Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980

221. Minutes of the Tokyo Economic Summit Meeting¹

Tokyo, June 28–29, 1979.

PARTICIPANTS

• Canada
• Joe Clark, P.C., M.P., Prime Minister
• Flora MacDonald, P.C., M.P, Secretary of State for External Affairs
• John Crosbie, P.C., M.P., Minister of Finance
• France
• Valery Giscard d’Estaing, President
• Jean Francois-Poncet, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Rene Monory, Minister of Economy
• Andre Giraud, Minister of Industry
• Germany
• Helmut Schmidt, Federal Chancellor
• Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor and Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs
• Hans Matthoefer, Minister of Finance
• Dr. Otto Graf Lambsdorff, Federal Minister of Economics
• Italy
• Giulio Andreotti, President of the Council of Ministers
• Arnaldo Forlani, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Filippo M. Pandolifi, Minister of the Treasury
• Japan
• Masayoshi Ohira, Prime Minister
• Sunao Sonoda, Minister for Foreign Affairs
• Ippei Kaneko, Minister of Finance
• Masumi Esaki, Minister of International Trade and Industry
• United Kingdom
• Margaret Thatcher, M.P., Prime Minister
• Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
• Sir Geoffrey Howe, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer
• United States
• Jimmy Carter, President
• Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury
• James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Energy
• Commission of the European Community
• Roy Jenkins

Tokyo Summit

First Session

Ohira: Now that the press has left let’s get to business. I extend greetings to all of you. I know many of you have come from afar. I am happy to welcome the new members of our group—Mrs. Thatcher and Prime Minister Clark. I am also a new member, and I hope I am welcome too.

Here in Japan we are in the process of conserving energy; we often open our shirt necks because of the heat. In this room, we may permit ourselves to take our jackets off and work in shirt sleeves, with your concurrence.

As Chancellor Schmidt said in the Bonn Summit,² we are members of a mountain climbing party; we were just getting out of difficult economic troughs. But just as we were getting to the peaks, we encountered difficulties—a landslide in the form of the oil crisis. The circumstances today are reminiscent of Rambouillet,³ or in fact more serious than at Rambouillet. But I believe we are wiser today, because we have gained wisdom from past experience. We should be fully utilizing it, and must cooperate, to get out of our predicament.

We face an immediate problem. We need to take fundamental long-range policy decisions, and we need to carry them out.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]

[Ohira:] As to the Agenda, I would ask that each head of state or government make five minutes of comments to form the guidelines for the Summit discussion. Then we would take up the specific Agenda. Subjects will be macroeconomic issues, energy, LDCs, trade, monetary issues, and finally the Communiqué. While we are talking, the personal representatives may be expected to start work on energy. Who would like to lead off?

Carter: The eyes of the world are on this Summit for a number of major reasons—the first and most important being energy. On this subject I hope that we can be bold, substantive, specific and hopefully united when we come to the final Communiqué. I prefer that we indicate targets based on specific figures. We should commit ourselves to meet these targets on a short-range basis and commit to attempt to reach long-term targets, even though there may be somewhat more uncertainty. In addition, we have to address the spot market, measures to limit stocking of oil in times of tight supply, and cooperation in a multilateral approach to new sources of coal, shale, tar sands, synthetics and solar. We should pledge to meet our goals and to be sure that we do so cooperatively and collectively. We should have the maximum consultation and dialogue with OPEC. This has been lacking so far and has caused grievous consequences. We should pledge to keep our oil imports down and follow with strict conservation of total oil consumption and increased efforts to come up with alternate supplies of energy.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]

Andreotti: This meeting should be mainly on energy. It should provide an external image which conveys the political character of the meeting. It should clarify what happened in Bonn and what was decided there. It should note the difficulties arising from events since Bonn. It should play a guiding role in shaping future events, bearing in mind certain differences among our countries. For instance, on energy, Canada is self sufficient, and Italy and Japan are in very large debtor positions. It should stress the interdependence among the problems of all countries. Our position vis-à-vis OPEC will be all the stronger if we take into account our requirements as well as those of the LDCs, which will be most harmed by OPEC prices if they are constantly raised.

On alternate energy sources, and nuclear energy, we are all faced by serious psychological problems exploited by those who oppose it. If we put in the Communiqué something on nuclear energy that is positive it will help our individual national programs. Perhaps from Japan can come words to inspire us on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Ohira: Regarding the point on peaceful nuclear energy, I feel that the most reliable, realistic alternative to oil is nuclear energy. We have adopted a course leading to more nuclear energy, and we expect the most of nuclear energy as an oil alternative. With the U.S., Canada and France we have developed and are moving forward on technical cooperation arrangements. Safety is of cardinal importance. We should be thorough in insuring safety. We should especially emphasize the positive need to go ahead with peaceful nuclear energy. Our efforts are behind schedule. We have much catching-up to do on the peaceful pursuit of nuclear energy. On nuclear energy, I hope for the further understanding and support of the other countries here.

Giscard: The Summit is an Economic Summit. Countries are invited here because of the role they play in solving the economic problems of the globe. In the past the press has speculated on the utility of these sorts of meetings and it has become somewhat critical. The Bonn Summit was useful and the follow-up to Bonn was positive. I am sure it is the hope of all that the Tokyo Summit will also be useful.

The main economic problem is the energy problem: oil supplies, and the securing of these supplies in the short, medium and long term. We must show that we have proposals on these time scales. Europe has prepared for the Tokyo Summit in the European Community. We have taken decisions and published a text.⁴ But our Declaration only makes sense if it goes hand in hand with decisions of our major partners. We hope these decisions will emerge in Tokyo. Our meeting will only be successful if we agree on quantified, specific targets to reduce imports immediately and lastingly. If not this will be a disappointing meeting.

Also we must address prices on the spot market. Our experts should draw up recommendations and we should take concrete actions on the basis of these recommendations.

Regarding alternate sources, the main ones are nuclear energy and coal. Other alternatives are not yet available. On coal and nuclear energy, we should express a determination to speed up production. We are all clearly concerned about safety, but this should not be an a priori condition to further new energy development, because if it is it will delay energy development.

