231. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bucharest1
202085. Joint State-Defense message. Subject: US Military Exports to Romania. Ref: Bucharest 5390.2
1. (S-entire text)
2. The meeting on July 1 between the DATT and Rear Admiral Dinu appears to have been a useful exchange. We believe it important to have an early second exchange to clarify more precisely what we have in mind.3 We are particularly concerned that the Romanians not build unrealistic expectations and that our exchanges reflect a careful and constructive approach.
3. Our strategy at this stage is to give the Romanians a general understanding of the kinds of equipment the US might be willing to license for sale and the kinds the US is not prepared to license, and to seek Romanian reactions to this approach. Begin FYI. Shortly we will inform the Yugoslavs, who approached us, that the US would approve an export license for the export to Yugoslavia of a US aileron drive system to be installed in the wings of the Romanian version of the Jurom jet fighter. This should not repeat not be conveyed to the Romanians at this time. End FYI.
4. Accordingly, at the Charge’s discretion, the Defense Attache should convey the following points to Admiral Dinu. Begin text:
—We found the exchange which took place on July 1 to be useful.
—In view of the interest in having further exchanges on this subject, we wish to outline in greater detail to you our general approach.
[Page 734]—We are pleased that Romania and the United States have developed, in a gradual and prudent fashion, a military relationship that includes high-level military visits, ship visits, and other interchanges.
—We are willing to consider making strictly limited exports of US military equipment to Romania on a case-by-case basis. While we are not prepared to consider sales of military equipment on a government-to-government basis (that is, under the US “foreign military sales” program) we could approve exports of some commercially-available US-manufactured munitions list items exclusive of major defense equipment or sensitive military technologies.
—These limitations would mean that most if not all items on the list provided to us in 1975 would be unavailable. The US might, however, be prepared to entertain specific license requests for some items under such headings as, for example, certain radars, communications equipment, light cargo-personnel vehicles, light aircraft, selected non-weapons components for the Jurom jet fighter, and other non-sensitive military equipment. US approval of export licenses would be subject to COCOM concurrence.
—Exports from the US of weapons or sensitive military technologies will not be possible for the foreseeable future. No US Government credits would be available for such exports to Romania.
—Exports to Romania of commercially-available munitions list items would not involve the conclusion of agreements between Romania and the United States.
—As a condition of export approval, we would require assurances from Romania that equipment sold to it not be transferred or otherwise made available to third parties.
—Our willingness to consider such exports to Romania despite its membership in the Warsaw Pact reflects the positive trends in US-Romanian relations and would depend on the continuance of such trends.
—Before proceeding further on this matter, we would appreciate receiving your government’s views on the approach we have outlined. We are particularly concerned that both our governments have similar perceptions of what is possible and what is not.
—If you inform us that Romania is interested in this approach, we will then carefully assess all factors and inform you of our final decision. In the meantime we would be prepared, as indicated in the July 1 meeting, to receive specific requests from Romania.
—If exports are approved, the US would plan no formal announcements, but you should expect eventual public disclosure of Romanian purchases of US equipment. The administration would also need to inform appropriate congressional leaders before sales were made.
[Page 735]—In dealing with diplomatic or congressional queries, we will take the position that US willingness to consider exports of certain commercially-available non-sensitive munitions list items to Romania would not mark a significant new departure in US military export policy. End text.
5. If the Embassy believes it would be helpful to the Romanians, the Defense Attache may also convey the following factual information on the procedures for making purchases of US munitions list items. Begin text. The US Government does not act as an intermediary for commercial munitions sales. Romania must deal on its own with US manufacturing firms. Once the terms of a sale had been worked out between Romania and the firm concerned, the firms would request US munitions licenses from the Department of State. Prior to requesting an export license, a firm may seek an advisory opinion to determine, before negotiating a sale, whether a munitions license would likely be approved. If Romania desires names of US firms which produce certain specific items of equipment, Romania could make inquiries to the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) in Washington. Romania could also consult the Department of State (PM) regarding possible release of specific munitions list items. End text.
6. In addition to receiving a report of the meeting with Admiral Dinu, we would also appreciate having your assessment of how future exchanges with the Romanians on this issue should be handled. Admiral Dinu appears to be a channel trusted by Ceausescu, but if the Romanians express continued interest we believe it may be essential to have an exchange in political channels to ensure that there are no misunderstandings.4
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 67, Romania: 4/80–1/81. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to the White House. Drafted by Courtney, Farber, and Tumminia; cleared by Bartholomew, Barry, Kreisberg, Siena, and Larrabee and in T; approved by Nimetz.↩
- In telegram 5390 from Bucharest, July 2, the Embassy reported on the July 1 meeting between Dinu and the Defense Attaché. The Embassy reported: Dinu “expressed his satisfaction with the meeting and the fact that the U.S. response had not been a categoric ‘no.’” See footnote 4, Document 230.↩
- The decision to approach the Romanians to seek clarification was taken at a July 23 MBB meeting. O’Donohue forwarded Secretary Muskie a briefing memorandum on the status of the Department’s position on military exports to Romania on July 22 recommending that the Defense Attaché approach the Romanians again seeking clarification. Muskie wrote in the margin “Clear cable and after Romanian response talk to Congress.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981, Lot 83D66, Box 6, Folder 1)↩
- In telegram 7097 from Bucharest, August 30, the Embassy reported the August 29 meeting between Dinu and the Defense Attaché: “While Dinu conveyed the impression of being personally pleased by the DATT’s response, Dinu sought to place the onus of further movement on the U.S. with his persistent request for an indication as to which item the US might favorably consider.” Noting that when the Defense Attaché suggested that further conversations might take place in political channels Dinu did not respond. The Embassy recommended that “if the Department still considers it necessary to be more fully informed of Romanian intentions, we could wait for Dinu to convey the response of his superiors.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870104–0582) Dinu did not follow up on the discussion.↩