Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

259. Memorandum From Robert Putnam of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, November 2, 1978

SUBJECT

• Intelligence Exchanges with Yugoslavia—Possible VBB Lunch Topic

Yugoslav Defense Minister Ljubicic raised the issue of military intelligence exchanges with Harold Brown during their private talks in September.² Brown agreed, and said we would follow up through intelligence channels. The intelligence side of DOD is now reviewing the problems this would pose and some in OSD are known to be a bit skeptical. (We have already asked that the matter be referred to you before any final decisions are taken.) This memorandum suggests a course of action for moving ahead with an appropriately cautious policy on these exchanges.

The benefits of the exchanges would be primarily political:

• —We can demonstrate support for Yugoslav efforts to remain independent of Soviet advances
• —We might expand our contacts with the Yugoslav military, which could be useful in the post-Tito period.
• —We might gain otherwise unavailable useful intelligence, if the exchanges are genuinely mutual.

The risks, to which some in OSD call particular attention, involve military and intelligence considerations:

• —The likelihood of KGB penetration of the GOY means that any information we pass is likely to surface in Moscow.
• —Therefore, we cannot give the Yugoslavs any really useful information.
• —Therefore, we are unlikely to get any useful information in return.³

We need also to reflect on probable Yugoslav motives and possible Soviet reactions.

The relevant NSC staffers (Hoskinson, Hunter, Thomson) are inclined to believe that these exchanges might be constructed in a way that would minimize exposure of sources and methods, while offering the prospect of significant political benefits. Ambassador Eagleburger says his only concern is “with how we proceed, not whether we should do so”, but he urges great caution and careful political supervision. (His views are in a cable at Tab A.)⁴

Because this issue involved balancing political, military, and intelligence interests, it needs eventually to be addressed in an interagency forum that can review all aspects, not just the intelligence issues. Because bureaucratically, the action at the moment is with the Deputy Undersecretary for Policy (Intelligence), normal NSC–ISA channels are not adequate for addressing the problem.

Therefore, I recommend that you raise this issue directly with Harold Brown, preferably at a VBB luncheon.

You could tell Brown that:

• —in principle, you endorse his offer to Ljubicic.
• —you understand there may be some intelligence reservations about the nature of the proposed exchanges.
• —we need to factor in the political implications before making a judgment about how to proceed.
• —once DOD has had a chance to prepare the groundwork, it might be useful to have interagency consideration of how to implement the offer.

You could ask Brown to have Resor convene—or offer to have the NSC convene—a small interagency working group with representatives from State, CIA, NSC, and the relevant offices in DOD. Working from the DOD paper, this group would draw up guidelines for the exchanges that would minimize exposure of sources and methods, while maximizing the political and intelligence returns to the U.S. (Hoskinson is a bit skeptical about the need for an interagency group and feels you may simply wish to review the eventual DOD decision yourself.) You might also want to touch base with Admiral Turner.⁵

Recommendation

That you speak to Harold Brown, Cy Vance (beginning at a VBB lunch), plus Stan Turner, about setting up an interagency working group to review plans for intelligence exchanges with Yugoslavia.⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 32, Luncheon Meetings (BBV): 7–12/78. Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Bartholomew.
2. On October 7, the Department notified the Embassy in Belgrade of the issues that came up in private discussions between Secretary Brown and Yugoslav National Defense Minister Ljubicic including the Yugoslav idea of intelligence sharing between the two countries. The Department informed the Embassy that Brown had agreed to “exchanges of information on the Soviets and said we would follow up through intelligence channels.” (Telegram 256055 to Belgrade, October 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780411–0986)
3. Aaron highlighted the three points above and wrote on the margin: “ZB—No worse than an exchange with the FRG.”
4. In telegram 7623 from Belgrade, October 17, Eagleburger expressed concerns “about what the Yugoslavs really intend” and nervousness about moving too far too fast as the military relationship was still in its infancy. “If the Yugoslavs really want formally to exchange (emphasis on exchange) intelligence information on the Soviets,” he argued, “then they are even more uncertain of their Eastern Big Brother than I had thought.” Although he agreed that the Departments of State and Defense should pursue Ljubicic’s offer, Eagleburger urged that the approach “be supervised at the political level in State and DOD (and, it goes without saying, this Embassy).” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 4–12/78)
5. Aaron wrote on the bottom of the page “ZB—You should ask Resor to contact me on this & I can work it out with our staff & State with or without a mtg.”
6. Brzezinski did not check either box. At the November 3 VBB lunch, Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski agreed that Defense should coordinate with Newsom on responding to the Yugoslavs. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 1, Vance/Brown/Brzezinski Luncheons—4–12/78) In a November 7 memorandum to Aaron, Putnam provided a scenario on how the interdepartmental coordination among Aaron, Resor, and Newsom would work for setting up a policy recommendation on the subject. Putnam also recommended that the DCI be informed either by Aaron or Brzezinski as “the DCI is apparently acting on the assumption that he is a player on this issue.” Aaron approved the scenario, and suggested that Putnam get Carlucci involved. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 51, Chron: 11/7–30/78)