Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

30. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

EASTERN EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION AND FOREIGN POLICY AUTONOMY

I. Soviet/East European Political Framework

1. The Kremlin considers a stable, obedient East European buffer zone, reasonably free of Western influence, to be essential to Soviet security. This applies especially to the GDR.

2. While relatively quiescent in the aftermath of the 1968 Czechoslovak invasion, East Germany and the regimes of East Europe remain potentially unstable and politically unpopular. Moreover, the Soviets are well aware of the ultimate contradiction between East European nationalism and Russian control. Moscow therefore has shown limited tolerance for either “destalinization” or “desatellization.”

3. In this situation, the Russians also are continuing to press for tighter economic integration in Comecon and military integration in the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, the Soviets seem intent, as a counter to increased East-West contacts, on tightening up internal discipline in Russia and in Eastern Europe.

4. Nonetheless, the actual exercise of control over the countries of Eastern Europe has not proven to be easy for Moscow. Beyond the broader forces of nationalism, East European instability has become an increasing possibility. This is due to the expansion of East-West relations, and, in particular, to the economic factor, CSCE, China and the effects of “Eurocommunism” and ideological ferment.

5. The Economic Factor. East Europeans are straining to pay for higher-priced oil and other imports from the USSR as well as Western advanced technology, raw materials, and semi-manufactures necessary to modernize and expand their industries. Their export earnings are far from adequate. Thus far, the very large growth in imports from the West has been financed by massive hard currency borrowing. East European and Soviet hard currency indebtedness has risen sharply, and the debt service ratios of several countries are being watched closely by creditors. The post-1973 Western inflation/recession has contributed further to the surge in East European hard currency trade deficits. Unless East European exports can be greatly increased, trade will stagnate and it will be difficult for these countries to satisfy rising consumer expectations. This could produce further political instability in some East European regimes which have tried to gain popular support through the satisfaction of consumer demand.

6. CSCE . The Helsinki Final Act provisions on human rights have had considerable psychological impact in Eastern Europe, stirring Soviet and East European leadership concerns. They were cited, for example, not only by the “Charter 77” dissidents in Prague but also by the vast majority of the estimated 100,000 or more East Germans who have sought to emigrate legally to the West.

7. China. The enhanced international role of China and Peking’s independent stand in the communist world poses serious problems for Moscow. Deepening Chinese relations with the U.S., Western Europe and Japan have generated some Soviet concerns. The USSR is thus all the more likely to oppose most efforts at political innovation in Eastern Europe as threatening to its own interests.

8. “Eurocommunism”/Ideological Ferment. The stands of the Italian, French and Spanish communist parties, and the positions of the Yugoslav and Romanian regimes, have had a marked effect on intellectuals and more independent-minded party members in Eastern Europe. These developments, together with the obvious irrelevance of the ruling ideology—both morally and in terms of pragmatic governing—are likely to be an important source of continuing tension in the Soviet Union and in East European states. This ferment so far has been limited largely to intellectuals and generally presents no genuine security problem. However, Soviet worry about how such ideas could infect East European ruling parties has contributed to Moscow’s rigid attitude toward CSCE implementation.

9. These factors of economic decline and frustrated political “possibilities” have increased the sense of popular dissatisfaction with East European regimes. As a result, the next decade may see a rise in social and political tensions there. These occasionally may take the form of civil disturbances. The most likely pattern will be one of increased pressure on the party leadership by elite groups, both within and outside of the party, to permit some devolution of power to more “modern” elements in society. Such long-term political dynamics will be viewed with great concern in Moscow.

10. With Eastern Europe, and at home, Soviet leaders are faced with a conflict between the CPSU imperative of hegemony and the rising demands of equality. Brezhnev’s response has been a pragmatic combination of holding to a firm line where possible (e.g., East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria) and grudging acceptance of gradual reform or autonomy where necessary (e.g., Poland/Hungary; Romania/Albania). The CPSU has taken a similar tough approach domestically. Toward East European regimes—as with Soviet society—the Soviet leadership has preferred, where necessary and possible, to shift the terms of debate and conflict from political to economic matters. In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, consumerism and economic aid constitute major expressions of this strategy. Soviet aid to Poland, following the June 1976 price riots, is a case in point.