We should be factual and credible in our statements on LDCs. Energy has hit hard the non-oil LDCs. This is not our responsibility and was not caused by us. The cost to our economies of the oil problem means it is more difficult for us to give more aid. We should have no fine statements but simply say we are prepared to do what is in our power to do, but that we cannot compensate for the effects of steep prices.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]

[Schmidt:] On energy, we should identify how much we have done following up Bonn and determine whether we can do more. I don’t like understandings that are not fulfilled, so we should avoid these here. I favor, as Valery and Jimmy said, necessary decisions to be taken in the energy field. I hope they will be taken. The FRG will be as cooperative as we can. We should not take decisions which only pretend to be decisions. We should not have gimmicks which are dismantled by public opinion or by OPEC. The OPEC meeting adjourned to see if we are seriously going to do something, or just engage in rhetoric. Also, they find it difficult to agree among themselves. There are OPEC governments who want to be moderate, who understand the impact of oil prices on the world and see them doing more harm to the LDCs than to us. They see that they have the possibility of destroying the international division of labor, monetary markets and so on. But it is not only selfishness that leads some OPEC countries to ask for higher oil prices. There is reason to believe that only a great rise in oil prices will enforce conservation and alternative production.

All of us want to reduce demand for imported oil. All of us want to do so by conservation of energy and by substituting for oil in specific ways—different ways being open to different countries. The FRG has reduced oil imports consistently since 1973. We have let the price mechanism work, and have no subsidies on petroleum or distillates. From 1973–1978, we have less energy demand as a percentage of economic growth than in 1973 or before. In 1979, we will import only a little more than in 1973 or in 1972. There have been major pressures to reduce oil imports over the last five years. There has been a mixture of letting the price mechanism work, and incentives to conserve, such as using government money for conservation. We have also subsidized the use of coal. Our coal is 700–800 feet deep. It takes eight to ten years to build a new pit and start production. The subsidy for one ton of coal is double the pay to a mine worker to mine it. But this leads to a reduction in imports of oil. We have reduced oil use in the generation of electricity. Only 9 percent of our electricity is generated by oil.

The situation of our countries differs. Some of us by artificial means have kept domestic prices of oil and distillate lower than they might be. Some are fighting environmentalists who are fighting the use of coal. Some are fighting the environmentalists who object to pipelines and new refineries, including crackers. The FRG is fighting the environmentalists on coal and the expansion of nuclear plants. We should tell our personal representatives to provide a paper which includes all those devices needed for overcoming opposition and a thoughtful, clear message on the enlargement of nuclear production. It would also be helpful to have something on coal. This would help Jimmy Carter as well as us in the FRG. It would help to include in the communiqué language needed at home to deal with the opposition to the substitutes for oil and with the environmentalists.

I agree with Valery Giscard that it is important to show to the suppliers in OPEC that we are taking this matter seriously and have a sincere approach to reducing oil demand. Then, when OPEC meets, we can build on this impression and strengthen the hands of the moderates. We should not leave the OPEC moderates out in the cold. We will have credibility only if we have medium range and long-term policies. For the rest of the century oil prices will have to go up because oil reserves are gradually being used up. Also, there can be political events like Iran, and these can increasingly lead to crunches. Coal and nuclear energy must be expanded. Also, we should use shale, tar sands and North Sea oil. Lots of money will be needed for pure and applied research for renewable energy, which should come on stream by the middle 90’s and by the end of the century enable us to use solar, geothermal and nuclear energy more.

I foresee a situation in the next century when we may not wish to use hydrocarbons any more. I can envisage that in one or two decades scientists will say we are heating up the outer atmosphere of the globe, when it will not be tolerable for nations to do this—when there will be too much heat and too little water, as in the Sahel. There may be a time when we have enough bio-mass, coal and petroleum but will be told that we should not use it. We should back up our studies by looking ahead one or two decades into the next century.

If we cannot avoid egotistic national policies, there could be a monetary crisis, high unemployment, and starvation and hunger in the LDCs.

With respect to short term energy goals and measures, I dislike what we were given in the draft communiqué—with the energy section blank. We should stress that our aides should give us a draft communiqué especially on energy, and especially on targets which we can measure in terms of time, goals, periods of reference and how to group nations, individually or together. Our aides should list the different attitudes and attempt to get agreement in these fields. These should not be issues of national or individual prestige. Obviously, we will have to express the interests of our countries and should not hide the interests behind verbal compromise. National interests are often hidden by economic or academic reasoning.

Thatcher: It is impossible to discuss economic prospects without discussing energy prospects. We are one-half of the way through 1979, but the prospects for the world economy deteriorate month to month. We started the year with less exaggerated payments imbalances, and the prospect of currency stability. The oil situation seemed to be under control. Now the difference is oil, and this has also affected inflation. This sharp oil price increase has happened for the second time within a decade. It is a long and short term problem. All our ideas of growth must be revised. We cannot grow as much in the future as we had hoped. Also, the situation is worse for the LDCs—high prices, slow exports and we are less able to help them because of oil. This also means more instability.

The fact of our meeting means we can get guidelines and leadership to surmount difficulties. We must face these matters realistically, making clear what can and cannot be done. If we only have a communiqué with pious platitudes, the world will see that we have failed. We need positive declarations in the energy area in three spheres. We must deal with the immediate situation, but also come up with solutions which continue year after year, not just talk about long term. Nuclear power takes a long time to develop. We will not have power from the sun or tides before the end of the century.

On energy, we must let the price mechanism work in full. But we should not rely on this totally. We should also have tax incentives for insulation and for shifting to other sources. The UK gets 70 percent of its electricity from coal production and 15 percent from oil. We need more nuclear and must convince countries that nuclear is safe.

On inflation, we have had a reduction since 1974, but we will have more if we should accelerate inflation as a result of oil price increases. We should fight inflation or we will have increased unemployment. We should also not accelerate the impact of oil price increases with inflationary policies. The oil price increase means loss of incomes for the moment. We can’t get around this in the short term. On growth, we should not be too pessimistic. We need increased efficiency in industry, the consumer sector and agriculture. We should see the need for adjustment and respond to change. The UK has not always responded adequately to change but unless we do we can’t get growth.

If we are to achieve a balance of supply and demand in oil we must make OPEC understand that oil price increases jeopardize the Western world. We should look to increased nuclear production for the future. We produce oil but have the same interest in saving energy as others because we depend on the world economy. We should be realistic and not cloak measures in soft phrases. This would give the world greater confidence than by hiding what we mean.

