233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Romania1
334596. Madrid for CSCE—Greenwald and Davidson. Subject: Counselor’s Meeting With Bogdan.
1. C-entire text.
2. Summary. During a tour d’horizon with Counselor December 16, the Director for the Americas in the Romanian Foreign Ministry, Corneliu Bogdan, stressed Romania’s firm commitment to the continuation of the Helsinki process and urged the U.S. to keep an open mind about the venue of the follow-on conference. Bogdan believed the [Page 739] Soviets do not want to interfere in Poland2 and observed the situation there appears to be calming down. The Counselor reviewed the U.S. position on Poland, and welcomed Romania’s constructive contribution at Madrid. The Counselor observed that next year’s most favored nation (MFN) hearings will probably focus more on Romania’s emigration procedures than on the numbers involved since the current rate of emigration is relatively satisfactory. Bogdan disclaimed any current interest in a new Mid-East initiative. Discussion of human rights, the IBRD loan, and Romania’s domestic situation will be reported separately.3 End summary.
3. The Director for the Americas in the Romanian Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan, accompanied by Romanian Ambassador to the US, Ionescu, and Embassy Counselor Ranghet called on the Counselor December 16 to review the international situation and discuss outstanding bilateral issues. EUR DAS Barry and the Romanian country officer also participated in the meeting and luncheon which followed. Conversation focused on Poland and CSCE and on the Middle East, next year’s MFN’s hearings, human rights, and Romania’s application for an IBRD loan for a power project. The last item is reported by septel.
4. Poland. Bogdan reiterated Romania’s well-known opposition to any form of outside interference in Poland’s internal affairs. He [Page 740] emphasized that the presentation by Foreign Minister Andrei to the Ambassador earlier in the previous week was the best statement of the Romanian position and remained valid. He also observed that the past several days had been marked by constructive calm; he expected the Gdansk commemoration would not get out of hand and lead to a pretext for intervention. He was reassured by DAS Barry’s report that the Gdansk observances had been orderly and non-provocative. Bogdan refused to speculate on the effect of a possible Soviet intervention and would not be drawn into a detailed discussion of the specifics of a Romanian reaction in that event. Nor would he volunteer any suggestion how he would like the United States to show its support for Romania in the aftermath of a Soviet intervention in Poland; but he stressed the need for close consultations prior to the US taking any action affecting Romania, including the issuance of a statement of support for Romania’s independent position.
5. Bogdan refused to comment on Foreign Minister Andrei’s trip to Moscow prior to the Warsaw Pact summit meeting.4 He claimed Andrei dealt solely with bilateral issues. He allowed that Romania’s role in the Warsaw Pact summit had been a moderating one, “as it always is”, but insisted that Romania had not arranged the meeting or sought in any way to be a moderator between the Soviet Union and Poland in the present crisis.
Middle East
6. DAS Barry asked the status of Romania’s “initiative” on the Middle East to convene an international conference to carry forward the accomplishments of the Camp David Agreements. Barry noted that the GOR had decided in late summer to postpone taking any action until after the US elections, and urged that the GOR still not initiate any action until the new administration had an opportunity to review the situation in the Middle East.
7. Bogdan claimed that the Romanian “initiative” had never been more than an “idea” floated to see if the apparent impasse in the Camp David process could be broken. At present Romania does not want to undertake any moves in the Middle East because they could lead to still more turmoil.
8. The Counselor expressed appreciation for Bogdan’s remarks, noting that the Iraq/Iran war and the corollary arguments among the Arab States which had grown out of it could contribute to a possible breakup of larger political blocs in the area and have a general destabi [Page 741] lizing effect. Bogdan agreed and said Romania wished to do what it could to keep the conflict in the Middle East and between Iraq and Iran from widening into a broader conflict which could ultimately involve a US-Soviet confrontation, which Romania always wishes to avoid.
CSCE
9. Ambassador Bogdan expressed satisfaction with the first session of the Madrid Conference. He reiterated Romania’s desire for a generally balanced discussion of all three Baskets. He stressed the importance Romania places on its proposal to host the next follow-on conference. Bogdan asked the U.S. to keep an open mind on the invitation and make no decision until the second session at Madrid is under way. Bogdan also proposed holding bilateral consultations on CSCE during the first week of February.
10. The Counselor expressed the US awareness of the importance Romania attaches to hosting the next follow-on conference. She assured Bogdan that no decision would be made until after the new administration has come into office. She took Bogdan’s request for bilateral consultation under advisement.
