135. Telegram From the Embassy in the German Democratic Republic to the Department of State1
5267. USCINCEUR for POLAD. Madrid for USDEL CSCE. Subj: One Year Later: GDR Popular Mood Darkens. Ref: Berlin 5229.2
1. (C-entire text) Summary: This message helps to flesh out the description in reftel of the mood of discouragement and pessimism pervading the GDR population. It shows that there has been a distinct shift in popular attitudes over the past sixteen months. Parts of the report were included in abbreviated form in reftel. End summary.
2. FSO Wayne Merry recently transited the GDR en route to his new post in Moscow. He revisited many of his former contacts during the period Oct. 15–28. The Ambassador asked him to compare popular attitudes then and now. Merry’s report follows.
3. Sampling of views: During a two-week unofficial visit to Berlin and the GDR, the reporting officer conducted an intense series of conversations with East German contacts developed during his 1977–79 tour as a political officer at Embassy Berlin. These contacts represent fifteen households located in East Berlin and in five communities in the [Page 421] southern and western GDR. Consisting of pastors, lawyers, academics, intellectuals, and a few workers, most of these contacts are very politically aware and are in a position to reflect not only their own views but also those of their professional clientele and communities. All of the conversations dwelt both on the East German popular mood in mid-October and changes in that mood in the year since the reporting officer’s previous visits. What follows is a distillation of the most politically significant themes.
4. Poland dominated every conversation: The future of Poland was almost synonymous with a palpable fear that deterioration of East-West relations could lead to war. Most contacts believed that the Soviet Union probably would eventually use military force against Poland, that the GDR Armed Forces would be compelled to participate, and that the Polish workers and army would resist fiercely. All felt that such a conflict would at best lead to the total breakdown of detente in Europe and the freezing of internal reform in Eastern Europe for a generation, and at most to a general conflagration. None of the contacts believed that the GDR leadership would have any substantive say in these events but would simply be led into them by the Soviet Union; none believed that the GDR or its Armed Forces would disobey Moscow’s orders. While admiring the courage and audacity of the Polish workers, most contacts feared that the Polish workers’ movement lacked sufficient self-control and realism to stop short of provoking Soviet military intervention. All contacts were extremely depressed at the prospect of another German invasion of Poland, even if only in the Soviet wake. However, it was the broader question of what a Polish war could lead to for Europe and the world which caused the most pessimism. While there was considerable hope expressed that sober counsels would prevail in East and West, there was little optimism that the deteriorating world situation could be controlled.
5. Inner-German deterioration: The deterioration in inner-German relations was linked by everyone to the Polish situation and to fears in Moscow and East Berlin of destabilization within the Soviet Bloc. Most contacts believed that Honecker’s recent hard-line attitude toward Bonn was the result of direct orders from the Soviet Union and reflected also a dominance in SED decision-making by an internal security-minded faction led by Paul Verner. Most contacts believed that the new GDR foreign currency exchange requirements would significantly reduce human contacts between the two German states for the foreseeable future, and that access to West German people, products and literature would decline sharply. No one felt that Western influence in the GDR could really threaten the stability of the regime or that East German workers would follow the Polish example. Most believed that the hardening of GDR and SED politics reflected, in [Page 422] addition to Soviet directives, a feeling of insecurity and ineffectiveness within the GDR leadership.
6. Poorer GDR economic performance: This ineffectiveness was most apparent in the economic field where a decline in the quality and availability of moderate-priced consumer goods was quite evident after a one-year absence. All contacts believed that this deterioration was genuine and would be of long duration, reflecting the basic inefficiency of the East German economy and the poor planning and economic leadership of the regime. Most assumed that the worsening of inner-German ties would lead to even poorer economic performance in the future due to reduced access to Western technology and lower worker motivation as Western consumer goods become more scarce. In general, most contacts saw a difficult period ahead for the East German economy and especially for the average working family.
7. GDR domestic political climate: Internal political policies of the regime appear to have tightened in the past year but not to the point of affecting people’s day-to-day lives. None of the reporting officer’s contacts were in any way reluctant to meet with him openly. The change was more one of a loss of confidence in the ability of a free-thinking individual to coexist with the GDR system without encountering serious problems in the future. The emigration of many prominent cultural and dissident figures to the West in the past year was mentioned frequently as a reflection of the increasing inability of the East German system to accommodate any publicized differences of opinion on political and social questions. The departure of Guenter Kunert and Rudolf Bahro were particularly cited as having deprived East German society of figures of moral and intellectual stature. Partly as a consequence of this loss of confidence, the reporting officer observed a sharp increase among his non-church contacts of interest in the possibility of following these writers to the West.
8. Comment: When the reporting officer arrived in East Berlin in mid-1977 the popular mood was one of cautious but genuine optimism about the future of East-West relations, broadening of ties with West Germany, and East German economic, political and cultural prospects. By the time of his departure in mid-1979 this optimism had considerably eroded but there still existed a general view that the coming years would be ones of progress and gradual improvement in these areas, albeit more slowly. By mid-October 1980 this optimism had collapsed. In its place is a general negativism about the future of life in the GDR and a genuine dread that Europe may once again be on the road to war. Even those individuals who believe that their own lives will not be significantly worse in the years to come foresee a more difficult life for the average East German and considerable social problems for the society in the near future. It is the reporting officer’s impression that [Page 423] this broad pessimism would be even more intense and more focused on the internal GDR situation and relations with the West if informed East Germans were not so preoccupied with what may happen in the next weeks or months across their Eastern border.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800521–0800. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Warsaw, Belgrade, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, London, Madrid, Moscow, Munich, Paris, Prague, Sofia, West Berlin, USNATO, and USCINCEUR.↩
- In telegram 5229 from East Berlin, October 30, the Embassy reported increasing pessimism in the German Democratic Republic over events in Poland and increasing concern on the part of the East German leadership with regard to popular unrest. The telegram concluded that the East German leadership would continue to overreact to Polish developments. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800518–0738)↩