Office of the Historian

14. Summary of Conclusions of a Presidential Review Committee Meeting1

Washington, August 23, 1977, 4:15–4:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Policy toward Eastern Europe

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Warren Christopher
    • Matthew Nimetz
    • Richard Vine

  • CIA

    • Stansfield Turner
    • Robert Bowie

  • Defense

    • Harold Brown
    • Walter Slocombe
    • General George Brown (JCS)

  • NSC

    • Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • David Aaron
    • Robert Hunter
    • Gregory F. Treverton

1. Christopher indicated the purpose of the meeting was to refine the choice between the two options discussed at the previous PRC meeting on Europe:2 Option 3—giving preference to those Eastern European countries that are either relatively liberal internally or relatively independent internationally; and Option 4—abandoning any implicit rank ordering and seeking to expand contacts and relations across the board to the extent feasible.

2. Brzezinski emphasized U.S. objectives, arguing that Option 3 would not cause Eastern European states to become more independent or liberal but that overt support for countries that have achieved a measure of one or the other would shore up their positions. By contrast, Option 4 would conduce merely to attempt to promote good relations and might diminish the special stake that Romania, Poland and Hungary have in their relations with the United States. Secretary Brown noted that pursuit of U.S. objectives should be limited by the need not to provoke something like the Hungarian uprising of 1956. Brzezinski agreed that our objectives should be pursued by working through existing governments.

3. Nimetz noted that the previous NSDM on Eastern Europe had established such a firm rank order and time-table that it prevented taking advantage of opportunities that arose. Christopher suggested that there might be times when the U.S. would want to move forward [Page 53] in relations with a particular country in advance of demonstrable progress on their parts along either of the two criteria. Vine suggested that our interests in limiting the GDR’s mischief in Berlin might call for a more forthcoming U.S. attitude.

4. Aaron and Nimetz stressed that the main point was to underscore the special status of Romania, Poland and Hungary, not to prevent limited improvements in relations with the other three countries. Brzezinski outlined the three areas of U.S. policy: atmospherics (visits), economics (MFN) and scientific and other exchanges; all agreed that those instruments are very limited. Aaron thought it might be preferable to rank concrete manifestations of policy, not countries. Secretary Brown agreed, noting that, for instance, a port visit by the U.S. Navy in Bulgaria should not be ruled out.

5. In the end there was general support for the following reformulation of Option 3: the U.S. would give demonstrably greater support for those countries that have achieved a measure of independence or internal liberalization (Romania, Hungary and Poland). Within that context, it would be appropriate to develop a scenario for returning the Crown of St. Stephen to Hungary. However, Option 3 would not preclude improvements in U.S. relations with the other three (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the GDR), provided those improvements were tangibly and demonstrably in the U.S. interest. Negotiations of claim agreements could continue, but the results would have to be assessed on their own merits, case by case. Efforts could continue to normalize our relations with the GDR, bringing them into line with Czechoslovakia, provided that effort did not dilute the basic differentiation.

6. There was general agreement that our European Allies, especially the FRG, have somewhat different interests in Eastern Europe than our own. No purpose would be served by exhorting them to adopt a posture identical to ours.

7. There was consensus that our policy toward Eastern Europe and toward CSCE should have parallel objectives. Both should promote modest steps toward re-joining the two halves of Europe, not as a threat to the Soviet Union but as an improvement in the security and life quality of all Europe.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 16, PD–21. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.↩
  2. See Document 6.↩