Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

25. Memorandum From Robert King of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 1, 1978

SUBJECT

• Your Request for a Memorandum Detailing Policy in Eastern Europe

Reg² passed on your request to him and Bill Quandt for a memo on policy in the two areas. Reg asked that I handle Eastern Europe separately.

1. Stages of U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe. Since January 1977 there have been three stages in U.S. policy. Initially there was a period of caution as the new administration began a general policy review. From January until the beginning of September, no new initiatives with any of the East European countries were undertaken, although previous European relationships were maintained.

A more active and decisive stage became evident toward the end of the summer of 1977. The PRM–9 review of European issues included a section on Eastern Europe, and the final PRC meeting on that aspect of European policy was held at the end of August. The President signed PD–21 on September 13³ which set the administration’s policies—we would seek to work with East European governments to enhance their international independence and increase the degree of internal liberalization. In concrete terms this policy involved continuing to give preferential treatment to Poland and Romania, improving relations with Hungary through returning the Crown and negotiating a trade agreement under appropriate conditions, but relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR would remain limited until there is some progress in either independence or liberalization although steps might be taken to put relations with these three countries on a more normal basis.

Since the enunciation of that policy one year ago, our efforts have been focused on carrying it out. The highlights have included the President’s visit to Poland, the granting of $500 million in CCC credits to Poland for the purchase of U.S. grain, returning the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary, negotiation of a U.S.-Hungarian Trade Agreement, including MFN, and welcoming Ceausescu here for a State visit.

With the Ceausescu visit and ratification of the Hungarian Trade Agreement the specific policy initiatives in PD–21 have been completed and we now seem to be entering a period marked by a less active policy for Eastern Europe. State Department East Europeanists are pushing to negotiate a Claims/Gold agreement with Czechoslovakia and may want to consider discussions on MFN with Bulgaria. There is some interest in maintaining the momentum that we have built up to deal with other outstanding issues toward the East European countries. The difficulty, however, is that those countries with whom we could achieve progress in our bilateral relations—Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the GDR—have not exhibited the international independence or the internal liberalization that would justify such actions.

With Poland, Romania, and Hungary we have now about reached the limit of what we can or would want to do. We should continue to work with Poland on the debt problem, but beyond granting the Poles an additional large CCC credit this year (and in future years) there is little more that we can do. We are similarly limited with Romania and Hungary. High level visits represent the most we can do in continuing to emphasize our interest in the region. A Gierek visit possibly in 1979 was mentioned during the President’s Warsaw stop, and the Romanians are anxious to host the President in Bucharest. The Hungarians would like to see Kadar in Washington, but such a visit would create problems with Hungarian-Americans who are still smarting from the return of the Crown. An invitation for a Kadar visit would best be issued after 1980, with an official visit by Secretary Vance to Budapest and possibly one by the Vice President as interim measures.

2. Your Role in Policy Formulation. You have clearly played the dominant role in formulating our policy towards Eastern Europe. Your background, expertise, and interest have given you a much stronger and more authoritative voice in this area. Furthermore, Eastern Europe is not a major focus of policy concern, thus other policy players are not willing to spend their political capital to challenge you in that area.

You have been largely responsible for conceptually framing the approach to Eastern Europe, but you have also been active in initiating and implementing specific actions (return of the Crown and Polish CCC credits). Your role as the strongest advocate for increasing from $300 to $500 million the total amount of CCC credit for Poland last December, however, resulted in a certain degree of criticism. Because of your Polish background, there was some muted feeling that you were playing favorites. In the context of the President’s visit and the importance of Poland, this was unjust. It would be useful in the future, however, to appear less of an advocate on controversial matters which involve Poland. The European Bureau of State and the Department of Commerce can take the lead, and they will lead boldly if they have your support. If it becomes necessary to reschedule the Polish debt there will be strong opposition from Treasury and EB at State to a policy giving Poland benefits other debtor countries do not enjoy. This issue is one on which you should avoid taking the lead if possible.

3. Reflections on the Decision-Making Process: My comments on the decision-making process are probably not unique to Eastern Europe, although as an area of lower priority the problems with the process may be more evident than in the areas of higher risks and concerns.

• —Interagency papers that have formed the basis for decisions, generally drafted in segments by several different agencies, have tended to be too long and poorly integrated. They may be useful in helping the working-level elements of various agencies to understand the problems, but they do not seem to be helpful at higher levels in informing and channeling discussion.
• —The policy options tend to be less sharply defined than might be desirable. The working level tend to round off the edges and fuzz the sharpness of options in the search for consensus.
• —While the policy process is never orderly and subject to neat timetables, there tends to be too little time before decision meetings to digest papers and even agenda, with the result that principals are less well prepared than would be desirable.

The drafting of policy and options papers by a single agency with ample opportunity for other agencies to comment and register dissents would seem to be more useful and orderly mechanism.

4. Basic Documents. Appended to this paper is a copy of PD–21, the principal statement of general policy toward Eastern Europe.⁴

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 16, PD–21. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Larrabee initialed the memorandum for King.
2. Reginald Bartholomew.
3. See Document 16.
4. Not attached.