Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

261. Memorandum for the Record¹

Belgrade, December 11–12, 1978

SUBJECT

• First Meeting of the US-Yugoslav Joint Committee for Military-Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation in the Field of Military Technique

PARTICIPANTS

• United States

  • Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James V. Siena, US Chairman
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Richard Vine
  • MG John R.D. Cleland, Vice Director, J–5, OJCS
  • MG Richard C. Bowman, Director, European and NATO Affairs, OASD/ISA
  • RADM Taylor Brown, Deputy Director, International Programs, OUSDR&E
  • Mr. Richard Violette, Director of Operations, DSAA
  • Mr. Harry Dunlop, Political Counselor, Embassy Belgrade
  • Colonel William Roche, Defense Attache, Embassy Belgrade
  • Mr. Irwin Pernick, PM/SAS, State
  • Commander Eric McVadon, Assistant for Yugoslavia, OASD/ISA

• Yugoslavia

  • Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Military Economy Colonel General Dusan Vujatovic
  • Mr. Mitrovic, FSFA (11 December only)
  • MG Sveta Popovic, Head, Department of Procurement of Armament and Military Equipment
  • Mr. Mirko Zaric (position not given)
  • Colonel Bozidar Ilic, Army
  • Colonel Vladimir Gabaj, Navy technical matters
  • Colonel Vrbica, Army
  • Colonel Vid Voh, Air Force
  • Colonel Djordje Jaukovic, Air Force procurement
  • Colonel Raicevic, Navy technical matters
  • Captain Petar Krunic, Navy
  • (Other unidentified military officers sat in from time to time)

(S) This memorandum supplements the attached minutes provided by the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat of National Defense and received in March 1979.² It includes only those items that may be of reference value for future Committee proceedings or for determining better the precise nature of Yugoslav military equipment requests.

First plenary session:

—Colonel General Vujatovic, the Yugoslav chairman, recalled that the initiative for forming the Committee came from Ambassador Eagleburger speaking for the USG.³ He observed that in the exchanges of draft documents neither government had seen a need to change the essence (of what was to become the final draft MOU). Vujatovic commented on the roles of the Federal Secretariats for National Defense and Foreign Affairs (FSND & FSFA) in preparing the Yugoslav MOU-related documents, but he stated (rather pointedly it seemed, considering the presence of the FSFA representative) that once the document was agreed upon, the work would be done by the FSND, and that the composition for the future of the Yugoslav side would depend on the nature of the work of the Committee and the matters to be discussed.

—In further introductory remarks, General Vujatovic said that there was a great need for the Yugoslavs to update weapons and equipment. They have strived, he said, to develop resources to build for themselves as much as they can, starting with small arms and some light weapons. For the most sophisticated equipment they must rely on foreign suppliers, with an effort to obtain, “frankly, as much dispersion as possible,” even with the technical problems that diversity of origin produces. He recalled oscillation in the military supply relationship with the US and said that he had heard criticism of excessive Yugoslav reliance on the Soviets. However, those complaining had not offered alternatives. He said that his government understood that the US was ready to support and supply Yugoslavia, “as Yugoslavia is today.” One facet of that US support was readiness to discuss “trade in arms and equipment.” He hoped that complaints of too much from the Soviet Union could be overcome. He recalled that there were US fears that technology or weapons would be transferred to someone else, but that had happened only once, to Ethiopia—a transfer that was not harmful to the US, in the Yugoslav view. He alluded, without elaborating, to American “suspicions” that “would be overcome in the talks.”

General Vujatovic said that to a large extent US and Yugoslav interests were common. “The US wishes,” he said, “for Yugoslavia to remain as it is.” There should be no apprehension or misgivings, and Yugoslav defenses should be strengthened. He stressed that arms are not a subject for grant or aid, but for “normal economic relations.”

—Deputy Assistant Secretary Siena, the US chairman, responded that the presence of the US delegation reflected a growing beneficial relationship between the two countries, based on mutual interests and respect. He said that the US respected Yugoslavia’s position and recalled SecDef’s remarks to Secretary Ljubicic concerning Yugoslav independence, territorial integrity and national unity. Our efforts in the security field, he said, were directed toward that policy.

—In outlining the US view of the Committee, Mr. Siena described it as a forum for regular contacts and a way to avoid the regrettable previous oscillations, but not as a replacement for established procedures. The Committee would review those established procedures to see how they were working.

