124. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the German Democratic Republic1
17173. Subject: U.S. Goals and Objectives in the GDR. Ref: (A) 78 Berlin 7741;2 (B) 78 State 287307.3
1. (S-entire text) Summary: The GDR Interagency Group met January 9 to assess the present state of our relations with the GDR and to consider the statement of U.S. goals and objectives in the GDR submitted by the Embassy (ref A). This cable contains a report of the general policy discussion, which centered on the pace of the development of our relations, the maneuverability of the GDR vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and CEMA, the value of and prospects for trade, GDR activities in Africa, and the paucity of our knowledge about East German society. It was agreed to continue the present measured pace of our relations, with a slight increase in cultural and exchange activity aimed at increasing the “transparency” of East German society. It was also agreed that further movement in the trade and cultural areas would be possible after the conclusion of a Consular Convention, the prospects for which appear improved. The Embassy-submitted goals and objectives statement was approved with some modifications. The revised, interagency approved goals and objectives statement, the format for which was revised January 17, will be sent septel. End summary.
2. Deputy Assistant Secretary Goodby, who chaired the meeting, opened by commending the Embassy for its excellent goals and objectives submission (ref A) and outlining the current state of US–GDR relations and the prospects for their development. Berlin, he said, remained the key albeit unspoken factor in those relations. Other important factors are our concerns for security and stability in Central Europe and for humanitarian improvements within the GDR. There are no immediate prospects for MFN, but, even in its absence, there should be a modest growth of trade. Following a Consular Convention, for [Page 385] which there was now some hope, we might take some small further steps such as granting permission for new GDR Trade Offices in New York and an expansion of cultural relations. Our general stance, he said, has been to maintain a low profile, with some maintaining that the less we do with the GDR the better. Others such as the Embassy, however, have argued for a more activist policy, a position supported by even some West Germans.
3. Noting that our relations with the GDR were marginal compared to those with the FRG, Woessner (EUR/CE) advised that we continue to proceed slowly with the GDR, taking one step at a time, the Consular Convention being the first. This did not have to mean, he added, that we ignore the GDR or present it with a hostile face.
4. Brown (EUR/SOV) asked how rapidly the GDR wished to proceed with the relationship. Woessner replied that the GDR wants to move very rapidly, the motivating drive being the desire for increased access to Western trade and technology. He was not persuaded, however, that the GDR’s aspirations in this regard were realistic. Gray (EUR/CE) postulated that, through a slight westward shift of its trade patterns, the GDR might also be seeking greater maneuverability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, particularly greater satisfaction in the economic sphere of its own national interests. Goodby added that this was precisely the impression he had gotten from GDR Foreign Trade State Secretary Beil and from certain West Germans. Kaplan (S/P) interjected that such maneuverability was illusory and, to the extent that it was achieved, might not always be in directions compatible with U.S. interests. The key factors inhibiting maneuverability for the GDR were, he added, the central importance of the GDR for Moscow’s policy toward Germany and Central Europe, the GDR’s paranoia about possible “infection” from the West and the fact that the Soviets, who fear the development of a “quadrilateral entente” (the US, Europe, Japan and China), are more fearful than ever about Germany on its Western flank. However exaggerated these Soviet and the GDR fears, they render prospects for East German maneuverability marginal. Noting that these margins are important, Barkley (EUR/CE) said it might be wise to engage the GDR, if only to test how fast and how far the GDR wants and is able to go. Greenwald (HA) added that another contributing factor to an increased opening to the West by the GDR might be its continued desire for increased political legitimacy and respectability. Such increased legitimacy for the GDR, Brown suggested might be one reason why the Soviets might allow the GDR greater leeway vis-a-vis the non-FRG West. Others include trade, a preoccupation with China, and a desire to lessen the GDR’s dependence on the FRG.
5. Concluding on the basis of the foregoing discussion that it appeared that the FRG, the Soviets and the GDR wanted to move the [Page 386] US–GDR relationship forward, Goodby asked why the US did not want to do so. Is there nothing in such forward movement for us but trade? Neets (Agriculture) replied that, while the GDR agricultural market is not great, it is active and capable of growth and currently represents the largest part of US trade with the GDR. Asked by Woessner how close we were to reaching the growth limits of that market, he said that, while we have made great strides, it will be more difficult to obtain a larger share as long as the Soviets continue their present levels of supply. Porter (Commerce) noted that overall trade turnover had increased an estimated 15 percent over 1977, with a sharp increase in GDR industrial exports from $16.7 million to an estimated $36 million. The GDR, she concluded is learning more about the US market, while the quality of GDR goods is becoming better known to American firms. With MFN, trade would probably expand significantly, with more turn-key contracts going to the US. Most of these contracts would otherwise go to other countries in the West. By way of example, she pointed to the estimated $300–400 million in GDR business that currently goes to US offshore subsidiaries each year. In this regard, Woessner noted that the British and French had long competed fiercely for the GDR market, divorcing such competition from political considerations. Touching briefly on the GDR’s indebtedness, Goodby asked if we could do a study of the question. Gray replied that indebtedness is supposed to be discussed in an ongoing CIA study of the GDR economy. He said he would check on the status of that study.