Jenkins: We had a successful conclusion of the MTN in April and now we need full implementation.⁵ Our concerted growth strategy was fulfilled, and as a result there has been more rapid growth in countries other than the U.S. On the monetary side, the stabilization measures of the United States on November 1 and the EMS have been helpful.⁶

The least progress has been on North/South relations, but in the EC we have renewed the Lome Agreement with 57 LDCs⁷ (Schmidt:1/2 of all LDCs).

But all this has been overshadowed by what has happened in energy. Energy should be the Summit theme. In the short term, immediate prospects will be damaged by developments over the past six months in the oil field. It will increase inflation, which is already going up in our countries. The balance of payments costs will be $20 billion per year in the OECD as a whole, and it will lead to a cut in our growth prospects. One question is how far we add to these unpleasant but survivable problems. The oil market will balance itself over a period. But if we do not have effective restraints and substitutes, this will be an expensive way of doing it.

The long-term trends in oil prices are going up, and we can’t avoid oil price increases. But we should address the speed with which oil price increases take place. If they take place suddenly there will be a rapid transfer of resources away from us without an increase in demand by OPEC. Although we save energy through a high level of recession, the Schultze paper⁸ indicates that the cost of saving a barrel of oil through recession is $300 per barrel. The danger is that the market will stabilize only at very high prices, and there may in fact be an apparent glut on the oil market as a result. We need to change our lifestyles and produce alternative supplies. Effective voluntary restraints are an investment in our prosperity.

Clark: It is important that the understandings we reach be serious. They will help only if we are clear on the impact of our commitments to individual countries. We should set goals that can be achieved. If not, there will be skepticism about the process.

We must also be cognizant about the impact on international and domestic opinion. We should try to insure that our people will support us on unpopular policies by indicating the importance of such policies to our futures. We need to change attitudes toward conservation. We are a high energy using country. We need to look at the alternatives very carefully. For instance, acidic rain results from the burning of coal. A number of alternatives have environmental consequences.

The Summit should take account of different circumstances in our countries. We anticipate a shortfall in domestic production of crude and conventional sources of energy because of our declining well production over the next five years. But we will have significant production of non-traditional fuels after 1985. Also, there are major regional differences in Canada. There is wealth where there is energy but there is less wealth in energy importing areas. This limits the use of price in influencing demand. Our priority national goal in energy is self-sufficiency by 1990 through substituting for oil, natural gas and other sources. This effort can be helped by the Tokyo Summit communiqué.

Ohira: We coped with the oil situation last year, but we were naive on the Middle East. On long-term energy development, our emphasis was inadequate. We should be firm in coping with OPEC price increases and should seriously pursue long-term research in energy.

The impact of energy on our economic structure should be pointed out. But the big question is have we achieved results. Since the first oil price increase we have diminished the impact on payments imbalances and cooled off inflation, but unemployment and inflation are still with us. In improving productivity, we must make a major effort at positive adjustment—structural adjustment.

With respect to Japan we are undertaking fundamental changes in our lifestyle. Our trends are toward qualitative improvements with affluence. Since I took office I have tried to produce qualitative improvements in daily life bringing the country to the city and the benefits of the city to the country. I am also interested in discussing the circumstances of city life. We must take a look at our lifestyles in responding to the energy problem. We must also pay attention to relations with the developing countries and look at the global community.

[This section of the discussion concluded at 11:10, and a coffee break took place. The discussion resumed at 11:35.]⁹

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]

[Giscard:] Our economic growth rate is not tied to rates of oil consumption. There was a fixed relationship between growth and oil consumption. We have broken that tie. We now attain growth with alternate energy sources. We must invest in alternate energy resources. This will help on growth as well.

Andreotti: We need positive results from the Summit. Last year we succeeded in part. Countries with greater economic possibilities increased their growth rates and this helped other countries to grow. Italy will maintain its undertaking of 4% growth.

Today the oil problem and fear of inflation may lead to slower rates of growth in some countries. As a result we could find countries with high rates of unemployment in difficult positions. It is important to fight inflation but we should lay down a coordinated policy, as noted by Giscard. We should not have a deflationary policy, but a coordinated system directed to the struggle against unemployment, and this should be set out with more emphasis in the Communiqué. If we do not it will have political repercussions on public opinion in different countries. We should not extinguish the hopes of the Bonn Summit.

Jenkins: The oil price increase had two countervailing effects. It increased the cost/pull impact on inflation, and it led to a decline in demand. These are difficult to reconcile. We need to come up with a balance between the two to avoid both inflationary and deflationary effects. We might for instance consider separate price indices, with one in which the effect of energy price increases are not included. We could isolate energy costs in dealing with wage indexation in certain countries.

Carter: As a result of Bonn I directed oil price decontrol. It started on the first of June. Domestic oil prices as a result have been increased more rapidly than in other countries because of the price increase in our oil, and OPEC increases. I agree that statistics would look better if we took Roy Jenkins’ idea, but our people won’t permit our trying to prevent energy costs from being incorporated in wage demands. We have focussed on energy with some degree of success. We have made much progress in 2½ years. Before 1973 for every 1% increase in GNP we had a 1.05 increase in energy use. Since 1973 that figure has been .37%. We have had a less than 50% increase in oil use as compared to GNP.

We also need to get at the roots of inflation. We have deregulated the airline industry and we are moving on transportation. We have modified our tax structure to encourage new investment and improve depreciation allowances. I am concerned about productivity improvement. More effort here is needed.

As a result of the MTN we reduced protection at home and have encouraged increased R&D in the government and have called for private industry to do the same.

Close cooperation among us is important. The issue is how to deal with energy. Premature media exposure of our views might reduce our flexibility and our ability to accommodate one another at this Summit. I still think we should emphasize specificity even if it means that each country spells out specifically what it can do and we are all locked into the same formula.

U.S. oil production is declining. Our oil wells are old and we have to use a great deal of tertiary recovery. Over the last 15 years we have had a 6% annual reduction in domestic oil production.

In our Communiqué we should be specific and substantive, because the world is looking to us to do something specific on energy. There is no substitute for this. I look forward to getting drafts from our personal representatives. I’ll go the second mile to accommodate my needs to yours. I must go home with the proof that others are sacrificing in order to get the American people to do the same. We should not have recriminations about performance based on lack of information on the circumstances in each country. It is easier politically to deal with energy if a country is almost entirely a consumer. It is more difficult if the country is sharply divided among producer and consumer regions. I was struck here by Joe Clark’s point. Canada, like the US, is not a homogeneous region. Some regions depend on imports and others on exports. We should understand the circumstances of one another. This meeting will be an abject failure if we do not accommodate present divergencies of views about energy.

