95. Telegram From the Embassy in Bulgaria to the Department of State1
2607. Subject: Questions About Bulgaria.
1. S-entire text.
2. What follows is an attempt, as I end my first year in Sofia, to set down the most important current questions about Bulgaria, from the viewpoint of American interests, and to give my frankest answers.
3. First, how solid is Bulgarian loyalty to Moscow?
4. Very solid. I see no sign of important change on the horizon, in this respect. By and large, the relationship works well for Bulgaria’s leaders, and the people accept it more readily than any other people in Eastern Europe.2 Nevertheless it is good to remember that no relationship is eternal, that Bulgarians are less attached to Russia than is commonly supposed, and that there are strains in the relationship (e.g. on economic issues, on Soviet policy towards other East European countries, on defense spending, on some foreign policy issues such as Bulgaria’s Balkan policy) which could grow with time. And I do not believe the Soviets have any infallible, ironclad system of keeping Bulgaria loyal. Still, it would be wishful thinking to expect any early deviation from the familiar pattern of loyalty to Moscow, and I expect this pattern to continue for years.
5. Second, how secure is Zhivkov’s position?
6. Very secure. He seems in excellent health, in full vigor, and benefits now from very long experience. In particular, he is senior enough and canny enough to cope with any changes in the Kremlin. (He seems to be in the process of decorating each Soviet Politburo member, one by one, and observers here say his bets are placed on all possible winners in the succession sweepstakes.) I am not aware of the existence of meaningful opposition factions, although Lilov seems a [Page 281] strong number two and a potential successor. The younger men in the leadership seem able, relatively flexible, often well qualified technically (especially the economists), and of course quite loyal to Zhivkov. There may be some personnel changes at the April Party Congress, but I would be surprised to see any major change in policy or direction. I think Zhivkov has shaped a system he can control—and can control the country with—until he dies or is incapacitated. So far I see no thought given to a succession.
7. Third, how well will the economy function in the next five years?
8. Not badly, as far as overall growth is concerned, and probably better comparatively than most of the countries of Eastern Europe. This is a guess by a non-economist, but the leaders have several things going for them: (a) Starting from such a low base in 1944, the Communist regime has been able to keep standards of living gradually rising to the general (repeat general) satisfaction. This should continue, although there are pockets of dissatisfaction. (b) Bulgarians are by and large an accepting people, not rebellious, and in their Balkan way they manage to get by all right even if supplies are limited and quality is low: they grumble, but they carry on. (c) The planners are using their heads. The Bulgarian new economic mechanism, somewhat like its Hungarian namesake, has aspects of rationality which may take some of the edge off the “Soviet model” insofar as Bulgaria is concerned. (d) Agriculture seems to be working tolerably well, although distribution is lousy. (e) There is enough corruption around—hard currency stores, winking at illegal currency exchanges, bribes, semi-accepted ways of beating the system—that almost everyone is coopted into the system by being engaged in beating it. (f) By toning down their desires for all-round industrialization, and accepting specialization within CEMA, the Bulgarians strike me as showing signs (in contrast to, say, Romania) of living within their means. Now all of the above could go sour, and I am not saying there will not be difficulties. In fact the rising price of oil, and the need for the USSR to continue to favor Bulgaria in providing raw materials, is a fruitful field for disappointment and possible friction with Russia. But in contrast to Czechoslovakia and Poland, where any growth rate at all seems to be a pretty big deal nowadays, the Bulgarians—a small country, only very recently industrialized—has some hope of meeting its goals without undue strain.
9. Fourth, how secure is the Party’s position? Are there any alternative centers of power?
10. With Moscow’s continued support, and ruling out unexpected disaster such as a real economic failure, I believe Party control is quite firm. I do not believe the Communist regime has very deep roots into the populace, however; many if not most Bulgarians accept their rulers precisely to the extent that they have a personal stake in the system. It [Page 282] is well to remember that while Russia always enjoyed great popularity among the Bulgarian people, the country was in the Austro-Hungarian or German sphere of influence for a good part of its history since 1878, and the people overwhelmingly accepted alliance with Germany in the two World Wars. In Czechoslovakia, I felt that the Czechs were a Western people being held prisoner by the East; in Bulgaria, I feel that the Bulgarians are a Balkan people who would swing with the wind if Moscow ever loosened its hold. But so long as Moscow’s hold is secure, the position of the Communists is also secure. As for alternative centers of power, there are none now in existence to compare with the Catholic Church in Poland, or with the potential for independence among workers in Poland or Hungary. On the other hand, there is not the fell hand of enforced uniformity that I gather one feels in Romania. The Orthodox Church is used by the regime, but its independent existence keeps some thoughts alive of alternatives to Communist rule. Even the puppet Agrarian Party serves something of the same purpose. I suppose the answer is that if events ever loosened the Party’s hold even somewhat, then the inclinations of the Bulgarians of pluralism would rapidly grow and spread. In this sense—and in the sense that it rules without the consent of the governed—the position of the Communist Party here is firm, but fragile.