11. Speaking “unofficially”, Bogdan saw no possibility for agreement on new proposals during the second session at Madrid. He hoped for agreement on follow-on meetings by expert groups, however.
12. The Counselor raised with Bogdan the question of participation by observers from non-government organizations (NGO) and private individuals and groups at a CSCE follow-on meeting were it to be held in Bucharest. Yugoslavia’s refusal to allow observers from these groups had led to considerable difficulty in the United States. The NGO’s and individuals concerned with the CSCE process became highly critical of the United States engaging in a process (i.e. Helsinki) in which freedom of expression was severely curtailed. As a further consequence, the press had been very critical of the Belgrade meeting and popular support in the US for the entire CSCE process had suffered. The situation at Madrid, however, was quite different, the Counselor observed. The Spanish had set aside space for the various groups to caucus and demonstrate, consequently they have not been frustrated but have remained in Madrid or returned to their home countries, including the US, believing the Madrid Conference has provided them a forum to air their grievances. Our impression has been that the entire CSCE process has gained support in the US as a result.
13. Bogdan listened carefully & thought for a moment before responding that there would of course be some difficulties because it would not be possible for Romania to agree to permit every individual or group to enter the country in an observer status. On the other hand, he said, his government had taken this point into consideration before [Page 742] issuing the invitation, and he was sure that satisfactory arrangements (not specified) could be worked out.
14. Ambassador Bogdan noted that the new alignment in the Senate would mean extra work during the MFN hearings. He believed, however, that the Romanian Embassy knew the key Senators and Congressmen involved and he hoped the hearings would go well. The Counselor saw the consistently high number of Romanians permitted to emigrate over the past year as a positive development. She believed, however, that this year much more attention would be focused on the process and procedures involved in emigration from Romania. Reports of harassment, bureaucratic delays and even physical abuse would be carefully reviewed and would play a major role in committee hearings.5 This point was carefully noted by the Romanians.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800603–0381. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Madrid for the CSCE delegation. Sent for information to Warsaw, Moscow, and USNATO. Drafted by Becker; cleared by Bridges, Barry, and in HA; approved by Ridgway.↩
- In telegram 320368 to Bucharest and Belgrade December 4, the Department instructed Aggrey to call on Andrei to discuss the situation in Poland, stressing that a Soviet intervention in Poland would have wide-ranging consequences on U.S.-Soviet relations. The Department also instructed Aggrey to ask Andrei for the Romanian view of the situation in Poland, and assure the Romanian Government of “our own continuing strong support for Romania’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870123–0417) In telegram 9896 from Bucharest, December 4, Aggrey reported that he had delivered the U.S. position earlier that day, and that Andrei promised to pass the information to Ceausescu and discuss the Romanian position with the Ambassador as soon as possible. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870104–0553) On December 6, Aggrey met with Andrei who informed him that he had just returned from the meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries Party leaders and Foreign Ministers in Moscow. “The general consensus,” Andrei told Aggrey, “was that Poland’s problems should be solved by the Polish people. At present, there is no intention of another Warsaw Pact state’s military forces interfering in the internal affairs of Poland.” However, Aggrey reported, Andrei warned that “if the situation in Poland reaches a point of unreasonable conflict” between the government and protestors, “such an eventuality could lead the regime to invite the Soviet Union to intervene,” something neither the United States nor Romania wanted to see. (Telegram 9971 from Bucharest, December 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870104–0550)↩
- In telegram 336127 to Bucharest, December 20, the Department reported Bogdan’s discussions with Ridgway on the internal situation in Romania. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800605–1009) Bogdan also met with Vest on December 22 and discussed Poland, CSCE, human rights, and bilateral relations. (Telegram 337804 to Bucharest, December 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800607–1136)↩
- In telegram 9846 from Bucharest, December 3, Aggrey reported that Andrei was in Moscow on December 2 for four hours to meet with Brezhnev. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800576–0767)↩
- In a December 16 briefing memorandum prepared by EUR, Ridgway was asked to stress that “concerned Americans and Congressional leaders are focusing increasingly on the process involved and not just on numbers.” On the copy of the memorandum circulated in the Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Bureau, Derian underlined “Americans and Congressional leaders” and wrote in the margin: “Back to the old ways. Not that USG is concerned but vague refs to ‘Americans’ as in: Oh, please, do this or that to help us—too bad.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1980—Human Rights and Country Files, Lot 82D177, Box 16, Romania–Nov thru Dec 1980)↩