Ohira: Two or three countries alone can’t do the job. We expect the United States to curb inflation, but inflation is serious in other countries as well. Therefore we must minimize inflation in all of our countries. All of us need a maximum effort to curb inflation. In FY’78 Japan’s domestic demand will grow at 8.5%. Our current account surplus will be $12 to $14 billion, although since March we have had a current account deficit. In the last three months we have had a $700 million deficit. Therefore in terms of GNP growth we could not reach the Bonn target although our growth served the purpose of the Bonn target.

The second oil crisis is tragic. In April and May we have had a 20% increase in the wholesale price index in annual terms. Clearly inflation is an important agenda item. It is important to remedy the supply side. Each should take major steps. We are now out of the period of post-war technology and we are at the end of a certain pool of technological resources. We need more R&D and greater technical efforts.

Ohira: Our session is about over. Each country can now brief the press as it sees fit.

Schmidt: Why don’t we do as we did last time and let you brief the press, Mr. Prime Minister.

First session ended 12:40 pm.

Second Session

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]

Ohira: Let us now turn to energy.

Schmidt: Let us now try to settle the energy issues now under dispute.

Thatcher: I have questions on paragraph 6.6 on the International Coal Advisory Board.¹⁰

Giscard: We are prepared to substitute a French text for 6.2.

Ohira: We will take up the German text as the basis for proceeding.

Carter: Have the special representatives already begun working on a draft? Was the U.S. draft also being used?

Ohira: I have received from our personal representatives a request. They want us to discuss the Communiqué language on import restraints. I believe that Option 1 contains a paragraph which we should consider at this point.

Giscard: To clarify the matter, in a few moments we will have a draft on 6.2 of the German text on limiting oil imports. I asked our people to prepare that after lunch. We will receive it in a few minutes.

Ohira: What I want to say is that our personal representatives are now starting to draft 6.2 in the German draft. They want to know whether we support Options 1 or 2. They would like to make a draft after hearing our guidance.

Clark: I understand from President Giscard that his delegation is drafting language to take the place of Options 1 and 2. We will have this soon. I would like to wait for the draft rather than modify these options.

Ohira: I now understand. Let’s wait for the French proposal.

Carter: Valery. Is there a specific reason for choosing 1978 as a base as opposed to 1979? If we could all choose 1979, or I could agree to 1977, we would remove confusion and distrust between the two groups.

Giscard: We can agree that in the text we can have just 1979.

Carter: If we could use 1979 it would eliminate confusion.

Ohira: 1979 is alright.

Clark: I have no difficulty with 1979.

Andreotti: I would like to wait until we get the French text.

Clark: I would like our personal representatives to consider options to add explanations on specific figures. We, for instance, have a short-fall in production and I would like it to be in the Communiqué.

Ohira: The Option most suitable to me is Option 1. We should give these to the personal representatives and ask them to report to us later.

Carter: The French draft is satisfactory to the U.S. I would like to fill in our figures which we accept as a goal for 1985. We can say less than the 1977 figure. Each can have footnotes as requested. The text is satisfactory.

Ohira: On the spot market issue, we should give this to our personal representatives to discuss. The representatives should review the Japanese text and all three texts.

Jenkins: We need to modify the texts somewhat. The Summit countries will specify how each country’s contribution can be met. But we need to discuss this with our other Community countries. This should be edited by the personal representatives.

Schmidt: I am not sure whether we are proceeding correctly. I take it you are not intending to instruct our personal representatives to prepare a paper on this issue based on the two alternatives. I don’t think there is any sense in letting the personal representatives work with no instructions. One block has been filled in by the American President.

Carter: I will give you a figure less than 1977.

Schmidt: The personal representatives will be left in the dark. There is no use to shift the paper to the personal representatives. The whole second paragraph needs general footnotes if we are to urge other countries to set single objectives for themselves. We proceed on the basis that such goals will be effective and that we will take efforts to reach these figures. But we must take into account different patterns of supply. Just setting a figure is ridiculous and will not impress economists or politicians.

There was the question of the dates. Jimmy Carter prefers 1979 but will also accept 1977. 1979 is a dangerous basis to start from because we will not have an actual figure for 1979, although we might have a projected figure for 1979. We have to use a complete year such as 1978, 1977 or 1973. I prefer 1973 because that is the year I started to conserve.

Of course, I know Jimmy can’t do that, nor can Canada. I ask what is the purpose of putting us into a strait-jacket? We can’t refer to a period not yet complete. We could refer to a period of the past but not a period not complete. I could accept 1979 or 1978 but what figure would you put for 1979?

Carter: I understand that in 1979 your imports will not exceed 1978. For 1977 U.S. imports were 8.6 million b/d. For 1979 they will be 8.5 million b/d. Both are a good basis and are okay with me. For the EC it was agreed to use 1978. Can we change the basis so that we have a common basis? If so we can accept 1977 or 1979. We could accept 1978 for the EC as a compromise.

Jenkins: We can accept 1978. It would be difficult to accept 1977.

Giscard: We could take 1978 for the EC with the U.S. having another reference year if 1978 is not representative.

Carter: Can Japan and Canada accept 1977?

Ohira: 1977 is desirable but we will settle for 1978.

Thatcher: Let’s look at the draft presented in Option 1. It was difficult for us to get a similar base year. It is better to get Option 1 than to reiterate the results of Canada, Japan and the U.S. We should ask our personal representatives to consider Option 1 and to give us square brackets tomorrow. But I am not sure that would help anyone. I am worried about what we say to the press.

Clark: 1977 or 1978 are acceptable to Canada. It would be helpful if we opt for one base year. The personal representatives could ask other EC countries what they think. We could press for one base year that is the same in all cases.

Thatcher: Some personal representatives do not know which draft they are supposed to be working on. One half are working on one draft and one half are working on another. We should send back more energy drafts to the personal representatives and ask them to look at Options 1 and 2. I think Option 1 should be chosen. We should probably discuss the French proposal rather than discuss Option 1. I am interested in the French draft. All these issues should be subject to discussion.

Ohira: On the spot market we should send the German proposal to the personal representatives meeting.