11. From a Soviet standpoint, this policy suffers from two basic defects. First, it has no natural terminal point. Gradual appeasement of East European demands—on economic issues, liberalization, or foreign policy autonomy—inevitably feeds rather than satiates East European appetites. Secondly, with its own major economic—and potential energy—problems, the USSR has neither the capacity nor the desire to divert scarce economic resources from internal Soviet requirements to the needs of more developed East European economies. Moreover, it is Western technology that is most relevant to East European and Soviet economic needs.

12. These two factors have important ramifications for Soviet/East European relations and consequent Western policy. The dynamic feature of this relationship offers long-term hope to East Europeans and poses a long-term threat to tight Soviet control. It also suggests the possibility of occasional eruptions when East European hopes and Soviet fears collide.

13. The development of East-West trade and appropriate Western technology transfers has enormous relevance and appeal to the coming educated generation of East Europeans. In time, expansion of East-West economic relations could lead to shifts in trade patterns and to some reduction of East European economic dependency on Moscow; this has occurred to some extent already in Romania and Poland. On the other hand, all East European states remain fundamentally dependent on the USSR for markets and for the supply of oil (except Romania) and other raw materials. However tight the future Soviet economic and petroleum pinch, Moscow is unlikely to permit this basic political reality to change. Finally, East European indebtedness and bleak export prospects pose serious obstacles to sustained Western commercial credits, and Western countries have other high priority demands on their limited resources.

14. Soviet leaders are determined to maintain overall control in East European politics, through military force if necessary. But they also seek to fend off East European pressures for change with partial concessions. How this balance evolves could be a major factor for Europe in the 1980’s.

II. East European Foreign Policies

15. Against the above analysis, this section describes the endeavors of East European states to delineate nationally-based foreign policies. Those efforts occur primarily in their private bilateral consultations with Moscow prior to multilateral Warsaw Pact and CEMA conferences, where the Soviets expect and generally obtain obeisance. The same approach is used concerning East-West conferences, such as MBFR and CSCE, where the limited East European influence must be exercised in private bilateral meetings with the Russians.

16. With the exception of Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania, Soviet control over East European foreign policy clearly is the norm. Nonetheless, there are some variations relating to particular East European national concerns.

YUGOSLAVIA

17. When considering foreign policy autonomy in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia must immediately be put into a category separate from the Warsaw Pact member countries. Yugoslavia’s foreign policy is made exclusively in Belgrade. Non-alignment, which sets Yugoslavia apart from both the major alliance systems in Europe, remains the key pillar of Yugoslav foreign policy. On East-West issues, including CSCE, Yugoslavia seeks to play a moderating role and to maintain an arms-length balance between the U.S. and USSR. On North-South economic issues, Yugoslavia champions the interests of the developing countries and supports demands for a New International Economic Order, while promoting dialogue between developed and undeveloped countries. On global political issues, Yugoslavia attempts to exercise a moderating influence but invariably goes along with the non-aligned consensus. Within the non-aligned movement, Yugoslavia has shown great concern over Cuban efforts to push the movement toward closer affinity with the USSR and other Communist countries.

18. Belgrade seeks to maintain good relations with all countries, particularly the major powers, and has generally managed to do this. In the past two years, Tito has visited the USSR and the U.S., as well as China, France and Britain. Tito’s efforts to improve relations with these countries are intended in large part to insure Yugoslavia’s continued independence and territorial integrity after his departure from the political scene. The recent Yugoslav effort to improve relations with China—including the recent visit of Hua Kuo-feng to Belgrade—has had an adverse effect on Yugoslav-Soviet relations, despite repeated assurances by Yugoslavia that its relations with one country were not directed against any other country.

19. As in the conduct of foreign affairs, the Yugoslav leadership insists on maintaining independence in its domestic policies, which are devised to meet the country’s rather singular needs and traditions. A particular form of federalism has developed to accommodate the diverse political and regional characteristics of Yugoslavia. From a rigidly Stalinist state in the immediate post-war period, the domestic system in Yugoslavia has evolved into the most liberal in Eastern Europe, with considerable freedom of movement and emigration, access to foreign publications and radio broadcasts and relative tolerance of cultural expression. Significant restrictions exist, however, on freedom of political expression and activity.

20. In the economic sector the Yugoslavs practice a kind of “market socialism” not found elsewhere in the communist world; the concept and practice of “self-management” are particularly unique. Belgrade maintains ties with both CEMA and the EC. Foreign investment—within limits—is encouraged in Yugoslavia.

