Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

251. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, March 3, 1978

SUBJECT

• Meetings with President Tito

The memorandum from Cy Vance (Tab A)² sets out effectively the background, setting, and issues for your meetings with President Tito. A suggested arrival statement and talking points for your toast are at Tab B;³ your latest letter to Tito at Tab C;⁴ his latest letter to you at Tab D;⁵ and Reston’s article on his interview with Tito at Tab E.⁶ The Yugoslavs have also suggested issuing a joint statement at the end of the visit, as has been customary on past Tito visits. State is currently negotiating an appropriate statement with the Yugoslavs, which we will forward to you before the meetings.

In your recent letter to him, you suggested discussions on East-West relations, disarmament, the Middle East, Africa, North-South relations, the global economy, and Tito’s trip to the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. We have not yet had a response to your letter soliciting his comments on this proposed agenda, but will send it to you immediately if and when it arrives.

The Yugoslavs have made clear that Tito will want to talk about major issues with you, preferably leaving bilateral issues to discussions at the ministerial level. However, he may raise with you the question of the Krsko reactor.⁷

The Yugoslavs have repeatedly said that the exchange of letters between you and President Tito have deeply impressed him, and it is clear they have done a lot to improve relations between our two countries. The Yugoslavs were particularly struck that in a recent letter you praised Tito’s leadership of the non-aligned movement,⁸ something no U.S. Administration had done before.

In your most recent exchange of letters, you discussed the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and CSCE. His reply (tabbed in the book) was only general on the first two issues, but sought your assistance in moving Belgrade to a successful conclusion, an appeal he also addressed—unsuccessfully—to Brezhnev. (Your response is also tabbed in the book, and you may wish to refer to it.)

Issues

In addition to material in the State Department book, there are the following issues:

Krsko. The basic issue is well set out in Cy’s memo: as part of our own non-proliferation program and in accord with the Act, we seek commitments from the Yugoslavs about disposition of U.S.-supplied equipment and fuel—commitments additional to the original Yugoslav agreement with the IAEA. We offered a package which would meet our requirements, and negotiations seemed to be going well. However, this week at the IAEA the Yugoslavs called our proposals unacceptable and said Tito would ask you for a “waiver.”⁹

—If Tito raises the issue in a general way, I suggest you applaud the Yugoslav record on non-proliferation; explain our concerns and legislation, thus making clear that we are not discriminating against Yugoslavia; express appreciation for their willingness to negotiate and that you look forward to a successful conclusion.

—If Tito asks for a waiver, this is the situation: the Non-Proliferation Act contains no “waiver” permitting you to authorize shipments of fuel to a country that does not meet the immediate conditions of the Act. There is, however, a theoretical loophole which gives EURATOM and the IAEA two years to meet the immediate conditions of the Act. Since Yugoslavia’s agreement is with the IAEA, that might be made to apply. But to use that loophole for Yugoslavia would create an impression that the Act is being dismantled as soon as it was signed. And it would put you in confrontation with the NRC, which is strongly opposed and feels that Yugoslavia supply agreement with us should not be through the IAEA in the first place. If Tito asks for a waiver, I suggest you explain that there is no waiver provision in the act that would apply, point out the effect on our entire non-proliferation program, and suggest that Vance discuss the question with Foreign Minister Minic.

Science and Technology Cooperation. During the past five years, we have had a science and technology cooperation program with the Yugoslavs, to which each side committed $7 million over that period. Our part has been financed out of our dinar holdings, which will not continue to be large enough to finance this program, in addition to the usual expenses of our Embassy in Belgrade.

The Yugoslavs have proposed, therefore, that we begin paying Yugoslav annuitants (from Social Security, etc.) in dollars instead of dinars, in order to free up extra dinars for the science and technology program. Treasury objects, on the grounds that that will swell the pool of dinars to excess, and that the proposal falls outside the intent of Congress, if not the law itself governing U.S.-owned foreign currencies.