After describing briefly the importance of the US Congress in the matter of arms transfers, Mr. Siena explained that US policies regarding sensitive technology transfer, coproduction and third-country transfers were an effort by President Carter to introduce worldwide some measure of restraint. He said that we were engaged in an effort to reconcile those policies with the US desire to assist Yugoslavia, and that the reconciliation would not always please the Yugoslavs. Mr. Siena asked General Vujatovic to accept that when unfavorable decisions were taken they were not a consequence of suspicion, but rather from trying to balance the relationship with the other policies to which he had referred.

—Mr. Siena and General Vujatovic agreed at this early point in the meetings that there were no problems in the substance of the draft MOU, that a working group would be named for further drafting, and that the agreed MOU would be initialed by the two of them in Belgrade, with subsequent formal approval by both governments later. Some items in the MOU were discussed:

—Regarding the frequency of the Joint Committee meetings, Mr. Siena said that although the US had suggested meeting twice a year to keep close to the problems, annual sessions and a provision for extraordinary sessions took care of that concern.

—Mr. Siena explained that to get USG agreement, the MOU should state explicitly that Committee actions would be governed by national policies, as well as national legislation. General Vujatovic said that his legal people contended that there were no policies not backed by legislation. The problems of finding mutually satisfactory wording was left to the working group. (Comment: The final draft of the MOU used the words “national legislation, regulations and procedures.”)

—In response to a question, General Vujatovic explained that the Yugoslav use of the term “military-economic” included production, licensing, coproduction, technical training, etc. The working group was tasked to ensure that the MOU language made this meaning clear and precluded confusion with the broader meaning in English of the word “economic.”

—Addressing another concern we voiced, Major General Popovic confirmed that the Committee would not replace existing procedures and channels for the handling of arms sales requests in either country. (Comment: The final draft of the MOU said the Committee would “review and follow-up development of the . . . cooperation between the two countries and the requests and orders placed by the authorities of one side to another . . . .”)

—General Vujatovic sought and received confirmation that the US SECRET classification for the MOU meant that the material would not be made available in the US to the public or the press. Mr. Siena explained that it would be necessary to notify the Congress on a classified basis of the MOU and that proposed major weapons sales over $7M must be reported to the Congress. That notice to Congress would be public. General Vujatovic asked if it were possible simply to divide the sale into, for example, ten contracts of $6M each; and Mr. Siena told him that was not possible. General Vujatovic said that Yugoslav law prohibited the publication of such information and that purchases had been made from the UK, France and Sweden without publication of the information. (Comment: The final draft MOU says that when Congressional notification of a proposed sale is necessary that the two governments “will agree how to proceed and will agree on the security classification of the proposed sale.”)

—Mr. Siena noted that provisions in the US draft concerning the transfer of technical data had been very carefully developed and were words with which the USG was very comfortable. General Vujatovic replied that the Yugoslav draft retained the essence and the working group could agree on a text. (Comment: This is the section on which we have recently approached the GOY, at ACDA’s insistence asking that language be added to explicitly prohibit unauthorized third-country transfers of items produced from US-origin data and technical information.

—General Vujatovic and Mr. Siena named the members of the drafting working group. Yugoslavia: MG Popovic, Col. Ilic and Col. Gabaj. US: MG Bowman, Mr. Violette and Mr. Pernick.

[Omitted here is discussion about specific weapons systems.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Larrabee Subject File, Box 68, Yugoslavia: Military: 11/77–12/78. Secret. Drafted by McVadon on April 7, 1979; approved by McVadon.
2. Attached but not printed. See footnote 5, Document 258.
3. Eagleburger proposed the creation of a Joint Military Working Group at the same time as the Joint Economic Working Group. (See Document 248 and footnotes 2–5 thereto.) In a June 14, 1978, memorandum, Hunter informed Brzezinski that “State, Defense, and Embassy Belgrade propose broaching with the Yugoslavs the idea of setting up a joint military working group—as we had suggested before the Tito visit.” Hunter, with Les Denend’s concurrence, recommended that State be allowed to approach the Yugoslavs with the idea, noting that “the group would not be primarily concerned with arms sales—though that might come up.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 4–12/78) The Department of State was notified of White House approval of the recommendation on June 16. (Ibid.)