after Harold sent his memorandum, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee completed action on the security assistance legislation. As the House Foreign Affairs Committee had done previously, the SFRC added $15 million to the FMS authorization for Thailand. The SFRC also approved Glenn amendments adding $10 million for Indonesia and $5 million for Malaysia.

The issue for your decision, therefore, is whether the Administration should support the additional authorizations as they proceed to conference and to the respective appropriations committees. Harold, and Cy Vance, recommend that you authorize such support. Our views on this subject, which differ, are set out below.

Views of Jim McIntyre

Secretary Brown proposes that State and Defense be authorized to support the proposed FMS increases for Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia in the 1980 authorization bill without requesting a budget amendment, on the grounds that this approach better accords with your concern to keep the budget down, limit arms sales, and avoid making security assistance a major Congressional issue.

OMB is concerned that support of additional assistance for these countries in the wake of the numerous security assistance supplementals and amendments already transmitted and our consultations about still other potential supplementals (which you subsequently disapproved) will confuse the Congress as to the Administration’s priorities. It could also encourage (and provide a ready excuse for) a growing tendency of the committees to modify specific country programs at their whim.

Moreover, OMB believes the recommended approach would undercut the integrity of the budget process. We cannot have it both ways. Either we support additional FMS credits for these countries or we do not. If we do, we should transmit a budget amendment so that the appropriations committees will have an unequivocal budget request. In the absence of a budget amendment, the appropriations committees are unlikely to take the additional requests for these countries seriously. If, on the other hand, we do not want to increase the overall total of FMS credit but merely wish to change priorities among countries, all we need do is inform the Congress of the revised country allocations. The country levels in committee reports are not legally binding.

In conclusion, OMB believes that Administration support now for the additional FMS credits for Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia is unlikely to affect the overall total finally authorized and appropriated. Administration support, moreover, will raise expectations in these countries that we may be able to meet only at the expense of fulfilling higher priority needs already before the Congress.

Views of Zbig Brzezinski

As Harold notes in his memorandum, I agree with the recommendation to support the Congressional initiative for Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The investment of a small amount of additional obligational authority will, in my view, produce a very significant return in an area of the world that is looking to the United States for tangible evidence of continued interest in its regional security. This is especially true because of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, and continuing Soviet efforts to upgrade both its and Vietnam’s forces in Southeast Asia.

Also, you should be aware that your words in the Georgia Tech speech³ have already given rise to significant expectations on the part of our ASEAN friends with regard to security assistance:

“Many nations are troubled—even threatened—by the turmoil in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East. To stand by our friends and to help meet their security needs in these difficult times, I will consult with the Congress to determine what additional military assistance will be required. This added measure of support is crucial for stability throughout the Indian Ocean area. And let me repeat, in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the world we will stand by our friends—and we will protect the vital interests of the United States, and you can depend on it.”

Unless these proposed additions receive our support, it is very likely that, once the appropriations committees have made their almost inevitable across-the-board cuts, the FY 1980 FMS funds for these countries will be less than what they will receive in FY 1979. I think that this result would be a very unfortunate signal to the ASEAN countries, particularly at this sensitive time.

DECISION

Authorize State and Defense to support additional FMS financing for Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. (NSC, State, Defense) (Congressional Liaison)⁴

Reaffirm your earlier decision denying additional FMS financing, while holding open the option to provide additional financing to these countries within existing totals by reprogramming. (OMB)

1. Source: Carter Library, President’s Files, Presidential Handwriting File, Box 132, 5/21/79 [3]. No classification marking. Carter initialed the upper right-hand corner of the first page.
2. Brown’s May 2 memorandum, in which he supported supplemental FMS funding for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, is attached but not printed.
3. Reference is to Carter’s February 20 speech. For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 111.
4. Carter checked and initialed his authorization for additional FMS funding.