Thatcher: We have had some consultations with the Americans on where we stand. Let me see if I can make it clear. There is a Japanese draft which has everything but energy. There is a German draft for details with the energy issue. And there is a French draft which deals with the oil import part of the energy issue.

Carter: You have that right, I think.

Thatcher: I am still concerned about what we say to the press. We need agreement about what to say. Should we say the discussion on energy continued and nothing else? Also the Prime Minister of Japan can speak on refugees.

Giscard: It would be useful if the energy ministers could give some indication to the personal representatives as to what we discussed here. The ministers and our notetakers can pass on the essentials of what we said to our personal representatives.

Thatcher: Will we get a clear text tomorrow?

Ohira: On the oil import question we will give you a text on Option 1 but we will ask our personal representatives to boil it down. They will also consider the German proposal on the spot market. They will report to us tomorrow morning.

I apologize for the inadvertencies. We will ask our personal representatives to work. Our notetakers will work with them. I hope our Ministers can also help. I know they will all do good work.

At 7:30 there is a banquet in the Imperial Palace. We will meet tomorrow at 9:30 am.

Third Session—9:50 a.m.

Ohira: You all have the communiqué language in front of you. There have been some fluid developments in the area of petroleum at the last minute as a result of the OPEC decisions.¹¹ We need to address the communiqué now to give our officials guidance. I would ask our notetakers to meet with their colleagues immediately after the session to bring the communiqué into line with our discussions here. The key issue is the level of import restraint on page 2.

Carter: The level of import restraint is crucial. We saw that OPEC dealt us a blow yesterday. We need a strategy which involves a commitment on oil market restraints. We are prepared to accept such restraints. I strongly request others to do so for 1979 and 1980. I would hope that the EC countries would accept specific national targets. And we should have goals for 1985, Mrs. Thatcher agreed yesterday. I hope we can carry these out without hesitancy. We should not have figures that apply to groups but to individual countries. We are prepared to commit ourselves in 1985 to the goal of 8.5 million barrels of oil per day. This is our 1977 level, and what we are committed to do in 1979.

Clark: I understand from our officials that we are being given a redraft of the first full section on page 2—a UK draft.

Lambsdorff: We can go along with the need for strong wording. But imports are only one-half of the problem. Consumption is another major part of the problem. We can accept the amendment to page 2, taking into account the position of other EC countries. [The amendment reads: “France, Germany, Italy, and the UK have agreed to recommend to their Community partners that each member country’s contribution towards these annual levels will be specified.”]¹²

Jenkins: I can confirm what Lambsdorff said. The new language is acceptable to the EC as a whole.

Clark: Does the word “member” refer only to Summit members?

Jenkins: No, all EC members.

Giscard: I can accept modification of the text at the top of page 2. On the bottom, can we get figures on alternatives. I would suggest, “The seven express their will to adopt as a maximum goal for oil imports in 1985 the 1978 figure for France, the FRG, Italy and the UK, and the average 1977–78–79 figure for the U.S., Japan and Canada. The 1985 goals will be seen as references to monitor the development of alternative sources of energy.”

Carter: I prefer the year 1977. I would also say “. . . as references to monitor conservation and the development of alternative sources of energy.”

Lambsdorff: Would you like to include 1977 for the U.S., Japan, Canada and the EC as well?

Clark: The French proposal causes us difficulties. We will have a production slump. Import levels will be higher in 1985 than for the 1977–78–79 period. Thus, we cannot accept the statement as phrased by the President of France.

Ohira: Circumstances for Japan make it difficult to accept this suggestion. We are making conservation efforts. But for us to specify targets for consumption would involve difficulties for Japan. In calculating growth, we cannot estimate year to year, and cannot estimate 1985.

Lambsdorff: We have now jumped from the top to the bottom of page 2. We need the language in brackets out.

Clark: We can accept 1979–80 figures. We should remove the brackets. We are prepared to commit to targets for 1985 at levels below projected increases. But Alberta supplies have declined. Our reliance on world markets will increase because of declining domestic supplies. We will reduce significantly the rate of import increase needed to make up the shortfall. We can reduce to one percent on the average our annual growth of oil consumption. We can reduce oil imports by 50 thousand barrels per day from projected levels. We could put this on the bottom of the first paragraph on page 2. It would read “Canada, whose oil production will be declining, will reduce imports by 50 thousand barrels by 1985 below what they would have been.”

Lambsdorff: Will Japan accept a statement like those accepted by the U.S. and Canada?

Ohira: Japan can accept the bracketed language with respect to number 2. [Canada, Japan and the U.S. will each achieve adjusted import levels to which they are pledged in the IEA for 1979, will maintain their imports in 1980 at a level not higher than those in 1979 levels, and will be monitoring this.]¹³ On point 3, Canada and the US can put in a figure for 1985, but for Japan it is impossible to give a figure.

Schmidt: I have not responded to your remarks. We should say we welcome the inclusion of the words which President Carter mentioned: “1985 goals will seek to refer to conservation and the development of new technologies.”

Carter: I am reluctant to make matters more complicated. But the establishment of a tangible 1985 goal is the most important part of the communiqué. It is done with the important understanding that goals will be reassessed on a periodic basis. If the goals are too stringent they can be modified without embarrassment. If all nations set goals and Japan is the only nation not willing to establish specific goals that would be a serious matter to explain. I urge Japan to draft specific targets which you believe you can meet, with the understanding that these can be reassessed and modified on the basis of experience.

Giscard: I noted that Jimmy Carter’s amendment was accepted by all. We can accept the figures suggested by the EC. We also have the figure of 8.5 by the US and Canada will give a figure. If these countries can put in figures, people will expect figures for Japan. It is difficult to accept that Japan cannot set a ceiling for oil imports. We do have a provision for adjustment. It is better for Japan to give a figure which could be adjusted on an annual basis.

Clark: The figure for Canada will be 600 thousand barrels per day for the period of 1985. On Japan’s problem, when we look at the language it strikes us that in English there is a significant difference in implication between target and goal. We can accept the word “goal,” which should allow Japan a greater sense of latitude. There is further latitude in the year by year basis of examining the target.

Jenkins: Is the Canadian figure 600 thousand barrels per day?

Clark: Yes.

Ohira: On targets for import reduction for 1985 Japan is isolated. I apologize for the situation. We are discussing the matter in haste. I suggest we discuss paragraph 3. Japan will finish its study on this position.

