Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

471. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, January 6, 1981, 1117Z

160. Subject: (S) U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan.

1. (S–Entire text)

2. This message attempts to summarize where we stand in our relations with Pakistan at the beginning of the new administration and makes recommendations on U.S. policy towards Pakistan. The underlying assumption of this message is that Pakistan is a country of critical importance in an area of the world vital to U.S. interests; that the question is not whether we should strengthen Pakistan’s ability to resist Soviet expansion in the region but how best to do so. In the interest of brevity it is also assumed that the reader is conversant with the history of U.S. involvement in the subcontinent over the last three decades.

3. What do we want from Pakistan? Our objectives in Pakistan must of course support our objectives in the region as a whole, which are to counter Soviet expansionism, promote long term stability and protect U.S. and Western access to the region’s resources, particularly oil. Within this context it is in our interest to see a Pakistan strong enough to present a serious obstacle to Soviet expansion in the region of the Gulf and Southwest Asia. It is important that an improvement in Pakistan’s defense capability take place rapidly enough to forestall a Soviet move motivated by some unforeseen opportunity or frustration with the course of the war in Afghanistan. In the entire region the Pakistani Armed Forces represent one of the few indigenous impediments to Soviet expansion. This is truer than even a year ago, with Soviet-Indian friendship just having been reaffirmed at the highest level,² Afghanistan under Soviet occupation, and conditions in Iran, chaotic as they already are, deteriorating. Economic stability in Pakistan is essential to a strong defense posture, and it follows that the strengthening of Pakistan’s military capability must go hand in hand with appropriate support for economic development. Finally we will want to see Pakistan maintain and strengthen its ties with other regional states opposed to Soviet expansion, primarily China and Saudi Arabia, to a lesser degree Turkey and, at least potentially, Egypt. It is also to our advantage to see Pakistan continue to play a leading role in Islamic councils.

4. What does Pakistan want from us? What Pakistan wants from us can be stated simply: Credible security assurances, which at a minimum will guarantee Pakistan’s national survival and territorial integrity. Whatever form such assurances should take they would naturally be expected to include direct access to U.S. military equipment. In conjunction with U.S. security assurances, Pakistan would expect the U.S. to contribute to its economic development and use its influence to persuade its allies, the oil-rich Gulf states and the IMF/IBRD to do likewise.

5. Impediments to achieving our goals: Fundamentally what we want and what the Pakistanis want are by no means irreconcilable, but there exist impediments to close cooperation. These are of two kinds: those that are based on misconceptions or long-cherished illusions and those that are quite real and based on practical considerations.

—A. In the first category is a long-standing Pakistani hope that somehow U.S. security assurances against Soviet aggression can be expanded to include a guarantee that the U.S. will protect Pakistan from India. A second and related Pak idea is that the U.S. is intrinsically an unreliable ally given to sudden and erratic policy shifts and with—when the chips are down—a bias in favor of India. In this regard it should be noted that it is widely believed in Pakistan (with some justification) that Republican administrations are more sympathetic to Pakistan relative to India than are Democratic administrations. While in one sense this belief will be useful to policy makers in the new administration it must be seen as well as an expression of the Pakistani view that we are a fickle friend. Our view of our relations with Pakistan has also not been free of illusions. We act sometimes as if we believe we can deal with Pakistan in a vacuum. We need go back no further than a year ago for the latest example of the U.S. announcing policy decisions regarding Pakistan without adequate prior consultations with the country that would bear the consequences of these decisions. We also have in the past often acted as though our old relationship with Pakistan could be resumed at any time we were prepared to resume our role as an aid donor. Presumably we have now been disabused of this idea.

—B. There are other and more serious impediments of an immediate nature. On the Pakistani side, our support for Israel is seen as a very serious impediment to close relations with the U.S., if Pakistan is to retain its Islamic and non-aligned credentials (which were obtained in the first place precisely because the U.S. was seen as not being an effective guarantor of Pakistan’s survival). To a lesser degree the crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations inhibits Pakistan from drawing close to the U.S., as the Pakistanis attempt to maintain good relations (rather unsuccessfully) with at least one immediate neighbor. On our side, we have been inhibited in achieving a closer relationship with Pakistan by public and congressional attitudes both toward the continuation of non-representative government and martial law in Pakistan and the continuation of a nuclear development program which could in the not too distant future (perhaps as little as 2–3 years) result in Pakistan setting off a nuclear explosion.

