222. Minutes of the Tokyo Economic Summit Meeting1

Tokyo Summit

First Session2

OHIRA: Now that the press has left let’s get to business. I extend greetings to all of you. I know many of you have come from afar. I am happy to welcome the new members of our group—Mrs. Thatcher and Prime Minister Clark. I am also a new member, and I hope I am welcome too.

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Here in Japan we are in the process of conserving energy; we often open our shirt necks because of the heat. In this room, we may permit ourselves to take our jackets off and work in shirt sleeves, with your concurrence.

As Chancellor Schmidt said in the Bonn Summit, we are members of a mountain climbing party; we were just getting out of difficult economic troughs. But just as we were getting to the peaks, we encountered difficulties—a landslide in the form of the oil crisis. The circumstances today are reminiscent of Rambouillet, or in fact more serious than at Rambouillet. But I believe we are wiser today, because we have gained wisdom from past experience. We should be fully utilizing it, and must cooperate, to get out of our predicament.

We face an immediate problem. We need to take fundamental long-range policy decisions, and we need to carry them out.

Before the agenda begins officially, I should note one thing. There was in Tokyo on 26 June a meeting of Trade Union leaders. Their representatives sent a statement to me; that is now before each of you. The Trade Union representatives asked that the statement be included in next year’s agenda, if we meet next year.

A few household points: First, the meeting, as in the past will be formed of the following: A President or Prime Minister plus a Foreign Minister and a Finance Minister. I hope that the Foreign Ministers can stay for continuity’s sake, although the Finance Ministers can be substituted for by another Economic Minister. Second, there will be simultaneous translation into English, French, German, Italian and Japanese. For technical reasons Japanese is translated into the other languages via English. Third, before you there is a button which you should push to be recognized. And there is a button for your personal representatives, who are in the other room.

As to the Agenda, I would ask that each head of state or government make five minutes of comments to form the guidelines for the Summit discussion. Then we would take up the specific Agenda. Subjects will be macroeconomic issues, energy, LDCs, trade, monetary issues, and finally the Communique. While we are talking, the personal representatives may be expected to start work on energy. Who would like to lead off?

CARTER: The eyes of the world are on this Summit for a number of major reasons—the first and most important being energy. On this subject I hope that we can be bold, substantive, specific and hopefully united when we come to the final Communique. I prefer that we indicate targets based on specific figures. We should commit ourselves to meet these targets on a short-range basis and commit to attempt to reach long-term targets, even though there may be somewhat more uncertainty. In addition, we have to address the spot market, measures to [Page 641] limit stocking of oil in times of tight supply, and cooperation in a multilateral approach to new sources of coal, shale, tar sands, synthetics and solar. We should pledge to meet our goals and to be sure that we do so cooperatively and collectively. We should have the maximum consultation and dialogue with OPEC. This has been lacking so far and has caused grievous consequences. We should pledge to keep our oil imports down and follow with strict conservation of total oil consumption and increased efforts to come up with alternate supplies of energy.

On North/South issues we should address problems of food research, storage, supplies and stable reserves. Individually and through the World Bank we should help LDCs increase energy production, and share energy technology with the LDCs.

I hope that the monetary system will be stabilized, and the IMF should maintain its basic purposes. I understand the problems of each nation in reaching a consensus on these issues. I am pleased with the results of the MTN and hope that Congress will approve them by August. We should express our commitment to conclusion of agreements.

The refugee issue is being addressed by our Foreign Ministers and there should be a report submitted for final inclusion in the Communique.3 We need a strong statement on refugees and strong support for LDCs.

ANDREOTTI: This meeting should be mainly on energy. It should provide an external image which conveys the political character of the meeting. It should clarify what happened in Bonn and what was decided there. It should note the difficulties arising from events since Bonn. It should play a guiding role in shaping future events, bearing in mind certain differences among our countries. For instance, on energy, Canada is self sufficient, and Italy and Japan are in very large debtor positions. It should stress the interdependence among the problems of all countries. Our position vis-a-vis OPEC will be all the stronger if we take into account our requirements as well as those of the LDCs, which will be most harmed by OPEC prices if they are constantly raised.