Lambsdorff: Are we accepting the French proposal to have a last sentence which reads “a high level group of seven within the OECD will monitor the results achieved” and “the 1985 goal will serve as a reference to monitor commitment to development of new sources of energy.”?

Clark: If there is flexibility on the base, the French draft is acceptable to us. We can accept OECD monitoring.

Carter: The U.S. accepts a goal for the 1985 import level not to exceed levels of either 1977 or the adjusted target for 1979, i.e., 8.5 million barrels per day. I assume we also accept monitoring of both energy conservation and the development of alternative energy sources.

Giscard: We are now engaging in a technical discussion of the draft. We are all agreed in principle. At this point, we should refer the draft to the economic ministers. They will put in a U.S. figure and look at the Japanese figure. If we do not do this we are wasting time.

Schmidt: On alternative sources, which ones are we talking about and which organizations? Three countries here have oil, shale and tar sands. How long will it take to develop them or to get supplies or the help of coal?

Carter: This commitment could be monitored by the OECD or the EC.

Schmidt: I cannot place my country under a non-sovereign body.

Carter: The EC agreed to let the Community monitor its target. We should try to strengthen the monitoring effort. We can give the duties to the IEA or someone else. Otherwise we will have no way of monitoring what we are doing.

Schmidt: I have no difficulty in submitting figures to an international organization. But the French proposal says “monitor.”

Giscard: Perhaps we can say “review.”

Carter: There are lots of congratulations of the EC in this communiqué. Can’t we limit EC congratulations to one and we will also agree not to be congratulated.

Thatcher: The communiqué should refer to product and not crude. The transparency of the European Community goes to the product, not the crude. They are two different markets.

Jenkins: That is right.

Thatcher: I doubt we can make the crude market transparent. I also would change the paragraph which says “we will require that at the time of unloading crude cargoes documents be presented indicating the purchase price as certified by the producer country.” We cannot require.

Jenkins: I appreciate your desire that there not be too much congratulations for the EC. If we take out the EC proposal the paragraph hangs in the air. Perhaps we can say we note the actions of the EC.

Giscard: It is important that all seven accept the EC program and then we can delete EC. Let’s say, “We agree to to take steps to bring into the open the working of oil markets by setting up a register of international oil transactions.”

Clark: I have not seen the details of the EC proposal. The communiqué language is preferable. It refers to a section of the scheme in place.

Ohira: About the brackets, “We will require that at the time of unloading crude cargoes documents be presented indicating the purchase price as certified by the producer country.”

Carter: No objection, I can accept the brackets.

Thatcher: The word “require” means new legislation and enormous bureaucracy.

Giscard: We should say we will consider a device such as this.

Thatcher: We can accept “we are considering the feasibility of requiring.”

Lambsdorff: I accept Mrs. Thatcher’s suggestion.

Andreotti: When we accepted this sort of language in the EC, we stressed the wish to control the oil market. If we do not make commitments here, we are taking a step back from the EC. Countries could get information on this from their customs authorities. If we only have a commitment to examine, the oil companies will be left with power.

Clark: I share the reluctance to come to a conclusion at this table. We should say we are considering the feasibility of requiring that.

Thatcher: I agree. Let’s find the facts first. I can’t agree here to introduce legislation.

Jenkins: We are not taking a step back from what was decided. This only emerged last night.

Thatcher: I accept the Clark modification.

Giscard: I find myself closer to Andreotti. There are documents with the origin and the purchase price of the cargo. Oil is not sailing around the world anonymously. The market should not be cloaked in secrecy. We should seek to instruct our ministers to set this system up.

Thatcher: We need to study this first. We cannot require, we can have a feasibility study but we cannot require.

Giscard: OK. I accept.

Andreotti: If we say we study the feasibility it seems to me this is a statement with no guts. We should have studied it earlier instead of saying “consider the feasibility of requiring . . .”

Lambsdorff: I can accept the Canadian language as modified.

Ohira: Then there is agreement on the proposal “we will consider the feasibility of requiring . . .”. In the next set of brackets we have “We will likewise seek to achieve better information on the profit situation of oil companies and on the use of the funds available to these companies.”

Lambsdorff: I would like to remove the brackets.

Ohira: If there are no objections, the sentence stays in and the brackets are removed.

Carter: I cannot accept the first sentence of the language on page 3, “We will seek to eliminate actions that might put upward pressure on oil prices . . .” Some of our laws provide subsidies.

Lambsdorff: We want to resist what happened in the past and prevent new action. We are under pressure to take new actions and want some strength to resist those pressures.

Schlesinger: We have by recent actions reduced the subsidy on crude oil while increasing the subsidy on distillate.¹⁴ We will minimize the impact of our subsidy on world oil prices.

Schmidt: I understand U.S. laws. That is not the issue. It is domestic. My government is under pressure from our own party to introduce new heating oil subsidies. We see this as counterproductive. We hope for additional leverage to tell Parliament that new subsidies are not on just now. We need additional language against subsidies.

Carter: We can say we will avoid new subsidies. This is to deal with the Congress.

Schmidt: I understand the problem. We have a Parliament too.

Giscard: I support the Carter text.

Lambsdorff: On the nuclear issue I would like to include the second and fourth sentences: “Without the development of nuclear energy in the coming decades, economic growth will be hard to achieve.” And “This must be done under conditions guaranteeing our peoples safety.”

Giscard: I agree with the Germans.

Schmidt: Then the text will read “We need . . .”, “Without development of nuclear energy . . .”, “This must be done . . .”

Carter: We can accept this except that I would prefer the language, “Expansion of nuclear generating capacity” rather than “the development of nuclear capacity.”

Thatcher: There seems to be a lot of new institutions in this Communiqué. What is this Coal Board? These seem to be quangos—quasi autonomous non-government organizations. It is an American expression I think. This Coal Board is a quango. I am against it.

Schmidt: What is behind this?

Schlesinger: This sentence expresses support for the International Coal Advisory Board which is presently in train in the IEA to expand the use of coal. It is already in the IEA.

Thatcher: I might accept it, but that doesn’t mean I support it.

Clark: I have no strong views. I share Mrs. Thatcher’s desire to avoid a proliferation of international agencies. I would be happy to eliminate it.

Carter: Okay to delete it.