6. Positive elements. Although there are impediments to closer U.S.-Pakistani cooperation there are also a number of positive elements, some of them stimulated by the very threat we seek to counter. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has generally drawn the Islamic world together in opposition to Soviet expansionism and, specifically, has made the Gulf states willing to provide some economic support to Pakistan to help meet this threat. The same is true of Pak-China relations. A second positive element is that since the Soviet invasion and the initial rejection of the U.S. aid offer there has been a growing realism in U.S.-Pakistani views of the other’s needs and interests, as evidenced recently by the Zia-Carter meeting, our decision to reschedule Pakistan’s debt,³ and increased Pakistani interest in acquiring new types of U.S. military equipment. Finally the new U.S. administration has not only the clean slate of any new government but is seen by the Pakistanis as determined to take a strong stand against Soviet expansionism and particularly in this area of the world.

7. What do we need to do? Although our interests in Pakistan and what we see as our most important objectives have been presented in stark outline, we believe that based on the facts presented here certain policy conclusions are fairly clear. If we are to effectively and expeditiously improve Pakistan’s ability to resist Soviet aggression in the region the following steps need to be taken:

—A. We need first of all to go considerably further in reestablishing our credibility. This means defining our policy objectives here and stating them clearly to Pakistan and its neighbors. If we are to strengthen Pakistan against the Soviets we will have to face up to Indian opposition to any strengthening of Pakistani military capability. Given Mrs. Gandhi’s policy of friendship toward the Soviet Union and almost paranoid mistrust of the U.S., it seems that the best we can hope for is minimum good relations with India, and we should accept that limitation. While the Indians should understand that we will not allow their objections to prevent our strengthening Pakistan, the Pakistanis must also understand that we can offer no absolute guarantees against India. We also need to make it clear to the Pakistanis, their neighbors, our allies, and U.S. public and congressional opinion that the situation that we face in Southwest Asia and the Gulf is of sufficient gravity (1) to override our concern with the lack of representative government in the country and (2) to require us to seek the removal of the legislative prohibition on aid resulting from Pakistan’s nuclear [omission in the original] government is in control [omission in the original] to resist Soviet aggression.

—B. Once congressional restrictions on aid are removed and our policy clarified, we will have a better chance of influencing a Pakistani decision to develop nuclear weapons (which also has its origins in Pakistani fears that the U.S. is not a reliable protector). Our non-proliferation policies have remained static in recent years, despite conspicuous changes in the international environment. The USG must, and presumably will, reexamine and revise those policies, which have unfortunately failed to achieve our non-proliferation objectives—in Pakistan, South Africa, Israel, Argentina, perhaps Iraq, and elsewhere. We need to keep working toward our objectives, but not with methods that have demonstrably failed, and not at the expense of other objectives such as enhancing the security of the region and stemming Soviet expansionism.

—C. After these steps have been taken we should reach an understanding with the Pakistanis on the terms of U.S. security assurances and then on the levels of U.S. military and economic support. Both the assurances and the material support must be sufficient to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that any attempt to dominate the region by either overrunning or intimidating Pakistan will meet with a level of resistance that would make such a move extremely costly. We should also remember that economic disorders precipitated the downfall of Bhutto and Ayub Khan governments and that any significant shortage of basic food commodities or run down of monetary reserves which threatened the GOP’s ability to meet its financial commitment could put the Zia government to the test. U.S. willingness to take the lead in providing PL–480 commodities and BOP assistance will be viewed as a crucial indicator of our commitment to Pakistan.

—D. Once we have made our position clear and shown our willingness to provide U.S. resources to strengthen Pakistan, we should both encourage our allies to increase their aid and encourage Pakistan to pursue the building up of a network of relationships in the region with like-minded states. These would include first of all China and Saudi Arabia, but also the other Islamic states opposed to Soviet expansionism. How such a network of relationships would fit into U.S. defense arrangements for the Middle East and the Gulf is beyond the scope of this message.

Hummel

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810006–1195. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. Reference is presumably to Gromyko’s visit to India in February. See Document 171.
3. See Documents 465, 466, and 470.