On alternate energy sources, and nuclear energy, we are all faced by serious psychological problems exploited by those who oppose it. If we put in the Communique something on nuclear energy that is positive it will help our individual national programs. Perhaps from Japan can come words to inspire us on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

OHIRA: Regarding the point on peaceful nuclear energy, I feel that the most reliable, realistic alternative to oil is nuclear energy. We have [Page 642] adopted a course leading to more nuclear energy, and we expect the most of nuclear energy as an oil alternative. With the U.S., Canada and France we have developed and are moving forward on technical cooperation arrangements. Safety is of cardinal importance. We should be thorough in insuring safety. We should especially emphasize the positive need to go ahead with peaceful nuclear energy. Our efforts are behind schedule. We have much catching-up to do on the peaceful pursuit of nuclear energy. On nuclear energy, I hope for the further understanding and support of the other countries here.

GISCARD: The Summit is an Economic Summit. Countries are invited here because of the role they play in solving the economic problems of the globe. In the past the press has speculated on the utility of these sorts of meetings and it has become somewhat critical. The Bonn Summit was useful and the follow-up to Bonn was positive. I am sure it is the hope of all that the Tokyo Summit will also be useful.

The main economic problem is the energy problem: oil supplies, and the securing of these supplies in the short, medium and long term. We must show that we have proposals on these time scales. Europe has prepared for the Tokyo Summit in the European Community. We have taken decisions and published a text.4 But our Declaration only makes sense if it goes hand in hand with decisions of our major partners. We hope these decisions will emerge in Tokyo. Our meeting will only be successful if we agree on quantified, specific targets to reduce imports immediately and lastingly. If not this will be a disappointing meeting.

Also we must address prices on the spot market. Our experts should draw up recommendations and we should take concrete actions on the basis of these recommendations.

Regarding alternate sources, the main ones are nuclear energy and coal. Other alternatives are not yet available. On coal and nuclear energy, we should express a determination to speed up production. We are all clearly concerned about safety, but this should not be a priori condition to further new energy development, because if it is it will delay energy development.

We should be factual and credible in our statements on LDCs. Energy has hit hard the non-oil LDCs. This is not our responsibility and was not caused by us. The cost to our economies of the oil problem means it is more difficult for us to give more aid. We should have no fine statements but simply say we are prepared to do what is in our power to do, but that we cannot compensate for the effects of steep prices.

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It is important for the world economy, and for financial stability to arrive at agreement here. France will play an active part in seeking solutions. We will defend our national interest, but will take an overall view of the problem. If we cannot take an overall view of the problem, we cannot avoid the effect of our situation on national economies.

SCHMIDT: This is one of a sequence of economic summits. Like Valery, I stress their economic nature. They have on the whole been benevolent for the development of the world economic structure and process. This is so not because we accomplished great changes, or reforms or improvements but because we avoided great catastrophe which might have occurred as a result of the events in 1973–74. We were successful in avoiding a lapse into beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the 1930’s. We should not belittle the success of our meetings. It is not necessary to have new dramatic schemes every year. They do help us to avoid temptations for bad policy due to bad domestic pressure, including from Parliament.

The Summits also give advice which is useful in particular fields. The last Summit gave advice, for example, in the area of trade policy. We lived up to the goal set in that field. We can be satisfied if Parliaments ratify, or agree to, what governments have done. In the field of nuclear fuel supply, there is no reason for disappointment since Bonn. And there is no reason for complaints with respect to the growth targets and follow-up to the advice to Japan and Germany at Bonn to get economies going faster than before. I can report that we have lived up to our obligation.

In two fields we have not completely lived up to the Bonn Summit. First on the international fight against inflation and for monetary stability. Only initial success has been achieved. Second is the energy crunch.

Let me be more specific, in Bonn we took action under pressure. You asked Germany to increase deficit spending to get quicker growth. We said we would take measures of up to 1% of GNP. We took these within 8 weeks of the Summit. This produced results which we and you, reluctantly on our side, sought. We will achieve 4% growth in 1979. At the same time these heated up the money supply. Public borrowing was up to 3.7% of GNP. This is large compared to the U.S. or France. It will create price difficulties for the FRG. These are the undesirable consequences of the measures we took under your pressure. We have not overcome these difficulties and will see them in the next wage round. We will also see difficulties in the capital and credit market because of the large public borrowing. The long-term rate has gone up 2½% in the last 12 months. I mention this because we should consider how we have lived up to the pledges made 12 months ago.

