Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, February 16, 1978, 0208Z

40777. For Ambassador Goheen. Subject: Desai’s Letter to President of February 7.

1. Quoted below for your information is the text of Prime Minister Desai’s letter of February 7 to the President. The original was delivered to Dr. Brzezinski by Ambassador Palkhivala on February 15.

2. Quote: Dear Mr. President, Ambassador Goheen conveyed to me on February 1 your letters of January 30² and January 31, 1978.³ I am indeed gratified at what you have said about your visit to India. Your feelings of friendship are warmly reciprocated by our people who, through your visit, have developed a feeling of great respect for the sincerity of purpose which you bring into your approach to public policy. Due to the impact of your personality and approach to problems Indo-U.S. relations stand on firmer ground today and this, I am convinced, is in our mutual interest and enlightened approach to the solution of world problems.

I share your concern for the dangers in the present situation in the Horn of Africa and its potential for escalation. We had briefly discussed this conflict when you were in New Delhi. Ethiopia and Somalia, apart from being neighbours linked to us by the Indian Ocean, are also members of the nonaligned fraternity of nations. It is in this spirit that we had, some time ago, urged the need for restraint and amicable settlement on the parties to the dispute. The situation has been so tense that any concrete initiative has so far seemed premature. Meanwhile, fighting continues and the dangers of international peace being damaged have, I agree, increased. It has been our view that intra-African problems should be resolved in consonance with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. We were disappointed that the efforts of the OAU to bring Ethiopia and Somalia together have not yet met with success. In the meantime outside intervention has accentuated both the dangers and difficulty of resolving the dispute.

A just and peaceful settlement would require recognition of the principle of respect for the independence and territorial integrity of the states in the region. But beyond this, we agree, that such problems, as the present Somalia-Ethiopia conflict, require restraint on the part of the bigger powers as they could become more complicated by increasing rivalry and foreign military involvement. If your information about the Soviet build-up of arms proves correct, the dangers and the complications have come closer than one would have hoped or expected.

In view of your letter and the possible gravity of the situation in the Horn of Africa, I am writing to President Brezhnev and will convey our concern at the dangers involved in this build-up and the consequent escalation. It is particularly important that Ethiopia, with an augmented military capability, should not attempt to cross the old established frontiers. I am, therefore, urging that any development which would have the possibility of encouraging either party to continue or enlarge the scope of the present conflict should be scrupulously avoided and instead steps should be taken that the dangers are reduced and not increased. I would also urge that the Soviet Union and the USA should mutually consult each other to defuse the situation and perhaps to persuade both parties to respect the letter and spirit of the OAU Charter. Meanwhile, in order that the conflict is defused, I would stress the importance, Mr. President, for counselling on Somalia and its friends and supporters the urgency of their accepting a clear responsibility to respect established frontiers in the African continent.

I am happy, Mr. President, that you have candidly explained your views about the nuclear problem in your letter of January 30, 1978. I am glad that after our conversations with you and later with Prime Minister Callaghan⁴ there is now a better understanding of my belief that it is the primary responsibility of the nuclear weapon states to reduce the risk of nuclear war and destruction. As you know, soon after your visit, I have also had occasion to discuss it with visiting Senators and Congressmen from the USA.⁵ It remains our view that firm steps need to be taken by the nuclear weapon powers to abandon the nuclear tests, to halt the production of nuclear weapons and progressively, within a fixed time-frame, eliminate their nuclear stockpiles if the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be meaningfully achieved and energies directed purely to the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. While we understand your sincere concern about the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons, you would appreciate that having unilaterally foresworn the intention to manufacture these weapons of mass destruction, and having devoted ourselves exclusively to peaceful purposes of atomic energy, we are genuinely sensitive and concerned about arrangements which are considered inequitable or discriminatory.

You would recall, Mr. President, that in my discussions with you, I had told you of the fears expressed to me by President Brezhnev at production of the neutron bomb by the USA.⁶ I had myself expressed my serious apprehension that the deployment of neutron bomb by USA could trigger a new arms race by forcing the USSR to produce similar or matching weapons and negate the search for nuclear disarmament. Mr. Brezhnev has now expressed to me serious Soviet anxiety at the prospect of the deployment of the neutron bomb which may cause a setback to the quest for agreements on limiting strategic weapons and international detente. I sincerely hope that it would be possible for the USA to recognize the dangers inherent in the possibility of a new arms race being triggered by the neutron bomb and the fears about security which it engenders and would strongly urge that, in the interest of the very objectives of non-proliferation you should refrain from going ahead with its production. Such a decision could radically improve the climate for detente and disarmament.⁷

I am greatly looking forward to my forthcoming visit to the United States and to renew the personal contacts which we have established during your visit to New Delhi. Apart from members of the administration, I have told the delegation of Congressmen, led by Congressman Wolff, when he so requested me that I would be happy to meet members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. They themselves have also invited me to do so. I am also planning to utilize the opportunity of my visit to the USA to address the forthcoming UN General Assembly Special Session, which may then be in session, depending on mutually convenient dates for my visit.

I have always maintained that even though we may have our differences on specific issues, the perspective of world problems, as viewed from New Delhi and Washington, may not be always identical, India and the United States have so much in common that we would do ourselves and future generations a disservice if we did not cement closer and friendlier ties between our governments, institutions and peoples. I sincerely hope that these exchanges of visits and our personal correspondence will play a significant role in building up a climate of mutual trust, warmth and friendship in our relations. I need hardly reiterate that I fully recognise the importance of personal exchange of views and, like you, would wish to continue our personal correspondence.

Please convey my personal regards to Mrs. Carter and tell her on my behalf how much we all here admire her for the warmth and affection which she has shown towards our country.

With warm regards, yours sincerely, End quote.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142–2212, N780002–0599. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to the White House. Drafted by Dubs; cleared by Thornton and in S/S; approved by Dubs.
2. See Document 93.
3. In his January 31 letter to Desai, Carter warned of a Soviet naval build-up in the Red Sea, the purpose of which was to supply Ethiopian troops fighting in the Horn of Africa. Carter asked Desai to raise the issue with the Soviets and Cubans in order to try to deescalate the situation. (Telegram 25994 to New Delhi, February 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780047–0344) Similar letters were sent to several other Heads of State; for the text of the letter to Nigerian President Obasanjo, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 1, Horn of Africa, Document 48.
4. See footnote 6, Document 93.
5. See ibid.
6. See footnote 4, Document 79.
7. In telegram 1728 from New Delhi, February 2, Goheen reported that Desai had suggested to him that if the United States cancelled deployment of the neutron bomb, the Soviets might stop their activities in the Red Sea, saying that “there might be some possibility of a trade-off in the interest of better mutual understanding and world peace.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780051–0310) In telegram 35706 to New Delhi, February 10, Vance directed Goheen, if asked, to reject any linkage between Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa and the U.S. deployment of the neutron bomb. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780063–0140)