11. Fifth, how sound is the society?
12. I see a great deal of sickness, and hypocrisy, and disillusion. In contrast to Prague, where I felt making the best of a fairly bad deal, but they do not believe in the system or in their part in it. Corruption is widespread, and cuts deeply. High living by the big shots is widely known and resented. The workers are to a large extent bought off, because—in a country which has largely industrialized itself over the last thirty years—they have privileges, and their pay is comparatively good. A huge proportion of this country moved to the towns and cities since 1944, and whatever the shortcomings, they are finding life one hell of a lot better than it was in a Balkan village before. As for the intellectuals, they are also bought out by being treated well by the regime—Zhivkov has been very clever at this—so that any potential dissident is usually headed off with a sinecure or a reward. Bulgaria is a rather old-fashioned country, with a lot of family life still going on, and in this sense it is still sound. But much is changing, and fast, and the system is based on deception and corruption. In this sense, the stability of the society is also becoming more fragile.
13. Sixth, how good, and reliable, are the armed forces?
14. Bulgarians have been good fighters in history, they are patriotic, and the soldiers would probably obey orders and acquit themselves tolerably well. Their equipment is spotty, and the tasks they could carry out are limited. In a general conflict, if they were to drive towards [Page 283] the Straits, they would probably, in my judgment, perform tolerably well—especially with Soviet help—in a fairly quick, sustained effort. But there are long histories of hatred with their Balkan neighbors, and if the Bulgarians were fighting Yugoslavs, or Greeks, or Turks, or Romanians, on the other fellow’s soil, I would expect their opponents to outfight them man for man. I would have doubts about the reliability of the Bulgarian armed forces in major tasks that took very long and that went very far beyond their own frontiers. But if the Soviets assigned them limited objectives, to be accomplished with decent equipment over a short time span, I suspect they would do rather well. (This is the opinion, of course, of a diplomat and not a military expert.) A footnote to this is that I suspect there are strains over military expenses, both within Bulgaria and with the USSR. I believe Zhivkov is sincere, at least in part, in his constant speaking about the crying need for reducing arms, and one element of this, I think, is the burden that arms expenditures are on a small economy like Bulgaria’s.
15. Seventh, are there any variations possible in Bulgaria’s foreign policy?
16. Not many, not soon. The conventional wisdom is that while Sofia may complain about not getting enough Russian oil at the right price, or about having to increase military expenditures, it is perfectly happy to follow the Soviet lead in foreign policy in toto. (I carry in my billfold, as constant reminder of where we stand in this respect, Foreign Minister Mladenov’s statement of last January in Moscow that Bulgarian and Soviet policy was identical “even to the nuances.”) Conventional wisdom is not far from right, I fear, although it stands to reason that the Bulgarians differ from the Russians sometimes on foreign policy issues, especially those that affect Bulgarian interests, and I assume that behind the scenes they are at least occasionally giving the Soviets their views. I can give some examples of hypothetical areas of divergence, but I cannot cite a single solid example of a difference on the record between Sofia and Moscow, in foreign policy. (But least the reader infer too much from that statement, let him try to think of open foreign policy—repeat, foreign policy—differences between Moscow and Budapest or Warsaw, not to mention Prague or East Berlin.) I assume that Afghanistan has caused the Bulgarians a good deal of discomfort, although their behavior has been loyal. They follow the Soviet line towards the Italian and Spanish Communist Parties, but I wonder if at times they would rather not have to do so. Most importantly, Bulgarian aims in the Balkans do not always coincide with Soviet aims, and we have evidence that the Bulgarians would like to cooperate more in Balkan multilateral endeavors than the Soviets have so far allowed. As for Yugoslavia, while outsiders often assume that Sofia is merely Moscow’s catspaw, I think the Bulgarians have [Page 284] their own aims and problems in their relations with Yugoslavia, and they do not by any means always coincide with those of the Russians. And in dealings with the West, the Bulgarians are more open and lenient about Western influence, cultural or economic, than the Soviets are happy to see, as I understand the situation. All of the above being said, I still cannot point to any open difference in Soviet and Bulgarian foreign policy, and do not expect to see any. I do believe, however, that this strict loyalty has a price, both in bilateral stresses and strains, and also in the amount Moscow must pay for Bulgaria’s continued loyalty. I have a feeling—which I cannot prove—that Moscow will have to pay a higher price for this loyalty as the years go by.