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On energy, we should identify how much we have done following up Bonn and determine whether we can do more. I don’t like understandings that are not fulfilled, so we should avoid these here. I favor, as Valery and Jimmy said, necessary decisions to be taken in the energy field. I hope they will be taken. The FRG will be as cooperative as we can. We should not take decisions which only pretend to be decisions. We should not have gimmicks which are dismantled by public opinion or by OPEC. The OPEC meeting adjourned to see if we are seriously going to do something, or just engage in rhetoric.5 Also, they find it difficult to agree among themselves. There are OPEC governments who want to be moderate, who understand the impact of oil prices on the world and see them doing more harm to the LDCs than to us. They see that they have the possibility of destroying the international division of labor, monetary markets and so on. But it is not only selfishness that leads some OPEC countries to ask for higher oil prices. There is reason to believe that only a great rise in oil prices will enforce conservation and alternative production.

All of us want to reduce demand for imported oil. All of us want to do so by conservation of energy and by substituting for oil in specific ways—different ways being open to different countries. The FRG has reduced oil imports consistently since 1973. We have let the price mechanism work, and have no subsidies on petroleum or distillates. From 1973–1978, we have less energy demand as a percentage of economic growth than in 1973 or before. In 1979, we will import only a little more than in 1973 or in 1972. There have been major pressures to reduce oil imports over the last five years. There has been a mixture of letting the price mechanism work, and incentives to conserve, such as using government money for conservation. We have also subsidized the use of coal. Our coal is 700–800 feet deep. It takes eight to ten years to build a new pit and start production. The subsidy for one ton of coal is double the pay to a mine worker to mine it. But this leads to a reduction in imports of oil. We have reduced oil use in the generation of electricity. Only 9 percent of our electricity is generated by oil.

The situation of our countries differs. Some of us by artificial means have kept domestic prices of oil and distillate lower than they might be. Some are fighting environmentalists who are fighting the use of coal. Some are fighting the environmentalists who object to pipelines and new refineries, including crackers. The FRG is fighting the environ [Page 645] mentalists on coal and the expansion of nuclear plants. We should tell our personal representatives to provide a paper which includes all those devices needed for overcoming opposition and a thoughtful, clear message on the enlargement of nuclear production. It would also be helpful to have something on coal. This would help Jimmy Carter as well as us in the FRG. It would help to include in the communique language needed at home to deal with the opposition to the substitutes for oil and with the environmentalists.

I agree with Valery Giscard that it is important to show to the suppliers in OPEC that we are taking this matter seriously and have a sincere approach to reducing oil demand. Then, when OPEC meets, we can build on this impression and strengthen the hands of the moderates. We should not leave the OPEC moderates out in the cold. We will have credibility only if we have medium range and long-term policies. For the rest of the century oil prices will have to go up because oil reserves are gradually being used up. Also, there can be political events like Iran,6 and these can increasingly lead to crunches. Coal and nuclear energy must be expanded. Also, we should use shale, tar sands and North Sea oil. Lots of money will be needed for pure and applied research for renewable energy, which should come on stream by the middle 90’s and by the end of the century enable us to use solar, geothermal and nuclear energy more.

I foresee a situation in the next century when we may not wish to use hydrocarbons any more. I can envisage that in one or two decades scientists will say we are heating up the outer atmosphere of the globe, when it will not be tolerable for nations to do this—when there will be too much heat and too little water, as in the Sahel. There may be a time when we have enough bio-mass, coal and petroleum but will be told that we should not use it. We should back up our studies by looking ahead one or two decades into the next century.

If we cannot avoid egotistic national policies, there could be a monetary crisis, high unemployment, and starvation and hunger in the LDCs.

With respect to short term energy goals and measures, I dislike what we were given in the draft communique—with the energy section blank. We should stress that our aides should give us a draft communique especially on energy, and especially on targets which we can [Page 646] measure in terms of time, goals, periods of reference and how to group nations, individually or together. Our aides should list the different attitudes and attempt to get agreement in these fields. These should not be issues of national or individual prestige. Obviously, we will have to express the interests of our countries and should not hide the interests behind verbal compromise. National interests are often hidden by economic or academic reasoning.

THATCHER: It is impossible to discuss economic prospects without discussing energy prospects. We are one-half of the way through 1979, but the prospects for the world economy deteriorate month to month. We started the year with less exaggerated payments imbalances, and the prospect of currency stability. The oil situation seemed to be under control. Now the difference is oil, and this has also affected inflation. This sharp oil price increase has happened for the second time within a decade. It is a long and short term problem. All our ideas of growth must be revised. We cannot grow as much in the future as we had hoped. Also, the situation is worse for the LDCs—high prices, slow exports and we are less able to help them because of oil. This also means more instability.