I have asked State-Treasury-OMB to propose an alternative—such as a direct appropriation of approximately $1.5 million a year to this program, which the Yugoslavs value highly. As soon as I have their proposal, I shall forward it to you for approval.¹⁰

Demonstrations. As you know, the Yugoslavs are very much concerned about the prospect of demonstrations during Tito’s visit. Two permits have been granted: one to a small group of Serbs, and another to a larger group of Croats. Justice and State continue to work on the problem, but at time of writing no way had been found to shift the demonstrations from in front of the White House. I will continue to pursue this issue; in any event, everyone is on notice that there can be no repeat of the incident when the Shah was here.

North Korea. The Yugoslavs have reported that President Tito continues to be interested in a possible role as go-between us and Pyongyang. In addition to the material in Cy’s memo, I believe you should know that:

—North Korean intransigence is responsible for the current diplomatic impasse. It is Pyongyang that maintains it is the “only legal sovereign government” on the Peninsula, insists that its friends and allies foreswear all contact with Seoul, rejects a renewal of serious, substantive discussions with the Republic of Korea, and refuses to contemplate the wider involvement of both Koreas in the international community through dual membership in the UN on a provisional basis, pending progress toward reunification.

—Pyongyang’s position is increasingly out of phase with international realities. More than 50 countries recognize both Koreas—54 to be exact. Both Koreas sit alongside each other in a growing number of UN Specialized Agencies, despite the North’s refusal to countenance dual membership in the UN itself. Though Pyongyang seeks to keep alive the fiction that South Korea is illegitimate, it must come to terms with the fact that the ROK is not merely a going concern, but has become a major world trading power which in a few years time will qualify for membership in the OECD on the basis of its industrial prowess.

—Some of the Communist countries—most notably the East Germans—have apparently acknowledged that any long-term movement toward reunification must progress through a prolonged period of “peaceful coexistence” in which North-South relations are institutionalized and regularized, i.e., the German formula.” This is a salutary development. Others should chime in, Tito included.

—Yugoslavia’s position is itself somewhat curious. Belgrade wishes to assume the role of go-between. Yet it has not carved out a policy toward Korea that reflects the dominant movement toward international recognition of the reality of two Koreas.

I recommend, therefore, that you emphasize the following points:

—Our belief that North Korea’s diplomatic stance is increasingly anachronistic.

—We are serious about implementing our troop withdrawal plan, but have no intention of responding to North Korean suggestions to discuss the Korean problems in forums which exclude the South. Our attitude toward contacts with Pyongyang will depend on the willingness of its allies to make reciprocal contacts with Seoul.

—Our conviction that a prolonged period of institutionalized peaceful coexistence is the only plausible route toward reunification. In that context the diplomatic objective should be the reduction of tensions between the two Koreas and a resumption of the North-South dialogue.

—Ask whether Honnecker’s veiled suggestions in Pyongyang that the North consider a two-Koreas policy comparable to arrangements worked out by the two Germanys reflects Soviet thinking on this subject. Inquire about North Korean reactions to Honnecker’s proposals.

—The Yugoslav policy of shunning direct commercial relations with Seoul appears to be inconsistent with the diversification of relations by South and North Korea which Tito has asked us to accept.

Post-Tito Contingencies. The Four-Power Political Directors have been working for some time on a general contingency paper in the event of Soviet pressure following Tito’s death. This paper seeks to identify the military supply needs of the Yugoslav military—for several contingencies—and Western ability to provide those supplies. It also surveys diplomatic efforts that could be made in support of Yugoslavia under those circumstances. The paper does not contemplate any form of direct Western military involvement. It will be discussed at the next Four-Power Foreign Ministers’ meeting, but this will not lead to any joint commitments, nor has the paper been discussed in any way with other countries, including Yugoslavia.

Overflight. Last week, there was another overflight incident, when four U.S. aircraft from Italy briefly violated Yugoslav airspace. We have no indications that the Yugoslavs detected the violation; but the State Department has informed the Yugoslav Ambassador about it.¹¹ You will recall that we were falsely accused of overflights last fall, but dealt successfully with the incident by sending a senior Admiral to Yugoslavia to compare technical data, and by showing our deep concern. There is now an “informal” procedure—to avoid setting a precedent that could cause problems during a succession crisis—by which we let the Yugoslavs know when there will be naval air activity in the Adriatic.

