Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

270. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 15, 1979, 11–11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of David Aaron’s Meeting with Colonel General Vujatovic

PARTICIPANTS

• Colonel General Laze Vujatovic, Yugoslav Assistant Federal Secretary of National Defense for Military Economy
• Vladimir Sindjelic, Minister-Counselor Embassy of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
• David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Steve Larrabee, NSC Staff Member
• James Siena, Deputy Assistant Secretary (European & NATO Affairs) (ISA)

After welcoming General Vujatovic, Mr. Aaron noted that the only thing he had not been dealing with lately was military sales to Yugoslavia. However, he promised to pay close attention to this in the future. (C)

General Vujatovic stated that he was here to sign the Memorandum of Understanding to improve cooperation.² (S)

Mr. Aaron underscored the importance that the Administration attached to the signing of the Memorandum and to the institutionalized arrangements created by it.³ (S)

Noting that there had been many attempts to improve cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United States lately, General Vujatovic remarked that the Yugoslavs were interested in strengthening cooperation in the military field in order to maintain their independence. In regard to military sales however, the two sides had not been able to achieve full understanding so far.⁴ The Yugoslavs were interested in obtaining up-to-date equipment because at some point in the future they might have to face a better equipped adversary. (S)

Mr. Aaron stressed the great importance that the US attached to Yugoslav independence and integrity. This was the basis of the US interest in pursuing a military supply relationship with Yugoslavia; it would allow Yugoslavia to strengthen its independence. While there had been some difficulties, the US, for its part, was determined to overcome them. We wanted to put the problems behind us and use the institutional mechanisms created by the Memorandum of Understanding to lay the basis for improved cooperation in the military field. (S)

General Vujatovic agreed. In his view the US and Yugoslavia should attempt to put aside past problems and concentrate on the cooperative aspects of the relationship. (C)

Mr. Aaron said that when he was in Yugoslavia with the Vice President he had not had enough time to see very much. The next time he visited Yugoslavia he hoped to see more, particularly defense installations. (C)

General Vujatovic replied that Mr. Aaron would be welcome in Yugoslavia and that he would try to arrange to show him whatever he would like to see. (S)

Mr. Aaron said that he would particularly like to see units with new American equipment. (S)

General Vujatovic noted that at present Yugoslavia did not have such units. (U)

Mr. Aaron remarked that he would have to talk to Mr. Siena about that. (U)

General Vujatovic said that the Yugoslavs had included visits to defense installations when General Rogers was in Yugoslavia. General Rogers had seemed quite pleased with his visit. Continuing, General Vujatovic noted that during his talks today he had gained the impression that the American system was quite complicated. Though it presented problems to the Yugoslavs they would try to adapt to the system somehow. In return he hoped that the Americans would show patience and openmindedness with the Yugoslavs during the initial phase. (C)

Mr. Aaron emphasized that the US wished to pursue its military relationship with Yugoslavia in a confidential manner. While at times this was difficult the US was determined to do it. (S)

General Vujatovic observed that in the past there had been some unfortunate experiences with leaks; he hoped this could be avoided because they had had a negative impact on relations. Turning to the question of past problems and misunderstandings, he remarked that sometimes it was difficult to know whether these were a consequence of the US system or whether they had a deeper political meaning. (S)

Mr. Aaron emphasized that this Administration did not send signals that way. Noting that the weapons procurement system was a complicated process, he reiterated that we did not use our military relations to convey political signals. If the US had a political message to transmit it would talk directly to the Yugoslav government, but it would not use the military supply relationship for this purpose. (S)

General Vujatovic stated that he was very pleased to hear this. (U)

In closing, Mr. Aaron said he hoped to see General Vujatovic again either in Yugoslavia or in the States and noted that now that Yugoslavia and the US had a military relationship, perhaps they would see more of each other. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Aaron, David: 1–12/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the West Wing of the White House.
2. In an October 3 memorandum, Larrabee recommended to Brzezinski that either he or Aaron meet Vujatovic for 15–20 minutes while the latter was in Washington to sign the Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Military Cooperation which had been negotiated the previous December. Brzezinski approved a meeting with Aaron. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 9–12/79)
3. On October 12, Larrabee forwarded to Aaron the Department of State briefing paper for his meeting with Vujatovic. In his covering memorandum, Larrabee recommended that Aaron stress three basic points with the Yugoslav General: Emphasize the importance of the MOU; reassure the GOY of the administration’s intention to pursue development of closer U.S.-Yugoslav military cooperation; and stress that the Departments of State and Defense have taken steps to improve communication with Yugoslav authorities. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: Military: 1/79–1/80)
4. In telegram 7163 from Belgrade, September 24, Eagleburger reported that the Yugoslav Government had decided to purchase 1,000 Dragon anti-tank missiles to be delivered by the end of 1979. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790438–1013) A week later, however, Vujatovic informed the Embassy that the Yugoslav Government had changed its mind and would not be purchasing any Dragon missiles either in 1979, or in subsequent years. (Telegram 7387 from Belgrade, October 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790451–1096) During their conversation, Vujatovic informed Eagleburger that the Yugoslav Government found USG proposal for the Dragon missile sale was unacceptable, and therefore had to cancel its order. He added that “it is obvious that the leaders of the U.S. want an independent Yugoslavia, but when it comes to practical application, there is always a tremendous burden of procedural problems.” (Telegram 7520 from Belgrade, October 5; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790460–1288)