The fact of our meeting means we can get guidelines and leadership to surmount difficulties. We must face these matters realistically, making clear what can and cannot be done. If we only have a communique with pious platitudes, the world will see that we have failed. We need positive declarations in the energy area in three spheres. We must deal with the immediate situation, but also come up with solutions which continue year after year, not just talk about long term. Nuclear power takes a long time to develop. We will not have power from the sun or tides before the end of the century.

On energy, we must let the price mechanism work in full. But we should not rely on this totally. We should also have tax incentives for insulation and for shifting to other sources. The UK gets 70 percent of its electricity from coal production and 15 percent from oil. We need more nuclear and must convince countries that nuclear is safe.

On inflation, we have had a reduction since 1974, but we will have more if we should accelerate inflation as a result of oil price increases. We should fight inflation or we will have increased unemployment. We should also not accelerate the impact of oil price increases with inflationary policies. The oil price increase means loss of incomes for the moment. We can’t get around this in the short term. On growth, we should not be too pessimistic. We need increased efficiency in industry, the consumer sector and agriculture. We should see the need for adjustment and respond to change. The UK has not always responded adequately to change but unless we do we can’t get growth.

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If we are to achieve a balance of supply and demand in oil we must make OPEC understand that oil price increases jeopardize the Western world. We should look to increased nuclear production for the future. We produce oil but have the same interest in saving energy as others because we depend on the world economy. We should be realistic and not cloak measures in soft phrases. This would give the world greater confidence than by hiding what we mean.

JENKINS: We had a successful conclusion of the MTN in April and now we need full implementation. Our concerted growth strategy was fulfilled, and as a result there has been more rapid growth in countries other than the U.S. On the monetary side, the stabilization measures of the United States on November 1 and the EMS have been helpful.

The least progress has been on North/South relations, but in the EC we have renewed the Lome Agreement7 with 57 LDCs (Schmidt: ½ of all LDCs).

But all this has been overshadowed by what has happened in energy. Energy should be the Summit theme. In the short term, immediate prospects will be damaged by developments over the past six months in the oil field. It will increase inflation, which is already going up in our countries. The balance of payments costs will be $20 billion per year in the OECD as a whole, and it will lead to a cut in our growth prospects. One question is how far we add to these unpleasant but survivable problems. The oil market will balance itself over a period. But if we do not have effective restraints and substitutes, this will be an expensive way of doing it.

The long-term trends in oil prices are going up, and we can’t avoid oil price increases. But we should address the speed with which oil price increases take place. If they take place suddenly there will be a rapid transfer of resources away from us without an increase in demand by OPEC. Although we save energy through a high level of recession, the Schultze paper8 indicates that the cost of saving a barrel of oil through recession is $300 per barrel. The danger is that the market will stabilize only at very high prices, and there may in fact be an apparent glut on the oil market as a result. We need to change our lifestyles and produce alternative supplies. Effective voluntary restraints are an investment in our prosperity.

CLARK: It is important that the understandings we reach be serious. They will help only if we are clear on the impact of our commitments to individual countries. We should set goals that can be achieved. If not, there will be skepticism about the process.

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We must also be cognizant about the impact on international and domestic opinion. We should try to insure that our people will support us on unpopular policies by indicating the importance of such policies to our futures. We need to change attitudes toward conservation. We are a high energy using country. We need to look at the alternatives very carefully. For instance, acidic rain results from the burning of coal. A number of alternatives have environmental consequences.

The Summit should take account of different circumstances in our countries. We anticipate a shortfall in domestic production of crude and conventional sources of energy because of our declining well production over the next five years. But we will have significant production of non-traditional fuels after 1985. Also, there are major regional differences in Canada. There is wealth where there is energy but there is less wealth in energy importing areas. This limits the use of price in influencing demand. Our priority national goal in energy is self-sufficiency by 1990 through substituting for oil, natural gas and other sources. This effort can be helped by the Tokyo Summit communique.

OHIRA: We coped with the oil situation last year, but we were naive on the Middle East. On long-term energy development, our emphasis was inadequate. We should be firm in coping with OPEC price increases and should seriously pursue long-term research in energy.

The impact of energy on our economic structure should be pointed out. But the big question is have we achieved results. Since the first oil price increase we have diminished the impact on payments imbalances and cooled off inflation, but unemployment and inflation are still with us. In improving productivity, we must make a major effort at positive adjustment—structural adjustment.

