Office of the Historian

279. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

Washington, February 12, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Tito’s Health

It now appears that Tito is dying.2 You will have to decide who will attend the funeral. In ordinary circumstances it would be a good gesture for you to do so rather than send the Vice President. In the current circumstances, however, the issue is more difficult.

If you go, Brezhnev may well be there. Whether you meet with him or not will be a major issue. If you do not meet him, you will be severely criticized for refusing to deal with the Soviets at a dangerous time and you will bear the onus for any further deterioration in our relationship. If you do meet with him, the meeting is likely to contribute to a further aggravation of our relationship because of the positions you will have to take. To have a different outcome will require that [Page 915] either the Soviets change their position on the Afghan invasion (which seems highly unlikely, particularly in that context) or you will have to modify your positions which will raise charges of zigzagging and undermine our efforts with our allies, the Islamic countries and the Olympics.

These considerations, plus the problem of squaring a trip to Yugoslavia with your position on not going to New Hampshire3 lead me to conclude that you should probably plan on sending the Vice President.

We need to begin planning soon so I would appreciate your decision.4

Agree, the Vice President should go

No, I will go

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 86, Yugoslavia: 2/80. Secret.↩
  2. Earlier on February 12, Brzezinski sent a memorandum to Carter informing him that “CIA reports this morning that Marshal Tito’s health is rapidly failing. He will not accept any food and takes very little fluid. The fluid intake and his heart medicine are both adversely affecting his kidneys. The prognosis is poor. We will be reviewing our contingency plans for the event of his death.” Carter initialed the memorandum indicating he saw it. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–2/80)↩
  3. On December 4, 1979, Carter announced his candidacy for reelection. At the same time, he announced that he must postpone campaign travels due to the ongoing situation in Iran. (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, p. 2194) On January 15, 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and with the Iranian hostage crisis continuing, Carter told a group of editors and news directors at the White House, that he continued to limit “the involvement of myself as a clearly identifiable, partisan campaigner” and that even when he might leave Washington, D.C., he would not “want to go to a fundraising event for myself, or to participate in a strictly partisan event, until I consider the alleviation of these crises to be adequate.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980, Book I, p. 90) Carter won the New Hampshire primary on February 26, with 47 percent of the vote. Senator Edward Kennedy won 37 percent.↩
  4. Neither of the two options were checked. Carter wrote at the bottom of the page: “My present inclination is to send Mondale and my mother.”↩