6. Turning to a consideration of the GDR as a CEMA/Warsaw Pact member, Goodby noted that not all the cards were in the Soviets’ hands. Larrabee (NSC) added that the GDR’s importance to the Soviet Union stemmed primarily from its security role. While the GDR is also of great economic importance to the East, over the last few years there had been a decline in its trade with CEMA, though there were recent signs that the GDR was making efforts to try to reverse this trend. With regard to foreign policy, he detected few meaningful signs of East German independence, except at times in relations with the FRG. Farlow (INR) agreed, saying it was hard to accept the assumption that the GDR enjoyed any meaningful independence or was any more liberal than most other East European countries. The GDR, he added, tends to act on two foreign policy levels. Publicly, the GDR’s leaders tend to take milder, less polemical positions than they do in private discussions with their allies. Their position on China, he said, was a good example, being more restrained in major public pronouncements compared to some other East European statements, but more outspoken in less publicized allied discussions—as during the recent Sofia Ideological Conference of Communist Parties. Gray noted, however, that the GDR was in the forefront of those publicly backing Vietnam and that the [Page 387] GDR press had carried a number of East German-authored diatribes against Chinese. He also noted that others like Hungary had adopted a rather slavish pro-Moscow foreign policy line, while pursuing their own national interests.
7. Porter observed that, as its most advanced member, the GDR is an important technology supplier to CEMA. For this reason alone, the Soviet Union would not allow the strained economic fabric of the GDR to tear. The GDR, however, has been finding it harder to obtain raw materials from CEMA and to meet contracts for finished products. This was producing greater tension in the relationship. Kaplan added that the “resentment factor” should not be underestimated. Eastern Europeans resent the GDR, because it is CEMA’s richest member, it is the only one to enjoy it and, most importantly in their eyes, it is German. Gray agreed but observed that resentment worked both ways, with East Germans recalling the nature of the Soviets’ arrival in and occupation of East Germany and probably feeling that their economy could advance far more rapidly if not linked to that of the Soviet Union. For the latter reason there is probably a desire among even the SED leadership to eke out more independence in the economic sphere. Blacklin (DOE) noted that resentment by its other CEMA partners tended to force the GDR to rely more heavily on the Soviet Union. CEMA in general, he added, is experiencing problems in obtaining needed energy resources, and the GDR, with only lignite, is particularly vulnerable. This, he said, has created opportunities for Western sourcing.
8. Noting that it has been nearly impossible to determine whether particular disturbances in and around Berlin have been undertaken as a result of Soviet or GDR instigation, Woessner observed nevertheless that Berlin provided a peculiar, particularly strong bond between the Soviets and the East Germans. Kaplan agreed, but doubted whether the Soviets allowed the GDR much independent play on Berlin. The way to deal with Berlin problems is with Moscow, not the GDR.
9. Greenwald said that, toward the end of internal liberalization, we should make a greater effort to open up East German society through exchanges and wider distribution of Western publications. Larrabee added that there were other reasons for trying to increase the transparency or porosity of GDR society, not the least of which were to keep open a Western option for the GDR and to improve our very imperfect knowledge of the GDR. Neets said that there was already sufficient knowledge about the GDR, most of it readily available in the FRG. That, according to Gray, was part of our problem; namely that most of our knowledge about the GDR came to us filtered through West German perceptions. Our own direct study of the GDR is limited because most academic observers of Eastern European Communist [Page 388] affairs are Slavicists who tend to ignore the GDR. It would be well, he said, to encourage exchanges that would foster American expertise in East German affairs. Larrabee agreed, and said it should be possible to upgrade our activities in this area within the limits of PD–21. Milton (ICA) added, however, that our presentations and exchanges programs had grown satisfactorily without a cultural agreement. Since such an agreement could later be used to limit our activities in the GDR, ICA would prefer to avoid signing one, unless it were demonstrated that we had reached the limits of growth in the absence of an agreement. All agreed.
10. Responding to Goodby’s request for a discussion of GDR activities in Africa, Larrabee suggested that, while the GDR has interests of its own in Africa, in the military-security sphere the GDR often appears to be acting as a Soviet surrogate and that the way to moderate its activities there is through the Soviet Union. Goodby said that the GDR was in Africa not only as a Soviet surrogate and that its military activities, restricted so far to advisors, have not been great. The ORPA/EE rep agreed that the surrogate role had been overplayed and reported that only small numbers of GDR military personnel have been detected in Africa. The ORPA/EE rep added that the GDR, which had long pursued its own interests in Africa, is also trying to develop the continent as a market. Farlow (INR) said that what was significant was not that the East Germans had been in Africa for a long time but that their [interests] correlated with and reinforced Soviet interests. A division of labor with the Soviets was evident, with GDR military aid down and economic aid up in 1978. Suggesting possible GDR support for terrorists, he said that we should monitor East German activities throughout the Third World, urging moderation when necessary. All agreed that this “monitor/moderate” formula was preferable to a neutral dialogue that could be interpreted as acceptance or even approval of an East German presence in Africa or elsewhere in the Third World.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790045–0942. Secret. Drafted by Gray; cleared by Larrabee, Kaplan, Brown, and in HA, EUR, L/EUR, INR, H/EUR, EB, DOD, ICA, CIA, DOE, Agriculture, Treasury, and the FBI; approved by Goodby. Sent for information to Bonn, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, West Berlin, and USNATO.↩
- In telegram 7741 from East Berlin, December 8, 1978, the Embassy reported on U.S. goals and objectives in the German Democratic Republic for the 1981 fiscal year. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780507–0857)↩
- In telegram 287307 to all diplomatic posts, November 11, 1978, the Department cabled instructions for updating the posts’ goals and objectives statements for the 1981 fiscal year. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780466–0695)↩