10. Memorandum From Gregory Treverton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Policy Toward Eastern Europe

This memorandum is a response to your request, sent along by Rick,2 for the status of policy toward Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe was one of four PRM–9 (Europe) follow-on studies we commissioned3 (the others were CSCE, European Communism, and general approach toward Western Europe). I think only two of those four—Eastern Europe and CSCE—should go forward for PRC consideration. The Western Europe response raises some interesting longer-term issues, but they are not the sort that require, or are ready for, immediate decision. Similarly, the European Communism is a good description of our current approach, and I doubt that we can say much more in a general way until we have a better analytic base for understanding the implications of those powers sharing power in Western Europe. More specific, short-term decisions—for instance with regard to France or Italy—should, I think we all agree, be handled in frameworks more restricted than PRM processes.

However, the Eastern Europe and CSCE studies should be brought rapidly to PRC consideration and then, I think, to Presidential decision.4 We badly need Presidential determinations in both cases. David5 and6 talked about the timing of a PRC meeting on CSCE, and Bob and I met with George Vest today. We agree that the meeting should be soon, but after the preparatory conference in Belgrade ends so that Sherer can participate. That will probably mean the very end of July.7 We will continue to consult with State. A meeting on Eastern Europe might be coupled with CSCE, but CSCE probably will require a meeting [Page 35] itself. If so, we should point toward a PRC meeting on Eastern Europe somewhat later. We may need some additional study on Eastern Europe, though I doubt that another round of studies would produce much better results. A sharply-focused agenda paper might serve as well. To that end, I prepared and sent to State a suggested set of questions on both CSCE and Eastern Europe; that paper is attached.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by Gregory Treverton of the National Security Council Staff 8

PRM 9 FOLLOW-ON: CSCE AND EASTERN EUROPE

POSSIBLE ISSUES FOR PRC CONSIDERATION

CSCE

The PRM follow-on draft9 is too general and too rhetorical to serve as a basis for fruitful PRC discussion, let alone decision. But there are decisions to be made, many of them tactical but most the sort that can only be taken by the President. The President’s prestige is clearly on the line at Belgrade; what we do there cannot be perceived as falling off our commitment to human rights, much less as cutting a deal with the Soviets. At the same time, CSCE is three baskets, not one, and there is little to be served by turning the meeting into a confrontation.

Issues that should be considered:

Basic Purposes

No one disagrees that our basic objective is maximum review of implementation without confrontation. But that raises the issue: how compatible are those objectives? That in turn raises specific questions:

—presuming there will be some closed-session review of implementation, do we raise specific cases at all, only a few for illustrative purposes shunning the most controversial (Orlov, Shcharanskiy),10 or many including some of the controversial ones?

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—what do we say to the press and to non-governmental organizations outside the conference? We cannot be silent, yet blurring what goes on inside the conference with what is said outside could provoke the confrontation we all say we want to avoid. (The Soviets have been quite clear in indicating that they are prepared to retaliate if need be.) Can we reach an understanding with the Soviets that will not be perceived here as a sell out?

—a related issue, as important, is how we deal with members of Congress who will go to Belgrade as representatives of the CSCE Commission. So far our relations with the Commission at the working level are good, and many of the Commission’s interventions have been useful (for instance, Dole pushed us in a direction quite opposite from what I might have expected). Yet in the fall, senior members of Congress will be independent actors no matter what our treaty with the Commission.

—should our preparations include a fairly detailed self-criticism, not just in Basket III but in others as well?

—what level representative makes sense for the opening session: Christopher, Young (as the President has once suggested), or a lower level?

Balancing the Baskets

The general question is what can be done to make our approach seem less biased toward Basket III? For instance:

—are there possibilities in the area of CBMs, even though the Soviets have shown little interest up to now (and others have worried that CBMs agreed in the CSCE framework will foreclose more valuable stabilizing measures in MBFR)?