21. Although the leadership is now preparing for the post-Tito era, with all its attendant uncertainties and imponderables, Yugoslav leaders insist that long-successful policies—non-alignment and self-management—will be continued after Tito and that the Yugoslav commitment to independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty will not be altered.

ROMANIA

22. Romania is the only Warsaw Pact member state which has been able to reduce significantly its economic and political dependence on the Soviet Union, assert policies that are opposed by other Pact members and assume an independent international role. Since the early 1960s the Romanians have gradually established political and economic ties to the United States, Western Europe, the non-aligned movement and other independent communist entities—especially Yugoslavia, China and the Eurocommunists—as a counter to Soviet leverage. In the process Bucharest has pursued a number of independent positions, inter alia:

—willingness to conclude a trade agreement with the U.S. and comply with the Jackson-Vanik amendment;

—opposition to economic integration within CEMA and military integration within the Warsaw Pact;

—non-participation in the Czechoslovak invasion;

—support for the rights of all communist parties to pursue their own course;

—membership in such organizations as the IMF and participation in the “Group of 77”; and,

—retention of diplomatic ties with Israel and playing an intermediary role in regional crises, most notably in the Middle East, where Ceausescu helped facilitate Sadat’s visit to Israel.

23. In 1978 Romania strengthened its ties to those states which are perceived as major counters to Moscow. The most dramatic part of this campaign was the unprecedented visit of Hua Kuo-feng to Bucharest. The Hua visit set the stage for a heightening of Soviet-Romanian tension, which culminated in Ceausescu’s public criticism of Moscow in the aftermath of the November Warsaw Pact summit. In five major speeches, Ceausescu indirectly rebuked the Soviet Union for seeking increased military expenditures by Pact members and for attempts to improve Pact command and control mechanisms that would negate Romania’s sovereign control over its armed forces. Couching his critique in highly nationalistic terms, Ceausescu sought to rally the population behind him once again in defiance of Moscow.

24. Appeals to Romanian nationalism and independence are used by Ceausescu both to counter Soviet designs and to offset public disenchantment with Romania’s standard of living and authoritarian political system. Foreign policy independence has been effective in bridging some of the gap between the population and the regime.

POLAND

25. Poland was the first among the Warsaw Pact countries to develop a positive relationship with the U.S. and to resume cultivation of traditionally close ties with such Western countries as France, Britain and Italy. This has led to a Western presence in Poland which far exceeds that which exists in most other Warsaw Pact countries. Despite the occasional strains it has produced in its relations with the Soviet Union, the Gierek regime has given every indication of continuing its moderate, pragmatic approach to Poland’s cooperation with the West. The regime continues to pursue a course of relative restraint toward vocal political dissidents; it continues at least an outward conciliation toward the thriving Roman Catholic Church, which has been greatly strengthened by the accession to the Papacy of John Paul II; and, in the interest of stimulating improved economic performance, it has shown some desire to encourage private farmers who cultivate about 80 percent of all arable land.

26. Moscow has grudgingly tolerated these deviations because it wants, above all, stability in strategically located Poland, and knows that cruder forms of interference or repression could lead to an upheaval that would necessitate an unwanted military intervention. In return, Poland faithfully supports Soviet foreign policy objectives, as well as the Soviet economic integration goals in Eastern Europe. Although only half of Poland’s trade is with CEMA countries, its interests in the area as a market for its products and dependence on Soviet raw materials are genuine. Warsaw’s support of major Soviet foreign policy goals also derives from an historically based fear that Moscow might one day revise its attitude on the German question, to Poland’s disadvantage.

27. The major question-mark surrounds Poland’s economic situation, which has deteriorated in recent years due to five successive bad harvests; stagnation in Western export markets; and a failure to date of major investments in Western capital equipment to pay off. As a result, Poland’s external hard currency indebtedness has grown markedly. Generous Western public and commercial credits have been granted but future prospects for Poland’s external economic picture are cloudy and Warsaw faces some tough political and economic choices ahead.

HUNGARY

28. Having gained power in the Soviet invasion of 1956, Hungarian party leader Kadar consolidated his position in the early 1960s and has since displayed skill and pragmatism in promoting Hungary’s national interests, without violating essential Soviet desiderata. He has thus achieved a rather firm political base and a measure of popularity. Kadar has in more recent years departed from orthodox Bloc patterns in such key areas as:

—the ten-year-old economic reforms (New Economic Mechanism), which provide for a variety of incentives and other market forces to operate;

—a measure of accommodation with the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches; and

—a relatively relaxed political-cultural atmosphere, including the cultivation of ties with Hungarians living abroad.