Clark: On paragraph 3, coal “exports” are only one-half of the problem. There must be a pledge not to interrupt coal trade under long-term contracts. On the issue of a national emergency, why don’t we say countries “pledge not to interrupt coal ‘trade’ under long-term contracts unless required to do so by reason of overriding national interests.”

Lambsdorff: Australia and New Zealand need the words “national emergency” for constitutional reasons. Besides, “national interest” could be economic, and be less than a national emergency.

Clark: I can accept national emergency but would like to have the word “trade”.

Carter: That’s okay with me. There are two things the Summit ought to achieve. Greater specificity regarding reductions of imports and promotion of the development of new energy sources. On page 5 we should be as strong as possible on these commitments. I favor the bracketed language on new energy technologies which says “We will insure that these resources are made available.”

Schmidt: I would like to second President Carter’s proposal and remove the brackets.

Giscard: I can accept the text and Jimmy Carter’s addition.

Carter: We want to use the bracketed language “appropriate international organizations” to include the IEA.

Giscard: Why do we have to say this? It might refer to anything. I do not just want to link this to other organizations. Besides the IEA is within the OECD.

Carter: The IETG could also consult with the World Bank on loans for instance.

Giscard: We should indicate what framework we are thinking of. I am thinking in terms of the OECD.

Clark: Is this not just a review and a reporting function? It will not imply a commitment of action as to what will follow.

Thatcher: That is also my understanding—only a report.

Carter: Why don’t we say OECD, IEA and other appropriate organizations?

Giscard: That is okay. In the OPEC Communiqué there is an unflattering reference to dialogue with other countries.¹⁵ In view of this we should delete “We hope these countries will participate in a continuous exchange of views on energy matters as well as other matters . . .” which implies that we are seeking a dialogue with OPEC. We can just keep the last sentence which reads “We remain ready to examine with oil exporting countries . . .”

Andreotti: President Giscard has the correct approach but we should add something on LDCs.

Schmidt: This requires a political discussion. OPEC’s second paragraph has some abusive language as regards relations between industrial and developing countries. It accuses us of failure to live up to our responsibilities to the Third World. The developing countries are aware that OPEC’s price actions are harmful to their development. Let me give you some figures: Brazil before 1973 used 10% of its total export earnings to pay for oil imports. Now it uses 40% of its export earnings.

In 1973 Turkey used 30% of its export earnings to pay for oil. Today it uses 100%. Many other countries like India face the same problem. Even if we could double our aid we could not offset this. We cannot keep silent any longer. As a matter of grand strategy we cannot keep our mouths shut and be quiet about this. We should not keep silent.

Giscard: This is a political question. We should let the Foreign Ministers look at the text. This should be revised. We can’t have cooperation after OPEC has turned us down in such clear terms. We should also re-draft the North/South section in light of OPEC’s price changes and other appropriate paragraphs.

Carter: I agree that we need to respond to the international abuse of the LDCs and ourselves by the OPEC price increase. There has been a 60% increase since December. This could go up 40–50% more by the end of the year. They have been encouraged by the timidity coming from us and others by our lack of response in the past. The trouble in the past was that it was difficult for single nations to speak out against OPEC. If one does it alone it could be subject to blackmail by OPEC, for example threats of withdrawal of funds. This is a propitious time to instruct our Foreign Ministers to work on our position on the matter. We won’t have another chance. We will be vulnerable if we act unilaterally. We should let the Foreign Ministers draft the strongest possible statement on OPEC. It is time to draw the line.

Schmidt: We should indicate that we are aware of different attitudes in different OPEC countries.

Carter: Good.

Giscard: In the Foreign Ministers’ text we should reflect our awareness of the concern by certain countries for international economic stability. All will understand what that means.

Clark: In the environment paragraph on page 4 we should add sulphur oxide.

Giscard: We should ask our Energy Ministers to look at the oil imports for 1985. Our Ministers for Foreign Affairs should clear up other aspects of the text indicating concern for our economies and LDCs.

Lambsdorff: A Japanese number is a pre-condition.

Giscard: If there is no number, let’s leave a blank line which can be filled in as soon as Japan gives its 1985 target.

Schmidt: I have some second thoughts on the spot market section. We should indicate that we urge not only oil companies but also oil exporting countries to moderate spot market transactions.

Ohira: I agree with Chancellor Schmidt. We agree to add oil exporting countries.

[The Third Session concluded at 12:05 pm. Energy Ministers, personal representatives and notetakers adjourned to prepare the last draft of the Communiqué section on energy.]¹⁶

Fourth Session

Began at 2:50 p.m.

Ohira: Our experts have been working on the energy section and it should arrive here any moment. In the meantime, let me read the section on OPEC: “We deplore the decisions taken by the recent OPEC Conference. We recognize that relative moderation was displayed by certain of the participants. But the rise in oil prices nevertheless agreed are bound to have very serious economic and social consequences. They mean more unemployment, more balance of payments difficulties and will endanger stability in developed and developing countries of the world alike.”

Carter: I would like to strengthen by adding a word. “Unwarranted” in front of “rises”. Also, why not add the phrase “worldwide inflation and less growth.”

Lambsdorff: I accept this.

Ohira: Then we have agreed to President Carter’s suggestion.

Giscard: I would suggest deleting the word “nevertheless” before the last sentence and simply say “we will remain ready . . .”

Andreotti: I would suggest that we say what the aim of our commitment at Bonn was, in the macro-economic section.

Lambsdorff: That was already mentioned earlier.

Clark: In the sentence on administrative action, I can live with the word “minimize”.

Lambsdorff: Why don’t we say “we will seek to minimize and finally eliminate administrative actions that might put upward pressure on oil prices that result from domestic under-pricing of oil and to avoid new subsidies which would have the same effect.”

Ohira: Finally, we need to address the level of Japan’s import targets for 1985. Here’s what we can say. “Japan adopts as a 1985 target a level not to exceed the range between 6.3 and 6.9 million barrels a day. Japan will review this target periodically and make it more precise in light of current developments and growth projections and do their utmost to reduce oil imports through conservation, rationalization of use and intensive development of alternative energy sources.”

Carter: That is a good figure. I congratulate you on making this decision in the proper spirit of this Summit conference.

Giscard: It is important that Japan has been able to produce this figure. It is a good commitment to the success of this meeting. Your proposal can be accepted by France, but I would like you to say that Japan will direct its efforts to the bottom end of the range through the development of alternative energy resources.

