116. Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State1
4344. USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, and CINCUSAREUR for POLADs. Subject: Czechoslovakia at the End of 1980—An Overview.
1. (C-entire text.)
2. This is a background report which may be useful in briefing the transition team. For more extensive discussion of certain areas we recommend reference to Prague A–4, “Czechoslovakia Isn’t Working,” and Prague A–16, “Czechoslovak Looks Inward.”
3. The outstanding impression of Czechoslovakia today as it has been for a decade, is of an apathetic, disengaged population ruled by a nervous, unselfconfident regime. The regime, imposed by Soviet pressure in 1969, has never been able to convince the people, the outside world or, seemingly, itself of its legitimacy. The trauma caused by the crushing of the Prague Spring of 1968 has kept the regime fearful of innovation and unwilling to take any step that might cause Moscow to raise an ideological eyebrow. This attitude has contributed heavily to the stagnation which now afflicts the economy.
4. After the brief orgy of liberalization in 1968 the people have retreated into mass apathy, appearing to concern themselves entirely with consumer spending, recreation, and work avoidance. Politics, including the small manifestations of intellectual dissidence, leaves the masses cold and Party membership is seen by most simply as a means of advancing careers. The regime, fearing outbursts of popular resistance a la Poland, has been reluctant to raise the currently subsidized prices to world levels and has so far kept action on improving work discipline to exhortation. It has since the Polish disturbances chosen to give in to workers’ demands in unpublicized local labor disputes rather than risk confrontation.
5. The Czechoslovak economy is sick. The strong industrial plant with which Czechoslovakia emerged from World War II is now by any standards obsolete and energy inefficient. Dependent almost entirely on imports for raw materials and energy, it has had to adjust to sharp rises in prices, even for goods supplied by the USSR, supplier of almost all of Czechoslovakia’s oil and much of its other raw materials. At the same time its industrial products have become steadily less [Page 351] competitive in both world and CEMA markets. The above-noted fear of policy innovation, unmotivated work force, and obsolete plant create almost unsuperable problems for economic policymakers, made no easier by traditional GOC reluctance to borrow heavily abroad. Problems are such that as of this date neither the 1981 economic plan nor the 1981–85 five-year plan has yet been completed. A set of measures to invigorate management of industry within the scope of a central plan is to be put into effect in January 1981, but no observer expects any revolutionary improvement to result. On the agricultural side, it has had to turn to the West for feed grains in fairly sizable amounts and must scrabble to fulfill demand for meat.
6. Czechoslovak trade, which accounts for over 30 percent of national income, is being sucked increasingly into the mire of the Comecon economies. The causes are Czechoslovak dependence on Soviet energy sources. Competitive inability to earn sufficient hard currency to diversify sources, and increasing Soviet success in promoting economic integration. Fifty percent of Czechoslovakia’s exports of machinery and equipment (traditional hard currency earners) are already going to the Soviet Union and an additional 30 percent to other Comecon countries. This trend is not contrary to the wishes of many Czechoslovak planners, who would rather see their country as an equal partner in a second-rate economic grouping than a second-rate country in world markets. The consequence is a decline in Czechoslovak opportunity for economic maneuver, just as the country has already lost its opportunity for political maneuver in the international arena.
7. The economic slowdown of the past two years has been accompanied by stiffened internal political controls. The current leadership is intensely aware of the potential social impacts of economic decline and its self-imposed policy limitations. It is putting the people, especially real or potential dissidents, on notice that it is prepared to ensure its survival over the difficult times ahead.
8. In foreign policy Czechoslovakia continues to be the most fervent supporter of Soviet policies and frequent mouthpiece for Soviet views, as it has been at the Madrid CSCE review. It pursues an activist policy, marked by many exchanges of visits, acts as a Soviet surrogate in certain Third World areas, and has some foreign aid responsibilities, most notably in Indo-China and Afghanistan.
9. Our bilateral relations with Czechoslovakia remain basically deadlocked pending resolution of the longstanding claims/gold issue. Our refusal to grant Czechoslovakia MFN rankles. Scientific exchanges continue but cultural exchanges are down to a trickle; across the board, lack of an exchange agreement leaves us with no means of enforcing reciprocity. Arranging normal contacts with officials remains extremely difficult. Heavy-handed anti-American propaganda fills the media [Page 352] almost constantly, poisoning the atmosphere. Seemingly pointless harassment, bureaucratic delay, and general obstruction of American tourists by Czechoslovak authorities led the Embassy in July of this year to request the Department to issue an advisory warning travelers of possible difficulties. On the positive side, however, the Czechoslovaks have worked steadily to resolve divided family cases, reducing the Embassy’s list of immediate (nuclear) families awaiting reunification in the West to two cases involving three individuals.
10. While the Czechoslovak side must bear the brunt of the blame for the propaganda atmosphere, the US side is not blameless. Czechoslovak officials perceive statements by US officials as part of a discriminatory policy, which makes a scapegoat of this country to further US policy goals with other countries whose human rights practices seem no less worthy of criticism. Quite clearly at the Belgrade CSCE Review Czechoslovakia served as a surrogate for the Soviet Union in receiving criticism from US delegates. With some justice GOC officials point out that positive factors, such as family reunification progress, tend to be ignored.
11. The outlook for bilateral relations is not bright. We are attempting to negotiate a claims/gold settlement before pending legislation requires us to seize the gold we hold and invest it to pay the claims, but can have no great assurance of success.2 Should that issue be resolved, some modest progress would be possible: The dormant Consular Convention would take effect, an exchanges agreement might be signed, permitting a modest increase in our information programs. As long as the Jackson-Vanik provisions of the Trade Act remain law, we foresee no early possibility of giving Czechoslovakia MFN and, failing that, no likely surge in agricultural trade. Our interests in Czechoslovakia are simply too few to provide an impetus for much improvement in bilateral relations.
12. The outlook is not, however, completely dark. In spite of 35 years of Soviet hegemony and an ever-increasing integration of the economy into the Soviet sphere, the Czechoslovak people remain Western oriented. The ties of emigration remain strong, with hundreds of thousands of Americans claiming Czech and Slovak ancestry. VOA and other Western radios, plus Austrian and West German TV, have large, regular audiences and any Western cultural attraction has a real sell out. In fact, this is a basic problem the regime faces—35 years of [Page 353] unremitting Communist propaganda have failed to change the Western orientation and basic values of the people.
13. Maintaining this Western orientation has over the years been our major policy thrust in Czechoslovakia. We have never been able to get any of post postwar regimes to exert independence of Moscow, but neither has Moscow ever been able to develop confidence in the loyalty of the Czechoslovak people to Soviet aims. Without such confidence the Kremlin cannot count on Czechoslovakia as a strong left flank for Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO forces in West Germany. We assume that future policies toward Czechoslovakia will be basically designed to deny it that confidence.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800566–1066. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Belgrade, East Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Sofia, Warsaw, and USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, and CINCUSAREUR.↩
- The agreement on Czechoslovak payment of claims for expropriated U.S. citizens was initialed on November 6, 1981, in Prague Congress passed a resolution approving the deal on December 15 and President Reagan signed it on December 29. As part of the deal, the Czechoslovak Government agreed to pay $81.5 million to the claimants.↩