Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

465. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 3, 1980, 11:10–11:50 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan
• General K.M. Afir (Notetaker)

President Carter: There are a few items that I wish to discuss with you privately. I want you to know how much we admire your courage and our nation is also full of admiration for your humanitarian acceptance of so many refugees. Our nation is one of refugees and we thus deeply feel about this. I am also grateful to you for your role as the Islamic Conference spokesman.² I would like to know the results of your recent intervention. Did you get a positive response?

(Some exchange of pleasantries, including birthday greetings for President Carter, etc.)

President Zia: I was encouraged by the response in Teheran.³ I was the first head of state in Teheran since the revolution and I was very warmly received. Bani-Sadr was at the airport. He is a straightforward and flexible man, with a very philosophical mind. He is very well read. During his conversations with me, Bani-Sadr was receiving reports from his Air Force commander. He cited them to me as indicating the difficulty he would have in accepting a cease-fire. His Air Force is being successful, more so than his Army, and Bani-Sadr would have difficulty in imposing a cease-fire. I asked him to consider it in the longer run and he said he would. Our estimates are that the Iranians are flying about⁴ 150 flights a day and that they have 650 pilots available. The Iranian military is very proud and confident of itself. As a result, the Iranians are now inflexible. Bani-Sadr said he would be helpless if he tried to declare a cease-fire because the military would object and the leaders do not have the institutions to impose their will. They see themselves as spokesmen for the people. The leadership is very divided but united in its determination to fight Iraq. They see themselves as the aggrieved party and they will fight to the last. They are also desperate. They feel isolated in the Islamic world. (They may be getting some aid from outside and President Zia described here the appearance of an Iranian Air Force 747 in Islamabad carrying sensitive equipment from North Korea.)

In Baghdad, I found the Iraqis equally confident though keen for a cease-fire, even on a unilateral basis. I told them that some withdrawal may be necessary for a cease-fire. The Iraqis said no. They disclaim any territorial ambitions, only the territory that should have been theirs back in 1975, Shatt al Arab and the three islands which should revert to UAE.

President Carter: This looks like a stalemate to me. The Iraqis are poised to take Dezful and thus to exclude Khuzistan. A stalemate is the most likely outcome and that would be a crippling blow to Teheran.

We share a common concern over the Soviets in Afghanistan. And it is important for the UN to maintain its condemnation. The foregoing, together with the fall of the Shah, has caused us to increase our presence in the region. We now have two carriers in the area. We have pre-positioned military cargo. We are developing the Rapid Deployment Force. We are conducting exercises with some of the countries in the region. We have acquired facilities in Oman and Kenya, and we are determined to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Moreover, we have recently deployed AWACS to Saudi Arabia. We want to contain the conflict, and we have discouraged the Saudis and Omanis from becoming involved.

In my State of the Union message, I stated the region was vital to our national security and that we would act to protect that security.⁵ I wanted Brezhnev to know we would feel our vital interests are engaged if there was a Soviet intrusion. They might have moved into Poland if not for the world reaction to their invasion of Afghanistan. I see no possibility of business as usual while the Soviets are in Afghanistan. Again, let me say how much we admire your courage as well as your support for the refugees.

I am disappointed and regretful that we did not have an adequate communication in the past on an economic/military package. The public/press exchanges were mutually embarrassing. I understand that you do not want military assistance, but we will continue to be helpful in modest ways with regard to the refugees. We also understand your aversion to U.S. military aid, which in any case is forbidden by Congress, but we are willing to discuss purchases, if you want, of military equipment. If you need the assurance from us that you could purchase F–16s, we would be forthcoming. I know you have access to French planes, but we are willing to sell if you so desire it. If you want it, let’s work it out between us directly.

We are deeply committed to the security of your country. We will be forthcoming if you want to purchase military equipment. We both have military backgrounds, so we can deal, if you want, directly.

