Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

96. Letter From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the Ambassador to India (Goheen)¹

Washington, March 29, 1978

Dear Bob:

I thank you for your letter of February 22.² I, too, had to await a holiday to reply. In this case it is simply getting the President out of town so I have some free time. As you may know I have had Africa added to my area of personal responsibility and that is very time consuming.

I think you are very right in raising the question of contingency planning for disengagement on the nuclear front. I think that is something best originated on your side, perhaps with Courtney’s assistance. Why doesn’t the Embassy do a piece setting forth how you see this process proceeding and what we should do to ease the transition? I have by no means given up hope on the safeguards issue but certainly the odds are not such that we can afford to wait in our planning. I have some hopes for Joe Nye’s meeting with Vellodi in New York next week.³ I shall probably go along. I am distressed that it has taken this long to get this meeting on the tracks. You are probably right though in saying that we should hold off until the Tarapur shipment has improved. Frankly I don’t think we have very much time on this issue. The Indian position is likely to get increasingly hard and if we do not have something worked out, or at least headed in the right direction, by the time Desai gets here we will be in very deep trouble.⁴

On the subject of the visit one thing that we should do is take another look at how good the follow-up has been on the last visit. Peter⁵ will no doubt have shared with you the work that we had done in various agencies about a month ago assessing the state of the follow-up.⁶ As you know it is very spotty and a lot of the fault lies with the Indians. At the same time however it is very difficult to get our bureaucracy enthused. Juanita Kreps’ refusal to go to India is symptomatic.⁷

I will generate another assessment exercise about a month before the Desai visit takes place. Would it be possible for you to ensure that the Indians do the same thing so that when Desai and Carter get together they have a clear picture of what has and has not been done? I never cease to marvel at the ability of the bureaucracy to be unresponsive.

As I think about the June meeting four topics come particularly to mind:

—The nuclear question is obviously going to feature very large but as I mentioned above most of the ground work will have to be done beforehand.

—I think the President should give another nudge to the Eastern Waters question.⁸ I appreciated your run-down on the conversations you have had. I mention it now and then here. One of the problems we have is that AID doesn’t like the idea. Therefore they tend to talk it down.

—The President should this time talk about conventional arms limitation and especially the DPSA problem if the Indians have not made up their minds by then.⁹ We are nowhere near strongly enough on record on this matter which is going to cause problems. I discussed this last matter at some length with Gokhale but got nowhere. (I am attaching the Memcon from that meeting that you may find of interest.)¹⁰

—Finally I believe we should have a very frank talk about bilateral aid. The trouble that we are beginning to have on the Hill because of the India-Vietnam deal is only symptomatic.¹¹ Any bilateral aid program is going to become the target for carping and criticism. Carter and Desai should face the issue of whether it is a good idea to have such a program at all. If I were an Indian it would certainly not be worth the trouble to me unless extremely large sums of money were involved.

I am glad you found the tone of the President’s last letter satisfactory.¹² Never hesitate to let us know when there are problems since you are much closer to the scene than we are. Also, when we receive a letter from Desai it is helpful if you let us know as soon as possible what you would like to see in the reply. We are under pressure here to get replies out within a week; thus a rapid input from you is very helpful.

I look forward to seeing you when you are back next time even if only for the visit. I am keeping in reasonably close touch with the Indian Embassy here. Gokhale impresses me but the Ambassador seems to flutter around a lot. He is probably quite effective however in the public relations area. The life of an Ambassador is not an easy one as you have no doubt experienced while awaiting this ponderous bureaucracy’s attempt to get dates for the Desai visit, etc. I really appreciate your patience on that.

Please give my regards to John Thompson when you see him. I will be writing to him soon.

Sincerely,

Thomas P. Thornton¹³

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 94, India: President’s Trip (1978) Follow Up: 12/77–3/78. Secret.
2. Not found.
3. Vellodi and Nye met on April 14. Telegram 101268 to New Delhi, April 20, reported on the discussion. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780169–0353)
4. In a March 27 letter to Carter, Desai agreed to visit Washington June 13–14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780088–0137)
5. Peter Tarnoff.
6. In a March 2 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton outlined the progress of the follow-up. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 94, India: President’s Trip (1978) Follow Up: 12/77–3/78)
7. In his March 2 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton expressed his frustration that Kreps had not yet scheduled a trip to India. He requested that Brzezinski “call Juanita Kreps and forcefully remind her that the President has offered her up.” See footnote 2 above.
8. See Document 3.
9. In a March 10 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton outlined the issue of Indian procurement of deep penetration strike aircraft: “The Swedes have asked us to permit them to sell Viggen aircraft (over which we have a handle because of US-origin components) to the Indians. This is a deep penetration strike aircraft of the kind we would certainly not want to sell to the Indians ourselves; hence we should not permit third-country transfer.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 99, Evening Reports: 3–5/78)
10. Attached but not printed is a March 29 memorandum for the record, in which Thornton summarized his discussion with Gokhale. Thornton told Gokhale that “it was quite unlikely we would approve sale of the Viggen” and that he hoped to “avoid the situation in which we had to turn down an Indian request.” Gokhale informed Thornton that he understood his “point but added that as far as he knew the Viggen is not in serious contention.”
11. In a March 10 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton explained that Representative Clarence Long, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee, had “latched onto the fact that India is providing credits for Vietnam and some food as well. (This came out of the Pham Van Dong visit to Delhi.) I gather that the credits are essentially supplier credits to help the Indians sell locomotives and other things from their excess production capacity. Nonetheless, this highlights again the perils of having a bilateral aid relationship with India.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Subject File, Box 99, Evening Reports: 3–5/78)
12. Carter’s March 8 letter to Desai focused on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms issues and hostilities in the Horn of Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840165–1922)
13. Thornton signed “Tom” above this typed signature.