—what dangers are there for us in a thorough review of implementation of Baskets I and II (for instance, in raising Jackson-Vanik)?

—should we take such a dim view of the “Brezhnev proposals”11 as we have up to now? Why?

Relations with Allies

—how much coordination with allies (and neutrals) makes sense? Until now our preparations have presumed that very close cooperation was an—perhaps the—imperative. There is no gainsaying the importance of close and frank coordination. But we do not want to go to the [Page 37] point of diminishing returns: it may be better for us all, and make for less tension among us, if for some aspects (review of implementation, for instance) we seek not an identity of action, but parallel action within an agreed framework (“themes”).

—are different kinds of consultations necessary? They may be, not as a substitute for the NATO process but in addition to it. What we hear from the Canadians, and in a less direct but stronger form from the Germans, is a political worry. That must be responded to in a political forum, not in the NATO context that emphasizes process over substance. If there are real differences of view, or real fears among the Allies about Belgrade, those need to be surfaced, not papered over. There may be value in some sort of consultation at the foreign minister or political director level.

New Proposals

—the main issue is clear and we are on the right side of it. The choice is between trying to pre-empt Soviet grand designs and scoring points on the one hand, and, on the other, trying to structure a continuing CSCE process with incentives for the East to participate. Yet there remains the tension between our current (proper) emphasis on constructive proposals and the need to convey a sense of political initiative on our side. Our proposals as a package look less trivial than do many of the constituent proposals. This may be an area in which unanimity within the Alliance is not imperative (for instance, there may be no harm in supporting a proposal like the Belgian one for a human rights court, presuming the Belgians are still interested.12

—how do we respond to grandiose Eastern proposals—for instance, for a non-first use of force? Again, there need be no reason to be fearful. We can convey to the Soviets our belief that CSCE is not the forum for such proposals. But at the same time we should be prepared to turn those proposals, if made, to our own purposes, to make of them something we could accept (even if the East could not).

CSCE in Context

—how does CSCE relate to our bilateral (or other multilateral) initiatives (this issue is flagged in the follow-on draft)? Should we step up those initiatives in the months before Belgrade, play them down or continue as is?

—more generally, are there ways, as yet unrecognized, that CSCE needs to be made to fit better with our general approach to human rights, or to relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (for [Page 38] instance, would move forward with MFN for Hungary be supportive, neutral or adverse with regard to our CSCE objectives, and vice versa).

Eastern Europe

The primary defect with the current PRM follow-on draft13 is that it washes out the difference between alternatives. With only several small exceptions it does not seem from the draft to matter whether we pursue Option III (bias toward countries that are either somewhat liberal internally or somewhat independent of the Soviet Union) or Option IV (efforts to expand contacts across the board). It may be that the “flatness” of the options reflects the reality of our limited influence in the region. But the existing draft also contains hints of bureaucratic compromise.

There are two other main defects in the current draft:

—there is too little richness to the set of policy instruments discussed. This is obviously related to the general criticism. But supposing we wanted to take an initiative in relations with Poland, there certainly is a richer menu of alternatives, if perhaps not an absolutely very rich one, than is conveyed by the response. The response tends to collapse all instruments into three: MFN, and claims settlements and consular agreements where applicable.

—the response needs to have a sharper sense of the domestic political context. For instance, returning the Crown is probably a non-starter; and it almost certainly is at the current moment and in relation to the upcoming Belgrade conference. Similarly, talking about what we might do to develop further our relations with Poland and Romania—a good topic and one for which some possible actions should be listed—ought to be cast against the difficulty we have, at least in the case of Romania, of doing even as much as we have in the past.

Suggested issues:

Basic Approach

—There is consensus that we seek to foster internal liberalism and external independence from Moscow in Eastern Europe. But there is disagreement, perhaps even fundamental, over how. Option III implicitly says that good behavior ought to be rewarded, while Option IV suggests that changes we seek can only occur over the long run with [Page 39] increasing contact between East and West. These follow-on studies may be no place to return to first principles, but without it the policy alternatives seem too abstract. Worse, the draft turns what looks like a basic disagreement into something that appears in the end not to matter: Options III and IV, with very different premises, seem to have quite similar policy implications.

