22. Minutes of a Meeting of the East-West Planning Group1
EAST-WEST PLANNING GROUP MEETING
MINUTES OF MARCH 21, 1978
A paper prepared by Colonel Odom served as the point of departure for discussing Eastern Europe in the context of US-Soviet relations.2 In light of the previous meeting at which China had been discussed in this same vein, Colonel Odom posed two issues: Is there an “East European card”? If so, how can it be played?
In the ensuing discussion, a number of objectives of and constraints on U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe were raised. Specifically, it was suggested, U.S. policy should do three things:
1. Encourage greater autonomy, through multilateral means whenever possible.
2. Ease the repressiveness of many East European regimes.
[Page 71]3. Direct efforts toward moderate change while avoiding frontal confrontation.
It has been the U.S. practice to favor regimes in Eastern Europe if they balance greater autonomy with the retention of stability, even though the domestic policies of these regimes are hardly compatible with American political values. The delicacy of the autonomy/stability balance means that we cannot play an “East European card” as we might with China. We must understand why we are doing what we are doing, even if we can not do much. Because the balance is delicate, we must keep our “tight-rope” act in mind and not demand too much clarity in an ambiguous situation.
U.S. policies will inevitably contribute to occasional confrontational situations between Eastern Europe and the SU. We will help to exacerbate both Eastern European-Soviet and internal East European tension. There will be sporadic periods of tension vis-a-vis Eastern Europe as a permanent backdrop to U.S. policy-making.
The paper prepared for the meeting did not set down specific goals for U.S. policy. A simple matrix of possible U.S. interactions with the Soviets and East Europeans presented four different mixes of cooperation and competition. Some illustrative pros and cons for each mix were used to call attention to the key assumptions underlying policy rationale for each. The brevity of the paper was useful in stimulating review of alternative US/SU/East European relationships, but most discussants thought it made the assumptions appear too stark, and without the nuance that, as it turned out, most thought characterize US-East European relations.
Viable, coherent policy alternatives toward Eastern Europe were felt to be difficult to develop because of both domestic and international constraints. Although it was agreed that at the extremes of policy Western Europe is obliged to follow the U.S. lead, it was also felt that we are presently in the middle ground and therefore much less influential in shifting the mix of cooperation and competition. For example, European East-West trade is much larger than US-East European trade. Consumerism is a much larger issue in East Europe than in the SU, and East European politics are more sensitive to economic pressures. The relatively small US-East European trade will thus probably be translated into low political influence where consumerism is concerned.
Eastern Europe also has a “Western orientation” or “Western linkage” which must be taken into account and which the Soviet Union lacks. These historical and cultural ties vary in strength. The Western orientation of East European countries, arranged in a descending rank order is: East Germany; Poland; Czechoslovakia; Hungary; Romania; and Bulgaria. This Western orientation acts to increase Western influ [Page 72] ence in East European countries and to limit policy options developed by the West. Western orientation, rather than consumerism, could turn out to be the most important long-term factor in US-Soviet relations where the East Europeans are concerned.
Events in Eastern Europe have some impact on Soviet foreign and domestic policy. For example, experiments in Poland and Hungary will influence the Soviets. Criticisms of the Soviets by the West European Communist parties have had resonance in Eastern Europe. We should be conscious of this indirect effect and should take it into account in our policy.
The comment was made that if one reviews the trends from Eastern Europe for the last five to ten years from a Soviet perspective, they all seem bad. And the Soviets are not facing up to the problem, by one interpretation. By another, the squeaky wheel is getting the grease. It was suggested that it might be useful to try to identify those things that are likely to get immediate Soviet attention; i.e., to identify the ceiling above which Soviets won’t tolerate interference. There was general agreement that the action or reaction (i.e. use of force) line was getting fuzzier, but none doubted that the Soviets would act when they deemed it necessary.
The fuzziness, or blurring of Soviet perceptions of what actions would be tolerated, was viewed as good. The Soviets are still going to be vigilant in areas where they feel the US is pushing greater autonomy for Eastern Europe. All agreed that US policies had to include initiatives that would fall within the fuzzy area and succeed by not ruffling Soviet feathers.
There was disagreement about the types of initiatives that would meet this criterion. Some felt that the Soviets would not allow any move by the Eastern European countries that would slacken the Soviet control of their economies or planning processes, and that any help given to Eastern European economies would eventually filter back to the Soviet Union and work to the US’s detriment. Another body of opinion held that the Soviets would welcome the movement of some of their East European problem children (in the economic sense) into an international framework that would impose some economic discipline without excessively increasing the autonomy of Eastern Europe. IMF membership for Poland was given as an example, but doubt was expressed that either Warsaw or Moscow could permit genuine IMF discipline to interfere with Polish central planning and CMEA regional trade schemes.
A similar disagreement concerned the linkage between technology transfer, economic growth, and military capability. Some argued that there was a direct linkage, i.e., that more technology transfer led to more economic growth and inevitably to greater military capabilities; [Page 73] others that military investment decisions depended more on the international context than on the availability of new technology from the West.
A final area of discussion was how to handle the inevitable confrontations between the US and the SU in Eastern Europe. There was general agreement that we should be more ambiguous about our exact course of action than we have been in the past (specifically at the time of Czechoslovakia), and that we should allude to the political costs of possible Soviet actions. Using Radio Free Europe more advantageously in such endeavors was mentioned. The possibility of increasing ethnic interactions (i.e., playing on the Western orientation) and using any influence gained therefrom was also suggested.
Several items not directly related to the day’s topic of discussion were mentioned:
1. Most thought it very useful to have a short period of general conversation before focussing on the agenda item. It was tentatively agreed to use the time while lunch was being eaten for this purpose.
2. Topics suggested for future meetings included: U.S. relations with the GDR, including the impact of U.S. intra-agency organizational structure on policy development; the Exim Bank, and particularly opinions on the Stevenson initiatives;3 ethnicity and national minorities in the USSR and Eastern Europe; and the relationship of technology transfer to economic growth and military power in East-West relations.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 130, East-West Planning Group: 1–8/78. Secret. Sent under an April 5 covering memorandum from Samuel Huntington to Brzezinski, Bartholomew, Odom, Shulman, Luers, Robert Bowie, and Arnold Horelick.↩
- See Document 21.↩
- Senator Adlai Stevenson III (D-Illinois) scheduled a number of hearings in the Senate in support of an expansion of the role of the Export-Import Bank.↩