Economic Cooperation. In his Reston interview (not in the part carried in the Times), Tito emphasized economic cooperation with us. In the last week, we have agreed with the Yugoslavs to set up two working groups, at the Deputy Assistant Secretary/Ambassador level, on economic cooperation—one group in Belgrade and one here. This will be announced in the joint statement at the end of the visit.

Kardelj. You may want to recall the visit of Mr. Kardelj last fall. At the moment, he is very seriously ill (cancer, reportedly), and you may want to inquire after him.

Detente. The Yugoslavs repeatedly say that detente between the U.S. and Soviet Union has possibilities of condominium, unless broadened to include “smaller powers”—i.e., Yugoslavia. You might go into Yugoslavia’s role (and that of other smaller powers) in CSCE, areas like diplomacy on the Horn, Tito’s role in dealing with both East and West, and his leadership of the non-aligned movement.

Horn of Africa. We would welcome more Yugoslav initiative on the Horn of Africa. We hope the Yugoslavs can capitalize on the relationships they have in Addis Ababa, a) to influence Mengistu’s government to pursue a more balanced and more truly non-aligned policy; and b) to cooperate in a settlement with the Somalis which will preserve Ethiopia’s territorial integrity—but at the same time avoid needless humiliation of the Somalis. If an Ethiopian-Somali settlement is to last, some arrangement for a broader ceasefire policing operation appears to us to be needed. It would be best to have this set up under OAU auspices; but if the OAU finds it difficult to work out arrangements, we would like to see more experienced countries—such as Yugoslavia and India—offering their help and serving as catalysts.

China. You may wish to explore with President Tito the possibility of his acting as a channel to Peking, much as the Romanians were used at an earlier stage:

—We are pleased to see the developing relationship between Peking and Belgrade. We think this is an important relationship and one that deserves to be broadened.

—We are committed to the process of normalization and would consider it useful if Tito could convey the earnestness of our intent to Peking.

—We consider the improvement of our relations with Peking to be a matter of historic and strategic importance.

—We believe that mutual efforts are necessary to create the environment in which the normalization process can be completed. Such mutual efforts include not only an expansion of the commercial and economic relations with Peking in order to foster political attitudes in this country that would favor normalization, but a broadening and deepening of our consultations with Peking about world affairs as well.

—To this end, perhaps Tito could indicate to the Chinese that we do not wish to use our relationship with Peking to get at the Russians. We do not seek to manipulate the Sino-Soviet dispute to our advantage. Rather, we believe that an improved relationship with Peking is simply in the American interest.

—But to convince our domestic skeptics that an improved relationship with Peking is in our interest, perhaps Tito would be willing to indicate to the Chinese that it would be helpful to us were the Chinese to discuss with us rather than preach to us on such issues as:

—Korea and the possibility of cooperative measures to promote a peaceful and just evolution of the situation on the Peninsula.

—Africa and ways in which we might pursue separate yet reinforcing ways of preventing outside powers from establishing positions of dominance on the Continent.

—Global strategic matters and ways in which US efforts to promote arms control and disarmament can take into account the Chinese position and encourage the Chinese to participate in our efforts.

—In short, we see China as a significant actor on the world scene, we consider that we have many parallel strategic interests with China, and we wish to act upon these parallel interests in order over a period of time to encourage the Chinese to play a constructive role in the addressing of man’s many problems.

Non-Aligned Movement. President Tito will want to talk with you about the Non-Aligned Movement. It would be useful to seek his moderating influence on a particular question—the next meeting of the Movement in Havana in 1979, when Cuba wants a signal success:

—Historically, the position of the US Government to the Non-Aligned Movement has been one of distance at best, and hostility at worst.

—We may not like Non-Aligned criticism of the United States, but we recognize that, in the long term, an independent movement of non-aligned states which view the world differently from both the United States and the Soviet Union, is in our interest. Therefore, we hope to communicate on a regular basis with the Movement.

—Since we now have an interest in an independent, non-aligned movement, we are concerned that the next Chairman of the Movement is Cuba, a country which is so closely aligned to the Soviet Union. Indeed, Cuban troops are presently being used to further Soviet goals in Africa and may even be taking orders from Soviet military officials there.