With respect to Japan we are undertaking fundamental changes in our lifestyle. Our trends are toward qualitative improvements with affluence. Since I took office I have tried to produce qualitative improvements in daily life bringing the country to the city and the benefits of the city to the country. I am also interested in discussing the circumstances of city life. We must take a look at our lifestyles in responding to the energy problem. We must also pay attention to relations with the developing countries and look at the global community.

[This section of the discussion concluded at 11:10, and a coffee break took place. The discussion resumed at 11:35.]9

OHIRA: Let us now turn to macro-economic issues. In our comments this morning we touched on the relationship between macro-economic issues and energy. Who would like to begin?

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THATCHER: In my judgment not enough attention has been given to the need to fight inflation. Even before the oil situation inflation was up in our countries. The oil price increase made inflation all the more important. In the past people have expected the standard of living to go up, and equated this with higher wages. The politicians took the words of Keynes10 on deficit financing, but did not recognize the point about the need for surpluses in good times. Strict control of money supply is needed to control inflation. Inflation is cheating the savings of older people. It transfers the savings of the elderly to working people. The problem has been underway for 30 years and it won’t go away.

OHIRA: The problem of inflation is important. Inflation and slow growth are two sides of the same coin. Unemployment is also urgent. The problem is acute. I share Mrs. Thatcher’s views.

SCHMIDT: I concur with Mrs. Thatcher. There are temptations in society to make up for oil price increases and the rise in the cost of living by increases in nominal incomes. This does not work. I would like to see this idea in the text of the Communique. I think we should stress the last section on page 5 in the Communique “attempt to cooperate . . .”. We are not in a Keynesian situation today. He is not applicable today.

GISCARD: Keynes addressed the situation of the 30’s with genius. If he were here he would update his analysis. He might suggest valuable amendments to the Communique. With respect to the Communique we should not aim at pursuing deflationary policies in our countries in order to combat inflation. We should restructure our policy to contain inflation. In France investment has not been a growth factor in the last three years; consumers and trade have led. In the present situation you need increased investment to increase growth. This encourages savings in industry and encourages production. High inflation and high unemployment are not satisfactory.

Our economic growth rate is not tied to rates of oil consumption. There was a fixed relationship between growth and oil consumption. We have broken that tie. We now attain growth with alternate energy sources. We must invest in alternate energy resources. This will help on growth as well.

ANDREOTTI: We need positive results from the Summit. Last year we succeeded in part. Countries with greater economic possibilities increased their growth rates and this helped other countries to grow. Italy will maintain its undertaking of 4% growth.

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Today the oil problem and fear of inflation may lead to slower rates of growth in some countries. As a result we could find countries with high rates of unemployment in difficult positions. It is important to fight inflation but we should lay down a coordinated policy, as noted by Giscard. We should not have a deflationary policy, but a coordinated system directed to the struggle against unemployment, and this should be set out with more emphasis in the Communique. If we do not it will have political repercussions on public opinion in different countries. We should not extinguish the hopes of the Bonn Summit.

JENKINS: The oil price increase had two countervailing effects. It increased the cost/pull impact on inflation, and it led to a decline in demand. These are difficult to reconcile. We need to come up with a balance between the two to avoid both inflationary and deflationary effects. We might for instance consider separate price indices, with one in which the effect of energy price increases are not included. We could isolate energy costs in dealing with wage indexation in certain countries.

CARTER: As a result of Bonn I directed oil price decontrol. It started on the first of June.11 Domestic oil prices as a result have been increased more rapidly than in other countries because of the price increase in our oil, and OPEC increases. I agree that statistics would look better if we took Roy Jenkins’ idea, but our people won’t permit our trying to prevent energy costs from being incorporated in wage demands. We have focussed on energy with some degree of success. We have made much progress in 2½ years. Before 1973 for every 1% increase in GNP we had a 1.05 increase in energy use. Since 1973 that figure has been .37%. We have had a less than 50% increase in oil use as compared to GNP.

We also need to get at the roots of inflation. We have deregulated the airline industry12 and we are moving on transportation. We have modified our tax structure to encourage new investment and improve depreciation allowances. I am concerned about productivity improvement. More effort here is needed.

As a result of the MTN we reduced protection at home and have encouraged increased R&D in the government and have called for private industry to do the same.

Close cooperation among us is important. The issue is how to deal with energy. Premature media exposure of our views might reduce our [Page 651] flexibility and our ability to accommodate one another at this Summit. I still think we should emphasize specificity even if it means that each country spells out specifically what it can do and we are but all locked into the same formula.

U.S. oil production is declining. Our oil wells are old and we have to use a great deal of tertiary recovery. Over the last 15 years we have had a 6% annual reduction in domestic oil production.