29. While remaining a loyal Soviet ally, Kadar has for the past two years used the CSCE umbrella to pursue a deliberate but low-keyed foreign policy aimed at improving relations with the West.

To this end, Kadar has:

—visited four West European countries in less than four years (Austria, Italy, West Germany and France);

—taken a moderate attitude toward West Europe’s Eurocommunist and socialist parties; and

—promoted ties with the U.S. Hungary’s relatively liberal internal and emigration policies have facilitated the U.S. granting of MFN status and the return of the Crown of St. Stephen, the symbol of Hungarian national independence.

30. Unlike most other Warsaw Pact countries, Hungary has eschewed criticism of Romania and Yugoslavia for receiving Hua or for Ceausescu’s refusal to sign several documents submitted at the recent Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow. In such international organizations as the UN and in other public fora, Budapest has increasingly pursued matters of vital or major significance to Hungarian national interest, while not antagonizing the Soviet Union.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

31. East Germany is of course a special case in East Central Europe. The GDR’s communist political system and highly cautious political leadership reflect the continued, anomalous position of the East German state. The GDR remains wholly dependent on an occupying force of twenty Soviet divisions. The Berlin Wall remains a grim reminder of the regime’s unpopularity. Despite widespread diplomatic recognition from the international community, the Four Powers (U.S., UK, France and USSR) retain their post-war rights and responsibilities for Germany and Berlin. While quiescent since the 1971 quadripartite agreement, Berlin, located at the center of Europe, remains a potential East-West flashpoint.

32. In the absence of a meaningful separate East German nationalism, the Honecker regime has sought to bridge the gap between party and population through policies aimed at boosting the standard of living. East Germans, for example, are permitted to use Western currency to purchase Western goods in GDR specialty shops. “Consumerism” has helped generally to meet some of the population’s rising expectations—generated in part by West German TV broadcasts which cover 80 percent of East Germany—for a better material life. More recently, Honecker has sought other bases of support, particularly in the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church, which has been promised sweeping concessions that include access to media broadcasts. If these are implemented, the Church could emerge as one of the most influential in Eastern Europe. The regime will want to ensure that it confines the Church’s role strictly to clerical—non-political—matters.

33. East German foreign policy is tied to Soviet foreign policy, including an increased presence in Africa. To the extent they diverge, the GDR tends to press Moscow to adopt more rigid policies in the East-West sphere in order to avert increased Western contacts. The East Germans are particularly concerned that their CSCE Basket III human rights commitments could arouse public expectations which, when unfilled, could lead to popular discontent. This foreign policy posture reflects the GDR policy of Abgrenzung, or separation, of the two German states.

34. There have been times when Moscow’s Western policy was seen as contravening East Germany’s fundamental need to assert its sovereign state identity. In the opening phases of detente, it thus tried to slow down or resist what it viewed as Soviet concessions to the FRG without sufficient benefits to the GDR. More recently, there are indications that the GDR is less than enthusiastic—given its growing economic problems—about Soviet proposals for increased military spending by Warsaw Pact members. For the most part, however, these challenges have been and are contained by Moscow which, with 400,000 troops in the GDR, still clearly sets the main directions of East German foreign policy activity.

BULGARIA

35. Bulgaria is usually considered the Soviet Union’s most loyal ally, and Bulgarian leader Zhivkov the most reliable associate. We know of no instance in which the Bulgarians have opposed Soviet objectives in foreign policy, even when these objectives may run counter to Bulgarian foreign policy interests.

36. This is particularly evident in the instances of Balkan cooperation and the Soviet exploitation of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav dispute over Macedonia:

—The Bulgarians have rejected various initiatives of other Balkan countries to promote multilateral commerce and cooperation, apparently because of Soviet opposition;

—There also is little doubt that the intensity of polemics and the state of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations over Macedonia is influenced, if not dictated, by Moscow’s desire to increase political pressure on Yugoslavia.

37. More recently, Zhivkov has traveled to Africa and promoted Bulgarian relations with selected African countries in an effort to further Soviet aims in Africa. Finally, there are indications that the Bulgarians have sought to improve their relations with Albania—again acting as a Soviet proxy.

