49. Editorial Note
On March 15, 1977, the Department of State sent a circular telegram to all Eastern European posts and Moscow and Bonn informing them of the ongoing debate about relocating Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) from their headquarters in Munich to the United States. The telegram asked for the post’s analysis of the relocation, in terms of reaction by both the government and the audience in their respective countries. The Embassy in Bonn, specifically, was also asked to assess West German perceptions of the U.S. commitment to Europe in case of a relocation, as well as the effect on West German commitment to maintain transmitters and any RFE/RL crew on German soil. (Telegram 57405 to multiple posts, March 15; National Archives, RG 59, [Page 171] Central Foreign Policy File, D770089–0757) For Bonn’s response, see Document 50.
The Embassy in Budapest responded on March 21 in telegram 885 that it expected little change in the attitude of either the Hungarian Government or the Hungarian population to a relocation of RFE to the United States. The Embassy concluded that the lack of significant hostility toward RFE on the part of the Hungarian Government meant that its attitude toward the radio would change minimally. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770095–1232) Hungary, however, was a special case.
The Embassy in Bucharest noted on March 22 in telegram 2100 that the move would “seriously damage both ‘rapport’ with its audience, and quality of its broadcast and research product.” The Embassy concluded that such a move might also “make RFE even more of a contentious bilateral issue by highlighting U.S. responsibility for RFE broadcasting.” Ambassador Barnes concluded there was “no political merit to any such move.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770098–0042)
Like the Embassy in Bucharest, the Embassy in Warsaw was also adamantly opposed to the idea of moving RFE to the United States. They wrote: “The opposition of the Polish regime to RFE/RL is based above all on the RFE’s demonstrated ability to respond quickly to events in Poland and to broadcast back into the country a true and usually balanced account of what is happening here.” The transfer to the United States would impair, the Embassy believed, the ability of the Radios to respond quickly to developments in the country. Just as importantly, “Poland’s intellectuals and other listeners would see a shift of the radios to the United States as signifying a reduction of US interest in Poland and a retreat under Soviet pressure.” (Telegram 2066 from Warsaw, March 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770101–1072)
Like the others, the Embassy in Sofia also concluded that a move to the United States would damage the timeliness and flavor of RFE reporting. It also stressed that the Government of Bulgaria would interpret the move as a victory for its “unremitting public and private hostility to RFE,” a conclusion, the Embassy suggested, that might also be shared by many in the Bulgarian public. The Embassy also suggested that a move would be interpreted by the Bulgarian Government as evidence that West Germany “has seen the light” in no longer permitting RFE/RL to operate from their soil, as well as, at least partial acknowledgement that RFE/RL were “not fully consistent with Helsinki [Accords].” (Telegram 625 from Sofia, March 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770099–0837)
The Embassy in Prague, however, believed that a move, if properly explained in advance, could provide tangible benefits. (Telegram 811 [Page 172] from Prague, March 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770108–0439)
In telegram 4013 from Moscow, March 25, the Embassy wrote that “there is, of course, nothing the Radios could do that would reconcile the Soviet authorities to their existence.” The Embassy further suggested that the Soviets would see the move as a sign of weakness, and would not relent in their propaganda against the Radios. They reported: “Moscow would portray the move to the States as resulting from the effectiveness of Moscow’s ‘principled stand’” and would “be encouraged to step up their efforts to attain this goal” of shutting down the Radios. While the Embassy did not believe that target audiences in the Soviet Union considered the physical location of the Radios, it did suggest that the use by Radio Liberty of recent émigrés, “including people with a reputation in the Soviet Union” was very effective. A move of the Radios, the telegram concluded, would make the use of émigrés much more difficult. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770104–0140)