President Zia: We admire you personally and we are grateful. We are a developing country and our dream is to have what is best for our military. We have only China, France, or the USA from whom to get aircraft; and only China or the USA for our tanks. We understand your sensitivity about India and we also understand that the U.S. must have an interest in Pakistan before it does anything for us. We do not ask you to sever your relations with India, but we are sensitive about any India veto over your relations with us. (Clifford apparently told Mrs. Gandhi that the Brzezinski visit was only an eyewash.)⁶ We should get your aid on our own merits, not because of an Indian veto or wishes.

We do not have any money for purchases. We will not get it from Saudi Arabia unless the Saudis feel a genuine interest in Pakistan. Our problem is that the Soviet Union is now our neighbor. I have told the Soviets that we will resist to the end and in the meantime, with your help, we will continue fighting the battle of Pakistan in Afghanistan.

President Carter: It is our fight too.

President Zia: I am 100 percent certain the Afghanistanis will not surrender. The Soviets will feel the pinch.

President Carter: What is your assessment of the effectiveness of resistance?

President Zia: Excellent. And they could do more.

President Carter: Do you think more is needed?

President Zia: Yes. Not enough has been given so far. I feel that Pakistan should continue to fight in Afghanistan, but Pakistan must be safe. It is in the interest of both Pakistan and the U.S. to support the freedom fighters. But Pakistan will be punished by the Soviet Union, and we are prepared for that. If they escalate, and they will do so in the next few months in order to humiliate us, we will stand up and we will need your assistance.

I could greatly improve the spirit of my Air Force if I had six more planes, but if I am able to feed more effectively 650,000 people, I can tell the military the country is getting stronger. I do not need direct military assistance. Our real need is in debt rescheduling. That would be the greatest favor to us.

President Carter: The three year part is the most difficult.

President Zia: One year to start and then the others will follow.

President Carter: We will do the one year and the food supply will be sustained by us. And if you want to buy military equipment, including F–16s, we will be forthcoming.⁷

President Zia: I need your support with the Europeans. They are too scared.

President Carter: Giscard and Thatcher said we should do more to help the freedom fighters. What should I tell them?

President Zia: Tell them to contact me. The freedom fighters need more anti-tank and anti-helicopter weapons (discussion of some defective SAM–7s). France has good weapons and the Europeans should be more helpful.

On another issue, I just want to say that Mrs. Gandhi is no friend of Pakistan or the U.S.

President Carter: Do not hesitate to approach me directly. You can also use a personal emissary to keep in touch with me.

There was an exchange of pleasantries and then the meeting concluded.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 8–11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “ok, J.”
2. Zia addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations in the morning of October 1. In telegram 3939 from USUN, October 2, the Mission reported that Zia “emphasized his role as spokesman for the entire world Moslem community. Zia expressed the ‛anguish’ of the Islamic world over the conflict between Iraq and Iran, and reported on his mission of goodwill to the residents of the two countries.” After criticizing the United States for its policies in the Middle East and North Africa, Zia “deplored the ‛tragedy of military intervention on a massive scale’ in Afghanistan, without directly referring to the Soviet invasion. He praised Afghan resistance as a ‛sacrosanct struggle,’ and denied Pakistani involvement in the resistance movement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800475–0472)
3. In telegram 9964 from Islamabad, September 28, the Embassy reported on Zia’s September 28 visits to Tehran and Baghdad in order to “ascertain the views of both Iran and Iraq on the conflict the two countries are currently waging.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800463–0040)
4. Carter crossed out the words “are flying about” and drew a line from the phrase to the bottom of the page where he wrote: “have had as many as.”
5. See Document 16.
6. For the Embassy’s report on Clifford’s meeting with Gandhi, see Document 169.
7. Telegram 297580 to Islamabad, November 8, notified Hummel that General Akhtar would be asked to inform Zia that the United States was “prepared to make available from U.S. Army stocks 200 Redeye missiles for purchase through foreign military sales channels” because of “ever increasing Soviet pressure on Pakistan.” (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tin: 980643000018, Box 3, Islamabad 80–81) Telegram 297580 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 333.