95. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the President’s Special Assistant for Appointments (Kraft)1
SUBJECT
- Visit of Indian Prime Minister Desai
The history of the Desai visit runs as follows: Desai was originally invited to come to the United States last fall; when the President decided to visit India, Desai agreed to postpone his visit here. While in New Delhi, the President and Desai agreed (in my presence, incidentally) that Desai should visit Washington at the time of his appearance before the UN General Assembly’s Special Session on Disarmament. The Indians then told us that Desai proposed to speak to the SSOD on May 25 and would like to come to Washington either directly before or after [Page 253] that date. We responded that the time before the NATO Summit was bad and Desai very considerately agreed to put his trip to the UN off until after the first week of June.
The President’s invitation was clear and cannot be reneged on. Given the reception that the President received in New Delhi, plus the immense importance that Desai attaches to his personal relationship with the President, it is clear that an official visit is indicated. Our relations with India are important and Desai personally holds the key to attainment of our nuclear non-proliferation goals as regards India. The Indian Ambassador has pointed out the incongruity of our asking Desai for help on The Horn while refusing to schedule a visit.2
The Indians have been exceptionally accommodating throughout the whole history outlined above. Desai is a major international figure who cannot be left dangling while we sort out all the details of the President’s schedule.3 Among other things, he must firmly schedule his UN appearance and that depends on us.
Ambassador Goheen, the State Department and I have all been approached by the Indians—politely but urgently.4 I have assured them that I will pursue the matter and am determined that we respond to them with some degree of consideration—i.e. by giving them reasonable advance notice.
There can be no doubt that there will be a Desai visit and the visit will be at the official level. As a matter of policy I therefore want to move ahead immediately in assigning a specific date for it in the time-frame set forth in my memorandum on visit scheduling.5
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 5, India: Prime Minister Desai, 6/12–15/78: Cables and Memos, 2/27/78–6/8/78. Confidential.↩
- On the Horn, see footnote 3, Document 94. No other record of Palkhivala’s comment to Brzezinski was found.↩
- Kraft underlined “Desai is a major international figure who cannot be left dangling,” and wrote beneath this paragraph: “The President (of the U.S.) is a major internat’l. figure who should not be jerked around by haphazard & indiscriminate scheduling—That’s why, oddly enough, he has one office to prepare his schedule, in coordination with foreign and domestic policy advisors—TK.”↩
- Telegram 3069 from New Delhi, February 27, reported that the Indian Ministry of External Affairs was under pressure to finalize Desai’s schedule. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780089–0312) In a February 28 memorandum to Carter, Vance communicated his concern that the date of Desai’s visit was not yet finalized, adding: “The Indians have been pressing us for an answer, and I believe we should reply very soon.” In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “What is the hold-up?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 19, Evening Reports (State): 2/78)↩
- Vance handwrote below this last paragraph: “I feel strongly that it is very important to go ahead with this meeting. Cy.”↩