Schmidt: I join Jimmy and Valery in expressing gratitude for your decision.

Andreotti: The agreement by Italy to the energy section was in the context of the overall EC number. I would like a line to be put in which says that the Community countries are taking their commitment “in the overall context of the EC” or “within a framework of the overall goals of the EC.”

Jenkins: I can understand the intention of the Italian Prime Minister and Italy’s point of view. We could not have a position which prejudices the interests of the other five countries.

Carter: I do not understand the point Roy Jenkins was making.

Jenkins: I was saying that we could deal with this issue at the Dublin meeting.¹⁷

Andreotti: That is not satisfactory.

Giscard: We can put in a French, U.K., FRG but not an Italian figure. If Andreotti does not want to be tied down here he can take Italy out and put Italy into the EC as a whole.

Thatcher: Why don’t we say that “France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. will make their contribution within the overall EC agreement to keep the 1985 figures no higher than the 1978 figures.”

Carter: That is moving away from specificity. It goes against all we have been doing here.

Thatcher: I am following up Andreotti’s point. The paragraph on France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. is not agreed by Andreotti. The EC Agreement is a total agreement.

Giscard: There is only one country that has not made a commitment. We have an American, a Canadian and a Japanese commitment. Now we are backpedaling. We are weakening the text. The fact that we say we will not import more in 1985 does not mean that within the EC we are going to arrive at 1978 ceilings. We are saying France, Germany and Italy will not go beyond 1978 levels. The only problem is Italy. Germany and UK and France will accept 1978 ceilings; Italy will probably go beyond it. That is Italy’s problem. France, Germany and the UK can agree not to go beyond the 1978 figure. We can say that France, Germany the U.K. and the EC will not go beyond the 1978 figures. Then we will not count Italy. This will enable us to negotiate within the EC’s ceiling levels. We will say we are entering into a commitment not to ask for more than the 1978 figure. We can delete Italy and replace it by the EC as a whole.

Carter: That is acceptable to us.

Andreotti: In terms of classification we are thus neither fish nor fowl. Since we are in the same condition as Japan on oil we should be entitled to the same increase as Japan. The same conditions should lead to equality of commitment.

Giscard: We can’t decide for our partners. We can’t give one partner a favored position. We can’t say when we share within the 1978 figure Italy will be in a preferred position. We can’t decide what Italy will be. The only way we can do this is to eliminate reference to Italy and refer to the EC commitment among nine major countries. We can’t decide on one without the other. Let’s not single out Italy and put it in the EC ceiling.

Andreotti: I am not asking for privilege. You can’t ask us to commit to accept the 1978 ceiling today without discussing the matter within the EC. Either we accept Mrs. Thatcher’s proposal, or we say in a footnote that our commitment will be made in the EC.

Jenkins: In the view of what was said by Mrs. Thatcher we can say that France, Germany, Italy and the UK will make their contribution within the overall EC contribution to keep 1985 imports within the 1978 level. Germany, France and the UK will be able to state that they will be able to keep their imports below the figures of 1978.

Carter: I accept President Giscard’s formulation.

Andreotti: We could have a note which would state that as far as Italy is concerned that the commitment as to the 1978 reference is accepted within the overall context of the EC.

Carter: I agree with that. The question of the next meeting needs to be addressed. When and where?

Andreotti: I would like to invite all of you to Venice in June of 1980.

Schmidt: I agree to Andreotti’s invitation which I am told will be on the Isle of San Giorgio. It is desirable that we should get together once a year to examine the economic situation of the world. If we are not intimately in touch on economic questions we might fall into the pits of egotistical economic policy. The danger is great. These kinds of meetings are healthy. I want to also thank our Japanese hosts for their kind hospitality.

Giscard: I want to thank Japan for its commitment to reduce imports of oil. I also accept Prime Minister Andreotti’s invitation, although I think that the next meeting should be for one week if it is on San Giorgio.

After an exchange of pleasantries, and thanks to Prime Minister Ohira, the meeting concluded.¹⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, International Economics File, Box 31, Rutherford Poats File, Summit: Tokyo, 6/28–30/79. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hormats who signed at the end of the list of participants. The full text of the minutes and other documentation on the Summit is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume III, Foreign Economic Policy. President Carter’s personal account of the Summit is in White House Diary, pp. 335–337.
2. See Document 157.
3. See Document 88.
4. The energy portion of the published conclusions of the European Council, which met in Strasbourg June 21–22, was transmitted in telegram 143 from Strasbourg, June 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D790282–0928) The Embassy in Brussels commented: “The European Council in Strasbourg outlined a broad Community approach to current energy crisis but fell short of adopting French proposal for price control in the spot market and annual country-by-country oil import reduction targets. Belgium and Italy tended, in general terms, to support the French line in the Council, while the FRG and the UK, generally supported by the Netherlands and Denmark, were largely successful in watering down the French proposals.” (Telegram 11381 from Brussels, June 22; ibid., D790283–0014)
5. The Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations ended in September.
6. On November 1, Carter and Blumenthal announced measures to strengthen the dollar. The European Monetary System aimed to maintain stable exchange rates within the EC.
7. See footnote 8, Document 88.
8. Not found.
9. Brackets in the original.
10. The participants are continuing their discussion of the communiqué language.
11. See footnote 3, Document 220.
12. Brackets in the original.
13. Brackets in the original.
14. See footnote 2, Document 214.
15. The OPEC communiqué reads in part: “[The conference] took note of proposals for a dialogue between OPEC and industrialized countries. Some of these proposals, however, seem to suggest that a meaningful dialogue can be carried out only on energy matters in isolation of other global, economical and structural problems.” The communiqué continued that the conference wanted to “restate its categorical rejection” of any dialogue that did not address “problems of development, the acquisition of advanced technology, the financial and monetary reforms, world trade and raw materials, along with the various aspects of the energy problem.”
16. Brackets in the original.
17. The EC was scheduled to convene in Dublin in November.
18. Regarding energy, the final declaration issued at the end of the Summit specified individual country goals for ceilings on oil imports in 1985 (the U.S. goal was 8.5 million barrels per day); pledged to increase the use of coal as much as possible and expand alternative sources of energy, including nuclear energy; and deplored the recent OPEC decision to raise oil prices. For the full text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1979, pp. 1197–1201.