Office of the Historian

224. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1

Washington, April 4, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Romanian Interest in Military Supply Relationship (U)

As you know, the Romanians recently raised with our air attache in Bucharest the question of establishing a military supply relationship with us (Tab A).2 With an eye to an eventual mini-SCC, I met with Barry and Siena the other day to discuss our response and to get a sense of the views of the various agencies and services. (S)

There was general agreement that the initiation of a military supply relationship with Bucharest would be a sticky wicket and that we should proceed very cautiously. While Romania and Yugoslavia share similar views on many issues, especially resistance to Soviet hegemony, there are significant differences which make the establishment of a military relationship with Romania more difficult—and more risky:

  • —Romania remains a member of the Warsaw Pact, albeit a reluctant one; the danger of technology transfer therefore is higher.
  • —The bulk of the Romanian officer corps was trained in the Soviet Union and unlike Yugoslavia, they have no familiarity with U.S. weapons systems or procurement procedures.
  • —The political situation in Romania is shaky. While Ceausescu has a firm hand on the reigns of power at the moment, there is considerable latent disenchantment with his increasingly capricious and irrational rule—as well as the deterioration of the economy over the last few years. Should Ceausescu die or be removed, a return to a more orthodox foreign policy, one more closely attuned to Soviet interests, cannot be entirely excluded.
  • —Romania maintains a harsh internal system and has a poor human rights record (in comparison to Yugoslavia’s), a fact which would provoke opposition in Congress. (C)

At the same time there was a general consensus that we have an interest in encouraging the Romanians to diversify their arms supply and reduce their dependence on Moscow. The group felt that we should [Page 711] therefore not close the door entirely—especially since the succession struggle in the Soviet Union may offer an opportunity for Bucharest to increase its freedom of maneuver. At a minimum we could quietly and discreetly discuss with the Romanians how our procurement system works and apprise them of the major legislative requirements without making any specific commitments. This might help to prevent some of the problems that have arisen with the Yugoslavs (whom we briefed too late in the game) while at the same time keeping the door slightly ajar for sales at a later date should circumstances prove propitious. (S)

We should be sure, however, that any moves with Romania do not jeopardize our military relationship with the Yugoslavs, and before proceeding too far, it would be wise to obtain Belgrade’s reaction to our establishing a military supply relationship with Bucharest. While the Yugoslavs would probably support efforts to aid Romania (with whom they themselves are cooperating to build a joint fighter, Orao) they might feel that such efforts on our part might expose them to increased Soviet pressure and thus prefer we not sell arms to Bucharest. At any rate, at some point we should discreetly seek their views. (S)

At the moment no agency or service has a firm view on how we should proceed. PM/EUR is working on a memo to Vance setting out the political, legal and legislative implications of the establishment of any military supply relationship with Bucharest, which should be ready in several weeks. Defense has prepared a memo (Tab B) outlining US and COCOM restraints.3 I will keep you informed as work proceeds. (S)

After State has finished its memo to Vance, I think the issue should be raised at a VBB and then a mini-SCC should be held.4 (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, President’s Advisory Board, Box 84, Sensitive XX: 4/1–11/80. Secret; Outside System. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Kimmitt. Aaron wrote at the top of the first page: “ZB—Very interesting and delicate. Bob [Kimmitt] should emphasize no leaks. DA.”↩
  2. See Document 223.↩
  3. Attached at Tab B is a undated and unsigned Department of Defense memorandum from the Office of International Security Affairs prepared for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs. The memorandum outlined the DOD position regarding a military supply relationship with Romania suggesting that sales of dual-use items on the Commodity Control List and the COCOM International list could be sold to the Romanian military without congressional approval, but that congressional notification was advisable. The memorandum further informed Siena that the USG had asked COCOM partners to extend a more flexible treatment to Romania, but that no consensus had been reached. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, President’s Advisory Board, Box 84, Sensitive XX: 4/1–11/80)↩
  4. Brzezinski underlined “VBB and then a mini-SCC” and wrote: “OK. ZB. (good memo).”↩