Office of the Historian

128. Memorandum From Stephen Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, May 3, 1979

SUBJECT

  • Attendance at Reception for GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Nier (C)

I am puzzled by the rationale behind your refusal to allow me to attend the reception for GDR Deputy Secretary Nier. I have no great love for the East Germans, and personally I would just as soon not go. Professionally, however, I think I should go. (C)

  • —Nier is a Deputy Foreign Minister. He is here at our invitation to put the finishing touches on a Consular Convention, which we made a precondition for any expansion of relations, and to sign several other bilateral accords. The GDR has accepted our compromise language on the nationality issue. (C)
  • —He is seeing Mat Nimetz and I understand that Nimetz will be at the reception. (C)

But there is a more fundamental point. Regardless of what we may think of the GDR, it is an important actor in world affairs. It is the ninth leading industrial power in the world and most powerful country, militarily and economically, in Eastern Europe. At the same time, it is part of a larger equation—the “German problem”—which has been, and to a large extent remains, a source of instability and tension in Europe. Its relations with the USSR and the FRG directly impact on our relationships with both countries. And its actions affect our interests in Berlin in important ways. (C)

Moreover, while the GDR remains strongly supportive of Moscow’s politics and internally orthodox, there are signs of ferment and change, and it would be short-sighted to underestimate their potential impact on Central Europe over the long run. (C)

These factors give us an interest in maintaining a dialogue with the GDR and learning more about it. We can’t do this, however, if we shun even the most informal contact with its diplomats. I am not suggesting that I should spend every Friday evening dining with the DCM at the Sans Souci, but I am suggesting that I should have some [Page 400] (low-level) contact with the GDR and that there may come a point when such contact will prove useful to us.2 (C)

Of course, I will abide by your decision and not attend the reception. I simply wanted to suggest some factors which should be taken into consideration in the future. (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 24, German Democratic Republic: 1/77–1/81. Confidential; Outside the System. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Jennings, Bartholomew, and Dodson.↩
  2. Brzezinski underlined “there may come a point when such contact will prove useful to us” and wrote in the margin “yes, but not yet for the NSC. ZB.”↩