—In discussions of “imperialism” at the next Non-Aligned conference in 1979, we wonder whether Cuban and Soviet imperialism will be discussed with as much vigor—if at all—as “U.S. imperialism.”

Welcoming Ceremony. It will be televised live to Yugoslavia, in six languages.

First Meeting. Tito has indicated he would like to meet alone with you at the start of the first meeting (Oval Office). No subjects have been advanced.

Security: Update. Friday night, the Yugoslav Consulate in San Francisco was fire-bombed. Warren Christopher talked with the Yugoslav Ambassador to note that the FBI is vigorously investigating it, and that we are acting to protect other Yugoslav installations—though so far only through the local police.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, Yugoslavia: President Tito, 3/6–9/78: Briefing Book. Secret; Sensitive. The date is handwritten.
2. See Document 252.
3. Attached but not printed. For the remarks at the welcoming ceremony and the toasts delivered at the State Dinner, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, pp. 473–480.
4. Attached but not printed; dated February 24. In the letter, Carter proposed an agenda for discussions including East-West relations, arms control and disarmament, the Middle East, Africa, North-South relations, and global economic issues as well as any other reflections Tito might have on his recent trip to the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Carter also expressed support for achieving “a substantial and well-balanced document” at the conclusion of the CSCE meeting in Belgrade. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 57, Yugoslavia: 1–3/78)
5. Attached but not printed. In the undated letter, sent February 12, Tito addressed the Palestinian issue, the Horn of Africa, and the CSCE conference in Belgrade. He also stressed his belief of the importance of adopting a substantial and comprehensive document at the conclusion of the Belgrade CSCE conference. (Ibid.)
6. James Reston, “At 85, Tito Still Looks to Future and Worries About the Present.” (The New York Times, March 3, 1978, p. A1)
7. In telegram 1359 from Belgrade, February 17, Eagleburger reported his conversation with Malivoj Maksic, Tito’s National Security Adviser, in which the two discussed how the meetings between the two Presidents should be organized, and whether the Foreign Ministers would participate in the meetings with the Presidents or have parallel meetings. Eagleburger concluded: “Tito clearly prefers to focus on international problems, leaving bilateral issues to others.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780076–1117) In telegram 1582 from Belgrade, February 25, Eagleburger reported his February 25 meeting with Maksic, in which the Yugoslav official stressed Tito’s desire for private meetings with Carter and informed Eagleburger that Tito would not get into details on bilateral matters, but would concentrate on international issues such as détente, CSCE, disarmament, the Middle East, China, North Korea, and the Non-Aligned Movement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780088–0200)
8. In his January 31 letter, Carter discussed the deteriorating situation in the Horn of Africa due to increased Soviet and Cuban involvement in the area. Carter asked Tito to use his influence in the Non-Aligned Movement and his good offices to convince the Ethiopian Government of the need for a negotiated settlement. He also asked Tito to convey to the Soviet Government the growing U.S. unease about Soviet and Cuban involvement in the Horn. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Yugoslavia: President Josip Broz Tito, 5/77–5/79)
9. As reported in telegram 2025 from Vienna, March 2, the Yugoslav negotiating team at the IAEA held that the United States should reacquire the spent fuel from Yugoslavia’s Krsko reactor. The Yugoslavs, the Embassy reported, told the IAEA that Tito would raise the matter with Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780095–1047)
10. In a March 6 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski informed the President that OMB, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of State disagreed on the possible way forward for the Science and Technology program. While OMB recommended allowing the various agencies to seek funding based on their own priorities, the Department of State recommended seeking a $7 million appropriation to fund the program for another five years, an option Brzezinski also supported. Carter approved the appropriation, noting in the margin that it should be a “regular budget item—no special budget request.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, Yugoslavia: President Tito, 3/6–9/78: Cables and Memos)
11. During a meeting with Belovski on February 28, Vest reported that a Navy F–4 jet had unintentionally penetrated Yugoslav airspace earlier that day. Vest assured Belovski that the airplane had been grounded and its equipment was being checked, and that the United States took the incident very seriously. (Telegram 52219 to Belgrade, March 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780092–1189)