In our Communique we should be specific and substantive, because the world is looking to us to do something specific on energy. There is no substitute for this. I look forward to getting drafts from our personal representatives. I’ll go the second mile to accommodate my needs to yours. I must go home with the proof that others are sacrificing in order to get the American people to do the same. We should not have recriminations about performance based on lack of information on the circumstances in each country. It is easier politically to deal with energy if a country is almost entirely a consumer. It is more difficult if the country is sharply divided among producer and consumer regions. I was struck here by Joe Clark’s point. Canada, like the US, is not a homogeneous region. Some regions depend on imports and others on exports. We should understand the circumstances of one another. This meeting will be an abject failure if we do not accommodate present divergencies of views about energy.

OHIRA: Two or three countries alone can’t do the job. We expect the United States to curb inflation, but inflation is serious in other countries as well. Therefore we must minimize inflation in all of our countries. All of us need a maximum effort to curb inflation. In FY ’78 Japan’s domestic demand will grow at 8.5%. Our current account surplus will be $12 to $14 billion, although since March we have had a current account deficit. In the last three months we have had a $700 million deficit. Therefore in terms of GNP growth we could not reach the Bonn target although our growth served the purpose of the Bonn target.

The second oil crisis is tragic. In April and May we have had a 20% increase in the wholesale price index in annual terms. Clearly inflation is an important agenda item. It is important to remedy the supply side. Each should take major steps. We are now out of the period of post-war technology and we are at the end of a certain pool of technological resources. We need more R&D and greater technical efforts.

OHIRA: Our session is about over. Each country can now brief the press as it sees fit.

SCHMIDT: Why don’t we do as we did last time and let you brief the press, Mr. Prime Minister.

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First session ended 12:40 pm.13

[Omitted here are the minutes of the second, third, and fourth sessions of the Tokyo Summit.]

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Special Projects, Henry Owen, Box 31, Summit: Tokyo: 6/28–30/79. Secret; Nodis. Attached but not printed are a cover page and a list of participants. According to the list, the following people participated in the Summit: Clark, MacDonald, and Crosbie; Giscard, François-Poncet, Monory, Giraud; Schmidt, Genscher, Matthoefer, and Lambsdorff; Andreotti, Forlani, and Pandolifi; Ohira, Sonoda, Kaneko, and Esaki; Thatcher, Lord Carrington, and Howe; Carter, Vance, Blumenthal, and Schlesinger; and Jenkins. The list notes that Hormats drafted the minutes. The list of participants and the sections of the minutes of all four sessions concerning energy are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980, Document 221. Carter’s handwritten notes on the Summit are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 4, Summit Meetings, 7/78–6/80.
  2. The first session of the Summit took place in the Conference Room at the Akasaka Palace and lasted from 9:40 a.m. until 12:18 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
  3. On June 28, the seven nations at the Summit issued a special statement on the tens of thousands of refugees then fleeing Indochina. For the text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1979, Book II, p. 1188.
  4. Reference is to the published conclusions of the EC Council meeting in Strasbourg June 21–22.
  5. OPEC met at the Ministerial level in Geneva June 26–28. The communiqué issued at the end of the meeting announced an increase in the price of crude oil. (“Text of Communiqué on Oil at End of Ministerial Meeting in Geneva,” The New York Times, June 29, 1979, p. D4)
  6. The Iranian Revolution, which began in 1978 and culminated in the January 1979 flight of the Shah from Iran and the establishment in April of an Islamic Republic under the Ayatollah Khomeini, precipitated a second energy crisis due to decreased oil production.
  7. See footnote 6, Document 24.
  8. Not further identified.
  9. Brackets in the original.
  10. John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) was an influential British economist and adviser to the U.K. Government. Among his many accomplishments, he conceptualized a new approach to macroeconomics that focused on the role of government in increasing aggregate demand.
  11. For Carter’s June 1 statement on the decontrol of domestic oil prices, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 981–982.
  12. Carter signed the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 into law on October 24, 1978. For his signing remarks, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1978, Book II, pp. 1837–1839.
  13. The second session of the Summit began at 3:05 p.m. and ended at 6 p.m. on June 28; the third and fourth sessions took place on June 29 from 9:50 a.m. until 12:10 p.m. and from 2:30 p.m. until 4:17 p.m., respectively. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) For the remarks to reporters by the Summit participants on June 29 at the conclusion of the sessions and the Declaration issued at the end of the Summit, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 1187–1201.