17. Eighth, are there any openings for the West?
18. Not too many, but more than most people think. The fact is that Bulgaria has been neglected, largely written off, and the West has invested very little here in money, or effort, or people. I am probably the wrong one to bring it up, but the quality of Western Ambassadors here has not always been topnotch, because Sofia is not considered an important enough post. (This was not always the case in the past: The British in particular have sent some first-rate diplomatists to the Balkans, including Sofia.) Nowadays some countries find it hard to get good quality young diplomats to agree to a tour in Sofia, so bad is its reputation. (I do not believe this is true of our Service.) And along the line, the quality of trade shows, cultural presentations, intellectual exchanges, and the like tends to be lower than with most of the other East European countries. For us and some of the other Western countries—especially the Germans, who have great opportunities here—this is a mistake, for Bulgaria has more to offer than its stereotypes say. Among the intellectuals, in business circles, in terms of popular interest, an opportunity is there for the West to have more influence. Especially in trade, the opportunity for a higher volume—with all the political consequences that entails—is clearly present. The reader will write all of the above off as a case of localitis, and I suppose my only answer is, “Come and see.” In plain hard terms of realpolitik, there are opportunities in Bulgaria which we should be exploiting.
19. Ninth, are any changes needed in US policy?
20. No, I believe we are on the right track. We have shown more interest in Bulgaria in recent years, partly because we discovered it was there, partly because the Bulgarians came out of their shells. In the wake of Polish events, the going may become trickier, but I think we should still go as far towards improving relations (I know the term is vague, but I hope its meaning is clear) as the Bulgarians are willing to go. I hope we will not try to fit Bulgaria into some formula that places them carefully in relationship to Czechoslovakia or the GDR or Poland. Bulgaria is Bulgaria, and I hope we will deal with it on its [Page 285] own terms. The loyalty to Moscow is firm, as I have said, but Bulgaria’s pride in its own identity as a nation is also firm, and I believe the manifestations of this pride are growing. (Next year’s 1300th anniversary of Bulgarian statehood—an anniversary the Soviets still have kept their distance from—is important in this respect.) In the field of trade, I would hope the US Government—whose powers are limited, of course, in the area—would do more to encourage US interest: I think the potential is considerable and if the MFN thing is raised by the Bulgarians, we should of course be willing to talk sympathetically. Meanwhile some more high-level visits would pay a good return on the investment of time. But in general, I would say our policy, of responding to a limited amount of opportunity, has been correct, and remains so.
21. Tenth, finally, how important to US interests is Bulgaria?
22. Not very. Not so long as conditions remain about as they are now, with the present leadership in place and with loyalty to Moscow the sine qua non of Bulgarian policy. I would add only that Bulgaria’s geophysical position is quite important, and since she is the only non-contiguous-to-Russia member of the Warsaw Pact, her position is somewhat vulnerable. As I have said, I see signs that the price of keeping Bulgaria totally loyal to Moscow is rising, and by the same token I see the potential for Western influence susceptible of increase. If Moscow goes on the defensive, to put it bluntly, Sofia becomes a prime target. And since we should be thinking ahead, perhaps more attention to Bulgaria now would be justified.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800469–0660. Secret. Sent for information to Belgrade, East Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, London, Moscow, Paris, Prague, Vienna, Warsaw, West Berlin, and USNATO. On a copy found in the Human Rights Bureau files, Hugh Simon (HA/EUR) wrote “Excellent Cable HS.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980—Human Rights and Country Files, Lot 82D177, Box 3, Bulgaria 1980)↩
- The Embassy reiterated the strength of the Soviet-Bulgarian relationship in telegram 2352 from Sofia, September 4. While acknowledging that the ties between the two countries were very strong, the Embassy wrote: “there are elements of Bulgarian national pride which are not satisfied by the relationship with Moscow.” The Embassy concluded: “US interests are best served by recognizing a Bulgarian identity apart from its ideological fealty to Moscow.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800425–0542)↩