38. Party leader Zhivkov’s long tenure in office and his close relationship with the Kremlin have been accompanied by the appearance of a stable regime—perhaps in some respects the most stable in Eastern Europe over the past 20 years. Intellectual dissidence—in contrast to Czechoslovakia, Poland, GDR, and, even, Romania—has been minimal and easily controlled. There has been no worker unrest of significance and political factionalism has not threatened Zhivkov’s position. However, Zhivkov has recently carried out changes in the Party and State leaderships which might have been motivated in part by real or potential opposition to his policies. More likely, these changes were carried out to improve economic performance and efficiency and to install younger, more vigorous leaders. Until recently, the Bulgarian leadership was one of the oldest in Eastern Europe.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

39. Since 1969, in order to accommodate Moscow, the Czechoslovak regime has been one of the most internally repressive and externally sycophantic in Eastern Europe. Under the close aegis of Moscow, Czechoslovak leaders have been carrying out the most widespread purges in Czechoslovak Party history and maintained tight controls over all aspects of Czechoslovak life—including punitive measures against political/human rights dissidents who sought to have the regime honor its commitments to the CSCE Final Act. The Prague regime’s domestic repressions at times seem to be an embarrassment to other East European regimes and even the Soviets in their relations with the West. Although both the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaderships reportedly have considered alternative courses of action to present hardline policies in Czechoslovakia, there are no indications that these policies will be modified. Realization of its vast unpopularity has made the Czechoslovak regime even more unimaginative and reluctant to undertake independent action (such as meaningful reform to improve the economy). It has, as a result, followed the Soviet foreign policy line wherever possible in order to prove its loyalty to Moscow. Perhaps more than any other regime in Eastern Europe, Prague has tried to buy political apathy through outright concessions to material wants (e.g., weekend cottages, travel abroad, automobiles).

40. Soviet domination of Czechoslovakia appears virtually complete, with the Prague leadership at times more subservient in following Soviet foreign policy than even Moscow would seem to wish. Prague has acted as a proxy for Moscow in propaganda attacks on the West in general and the U.S. in particular, particularly when for tactical reasons the Soviets preferred to be either silent or moderate in their commentaries. In the past, Prague has played a considerable role in Soviet foreign policy strategy by acting as a penetration agent among developing countries, particularly because the Czechoslovaks were more acceptable than the Soviets to these countries. This role has diminished over the past years, in large part because Prague’s economic difficulties at home have made it impossible for it to play such a role and also because other East European regimes have acted as penetration agents in various regions—e.g., East Germany in Africa. Finally, the cautious attitude of the Prague regime in borrowing from the West and also in pursuing cultural contacts have generally resulted in limiting Czechoslovakia’s ties with the West.

ALBANIA

41. Albania’s xenophobic, isolationist foreign policy is unique among the communist regimes in Europe. The Tirana regime has refused to countenance any improvement of relations with the U.S. and several other Western countries until all its demands have been realized. It also continues its unrelenting struggle against the “social imperialism” of the USSR and, more recently, against China.

42. Albania has been quite selective in its establishment of diplomatic and trade relations with other countries, particularly in Western Europe. Despite the cessation of economic assistance from China—Tirana’s last benefactor—there are at present no signs that the Albanians intend to modify their intransigent ideological policies. Albania has hinted at its interest in increasing commercial and perhaps other links with some Western and Third World countries. Tirana’s relations with neighboring Greece have improved somewhat since the break with China. But there has been no such improvement with neighboring Yugoslavia, whom the Albanians revile as revisionist and fear as a larger neighbor with a substantial Albanian minority population. The Albanians have also refused multilateral Balkan cooperation endeavors, insisting that such endeavors be conducted on a bilateral basis.

43. The Tirana regime is the most repressive in Eastern Europe, and the Albanian standard of living continues to be the lowest in Europe. Any hopes that it would improve in the near future evaporated with the cessation of Chinese economic assistance. The regime has carried out incessant strident propaganda campaigns which rail against foreign influences, urge the population to greater sacrifice and economic effort, and demand strict ideological conformity with the policies of the leadership.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Official Working Papers, S/P Director Anthony Lake, 1977–Jan 1981, Lot 82D298, Box 11, Classified Correspondence, 1979, M–Z. Confidential. Sent under a February 7 covering letter from Anthony Lake to Ronaldo Sandenberg, Special Adviser to the Foreign Minister for Political and Economic Affairs in the Bilateral Area in the Ministry of External Affairs of Brazil.