Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

176. Telegram From the Embassy in Hungary to the Department of State¹

Budapest, January 13, 1981, 1602Z

153. Subject: Ambassador’s Meeting With Mr. Gyula Horn, HSWP. Ref: Budapest 0131.²

1. Horn and I had agreed to meet January 13 for a general review of the international situation. Horn is Deputy Head of the HSWP International Department; he specializes on Western countries and is advertised by many of our Hungarian contacts as the real “comer” on the Central Committee Staff.

2. I went over much of the same ground that I covered with Nagy yesterday and found Horn, if anything, more au courant than Nagy about Washington developments, particularly the Haig testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee. Horn said the HSWP had been very worried about a Reagan victory up until the debate which seemed to them to show Reagan’s position as more responsible than Carter’s and he added that their positive feelings about the Reagan administration have increased as they have read various statements of the President-elect and his Cabinet-designates since the election.

3. Horn divided his comments into the following five areas:

—East/West relations—Horn emphasized what he called the subjective factors here, which he thought gave some opportunity for an improvement in US/Soviet relations, although he conceded that Afghanistan and probably Poland would prevent those relations from getting very much better in the near term. He said the Soviets had become so disenchanted with Carter and Brzezinski that their very removal from the scene is positive in that the Soviets will no longer be able to dwell on them as personalities and will have to face new personalities and hopefully “pay more attention to the issues.” He thought the evolution of US/Soviet relations would take up most of 1981 given the US “structural impediments” (our political system) and what he called Soviet preoccupation with “border issues”.

—(A) SALT—Horn said the Soviets will be looking early on for some signals about what the U.S. intends to do on SALT even though they and all other Warsaw Pact members acknowledge and understand that SALT II will not be ratified in its present form. He pointed to the need for some re-statement by the new administration of President Carter’s assurances of a year ago that, pending ratification of SALT II, the configuration of U.S. strategic forces would not violate the terms of the draft treaty.

—(B) TNF—Horn characterized US/Soviet technical talks in Geneva as a complete failure. He said he and others had accepted what he called the “Genscher explanation” of the TNF modernization decision made by NATO in December 1979, namely that the modernization was needed to fill a gap in the FBS, both land-based air in Europe and elements of the Sixth Fleet, which might be needed for deployment in the Third World contingencies. However, he said it must be recalled that TNF are “strategic” for the Warsaw Pact and that their modernization will almost certainly drive the Soviets toward cruise missiles and perhaps an ABM system to protect the SS–20 and oncoming SS–36. He said that this spiraling process would enhance the power of the military in the Soviet Union and would have a deleterious effect on openings of pluralism and “democratic socialism” in the East European countries.

—Madrid—Horn said that Hungary found the outcome in Madrid³ to be surprisingly good given the sulphurous atmosphere that prevailed before the conference actually began. He admitted the true test was yet to come. Although Hungary does not expect many of the 83 proposals on the table actually to be passed, they do hope for two things: (1) that a continuation of the Helsinki process is assured with another meeting scheduled within several years or some variant of the Finnish proposal for an even more permanent process, and (2) that some sort of a disarmament conference follow Madrid although they were not very particular about its form. He did feel the French proposal was totally negative.

—Differentiation—Horn said he hoped that the Reagan administration would not view the Communist world as a monolithic bloc. He thought the Carter administration with its policy of differentiation was basically on the right track but could have made even more headway. He referred to a portion of General Haig’s testimony this week⁴ which he interpreted to be a much more realistic viewpoint about China than had characterized anything that Brzezinski had said on the subject. Horn emphasized that Hungary wishes to make even more advances towards opening up the system and sees the Polish situation as an opportunity in that direction rather than a threat to the process.

—Poland—Horn said the Warsaw Pact Summit meeting of December 5 had turned a new corner with respect to the Brezhnev Doctrine; it was decided not to use force but to allow the Poles to work out their own admittedly very difficult economic problems. He characterized the bringing of Soviet and bloc forces to a higher defense condition as political rather than military. Horn said he believed that the Polish situation was also distinct from Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968, in that it seemed that the interests of the Soviet Union, the other Warsaw Pact states, the U.S., and NATO were coming to an almost identical position, namely that nobody wanted to see tensions rise in Poland and everyone wanted to see the Poles work out their own problems, giving them a helping hand where appropriate. He said he thought it was inconceivable that the Soviets would actually invade Poland because such an action could do nothing to resolve the Polish economic problems. He was, however, worried about Solidarity and its search for “monopolistic power”.

4. Comment: Horn is a bright and articulate person whose command of English is really getting quite good although we used Miklos Revesz, MFA desk officer, as interpreter for part of this conversation. Given his interest in getting to know the new people in Washington, I urged Horn to accept an ICA travel grant this spring or summer and he said he would let us know. I think he actually reflects the concerns of this small nation in the Warsaw Pact which still hopes to do business with both sides. He is alternatively optimistic and pessimistic with optimism slightly winning out.⁵ He and others in Budapest will be looking for an early statement of the Reagan administration policy towards this part of the world, as distinct from policy towards the Soviet Union. Horn is much more worried about Poland than he let on and I think his remarks about the monopolistic philosophy of Solidarity reflect concern that the Polish Party is having trouble penetrating and breaking away pieces of Solidarity.

Bergold

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810019–0324. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.
2. In telegram 131 from Budapest, January 12, the Embassy reported the conversation between Bergold and the State Secretary of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Janos Nagy. Bergold reported that Nagy was optimistic about the Reagan administration, and believed relations would return “to a more predictable and reliable atmosphere in East/West relations associated with the early and middle seventies.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810017–0314)
3. For information on the CSCE Conference in Madrid, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977–1983.
4. General Alexander Haig, Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of State-designate, testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during his confirmation hearings beginning January 9, 1981.
5. Horn took a much more pessimistic note in a early November conversation with visiting EUR/EE director Peter Bridges, concentrating on the dangers developments in Poland posed for East-West relations in general and U.S.-Hungarian relations in particular. See telegram 5910 from Budapest, November 6, 1980. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800534–0484)