—how does our policy toward Eastern Europe relate to our policy toward the Soviet Union? Again, the question is a basic one, but it at least needs to be raised. In a period of strain in U.S.-Soviet relations, should we freeze relations with Eastern Europe (as a signal to Moscow) or make special efforts to move them (as a signal to Eastern Europe)? Or if it is fair to characterize our posture toward the Soviet Union as Option IV (subject to Congressional limitations), then does it make sense to pursue another policy with respect even to the closest Soviet satellites?14

Differentiations Among Countries

—what are the different policy instruments that might be used to differentiate among Eastern European countries on some agreed basis? What are possible initiatives, country-by-country, that might be employed?

—to put the same question the other way around, is any attempt to differentiate among countries likely to be swamped by several major actions, such as returning the Crown or awarding MFN?

—given a general approach, to what extent should specific actions on our part be conditioned on commitments by the countries (on family reunification, emigration or other issues), as opposed to using those actions as rewards for good performance? Is there much practical difference between the two?

—is there a case for special treatment of the GDR? If so, what is it? The draft tends to argue that given the GDR’s pivotal position and given the paucity of our information about it, we should expand our contacts with it no matter what general approach we take to Eastern Europe. Is that convincing? How would we expand our contacts with the GDR? And what would we gain?

—Yugoslavia is omitted from this draft. On what basis? How do choices about policy toward Yugoslavia—economic, political and military—bear on our general policy toward Eastern Europe?

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Coordination with Western Europeans

—how much do particular policy options depend on coordination with Western Europeans? How much cooperation is possible in particular areas? Are there areas in which our choices could threaten existing Western European policies or arrangements (for instance the FRG’s ransoming of ethnic Germans)?

—how can we better understand, and perhaps begin to influence, the Eastern debt situation? The draft’s idea of a State/CIA/NSC working group seems a good one.

—are there relations between Eastern and Western European Communist parties that we can and should influence, positively or negatively?

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 27, PRM–9 [2]. Confidential. Sent for information. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the memorandum: “RI, GFT—good memo—push for a paper and meeting. ZB” and indicated that the memorandum should be returned to Treverton and Inderfurth.
  2. Inderfurth.
  3. See Document 7. See also footnote 1, Document 11.
  4. Brzezinski wrote “agree” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
  5. Aaron.
  6. Bob Robert King.
  7. Brzezinski underlined “the very end.”
  8. Confidential.
  9. Follow-up Study to PRM/NSC–9: CSCE. (Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of European Security Political Affairs, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, (CSCE)—1973–80, Lot 89D288, Box 1, PRM–9)
  10. Yuri Feodorovich Orlov, founder of the Moscow Helsinki Group, arrested and sentenced to ten years in prison in 1977. Anatoly Borisovich Shcharansky (Nathan Sharansky), spokesman for the Moscow Helsinki Group and leading refusenik, was arrested on charges of espionage in 1977 and sentenced to 13 years in prison.
  11. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 154. On February 2, Brzezinski also sent a memorandum to Vance and Brown with a history of the SALT negotiations, emphasizing the exchanges that had taken place from 1974 to 1977. (National Security Archive, The Carter-Brezhnev Project, Electronic Briefing Book, Document IV–20)
  12. Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
  13. See Document 11. On June 17, Vest and Paul Kreisberg, Acting Director of the Office of Policy Planning at the Department of State, forwarded a memorandum to Christopher through Nimetz with the Department’s draft of the Eastern Europe follow-up study requested by the NSC on April 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Official Working Papers, S/P Director Anthony Lake, 1977–Jan 1981 Lot 82D298, Box 2, S/P-Lake Papers—6/16–30/77)
  14. Brzezinski highlighted this paragraph in the margin.