Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

169. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, February 1, 1980, 1049Z

2224. CINCPAC for POLAD—Handle as Specat. Subj: Clark Clifford’s January 31 Meeting With Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Ref: New Delhi 02112.²

1. S–Entire text.

2. Summary

Mrs. Gandhi greeted Mr. Clifford warmly and responded enthusiastically to the personal message he delivered to her from President Carter.³ Mr. Clifford stressed the importance the President attaches to maintaining a close personal relationship with Mrs. Gandhi. The President is deeply concerned at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and determined that the Soviets understand any further moves would be opposed by the U.S. U.S. arms supply to Pakistan was part of this effort. However, due to the modest character of the equipment, this should not be a matter of concern to India. We are also prepared to sell arms to India. There is nothing in our relationship with China which threatens India. US aims in South Asia are the same as India’s—a region of non-aligned independent nations. We both seek Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The U.S. hopes India will use its influence with the Soviets to that end.

Mrs. Gandhi responded that India wanted good relations with all its neighbors. However, any arms Pakistan acquired would induce a “dangerous state of mind”. Zia will use them against India and to suppress his own people. The US was backing an unpopular ruler as it has done in Iran. Mrs. Gandhi doubted if the Soviets would enter Pakistan. India has made clear to the Soviets that it does not approve of their troops being in Afghanistan. Mrs. Gandhi felt they would remain “until the government in Kabul is secure.” Mrs. Gandhi described her own and Soviet fears of China, with which she is committed to have good relations. She deplored the return of the “Cold War” atmosphere and wants good relations with the U.S. Some American Presidents and Western media have been against her, but she has never tilted against the U.S. “She was neither pro-Soviet nor pro-U.S., but pro-India.” End summary.

3. Special Presidential Emissary Clark Clifford met with Prime Minister Gandhi for an hour and 20 minutes January 31. Also present on Indian side were Acting Principal Private Secretary C.R. Krishnaswamy Rao Sahib, MEA Secretary (East) Gonsalves and note takers. Mr. Clifford was accompanied by Ambassador Goheen and NEA/INS Country Director Howard Schaffer.

4. The meeting was amicable and, in our view, was a highly useful exchange. Mrs. Gandhi was at her attractive best. She spoke candidly and completely without rancor. Her presentation of India’s position lasted for an unusually long 30 minutes, without interruption. She made it clear from the outset that she appreciated the opportunity to exchange views and was pleased that the President had sent Clifford, a personal friend and senior advisor, to India for this purpose.

5. Clifford began by expressing President Carter’s high regard for Mrs. Gandhi and his greetings to her. The Prime Minister responded enthusiastically to this and asked that she be personally remembered to the President and the members of his family. She recalled with great pleasure the visit of Mrs. Lillian Carter and Chip to India in 1977.

6. Clifford spoke of the shift in political winds in the United States. He said that it was now his personal conviction that President Carter would be renominated and reelected. He would thus have five more years in office, exactly the length of Mrs. Gandhi’s newly begun term. He said that it was important that these two leaders of the world’s greatest democracies be in close contact and through their dialogue seek to avoid misunderstanding about the policies of their two countries. He said that the President had selected him with a view to conveying to Mrs. Gandhi the importance that he attached to this personal relationship.

7. Clifford opened his presentation by speaking of the growing concern the US had over the past years with Soviet moves. He mentioned the build-up of Soviet military forces, their ability rapidly to deploy these forces in different parts of the world, and Soviet-sponsored activities in Africa and the Indian Ocean area. It was against this background, further complicated by developments in Iran and their impact on the power balance and stability of the area, that we viewed the Soviet move into Afghanistan. Clifford described this as an abrupt change in what had been until then the Soviet practice of intervening with its own troops only in the countries of the Warsaw Pact. He said that we do not really know why they had moved into Afghanistan. The reason for their move was less important than the fact that they had gone in with a very substantial military force.

8. Clifford said that we had to assess the Soviet move both in terms of what it meant for the South Asian and Southwest Asian region and what it meant for the broader global situation. He stressed that we believe that aggression unopposed leads to further aggression; we had learned bitter lessons in the past on this score. He said we were now seeking to send a signal to the Soviet Union that its move would be politically costly to it and that any further moves would be opposed.

9. One of the decisions we had made following the Soviet invasion was to provide arms to Pakistan. Clifford assured Mrs. Gandhi that this should not be a matter of concern to India. He stressed the modest amount of such equipment, its defensive character, and the fact that it would comprise items designed to enable Pakistan to defend its northwestern frontier against actions from Afghanistan. He added that the major purpose of the assistance was to serve as a symbol, so that the Soviets would be aware that if they were to move into Pakistan, this would be a matter of grave concern to the US. The US is also seeking to get other countries to provide assistance to Pakistan so that the signal to the Soviets will be reinforced. He noted that US is also prepared to sell to India arms of a high level of sophistication if India wishes to purchase them.

10. Clifford said that US-Chinese relations were gradually being normalized. There had been exchanges of delegations and many US Cabinet members have visited China. The most recent Cabinet official to do so had been Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.⁴ Clifford stressed that the US did not intend to provide weapons to the Chinese. There was nothing in our relationship with China which could be viewed as a threat to India.

11. Clifford emphasized that the US seeks no special position in South Asia. We wish to see in the region non-aligned, independent nations free to develop their own futures. We consider India the leading regional power. We want no confrontation with the Soviet Union in the region and we understand India’s concerns on that score. Nonetheless, we must recognize that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan necessitates a greater interest on our part in the region than we have had before. The occupation of Afghanistan brings Soviet forces to within 300 miles of the Persian Gulf. Clifford cited the President’s remarks in the State of the Union address about U.S. vital interests in the Gulf and our determination to use force if necessary to protect these interests.⁵

12. Clifford said that in his view we seek the same goals in South Asia as does India. These are that the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan and that Afghanistan once again become an independent and non-aligned country. Even if they simply seek to establish a puppet government in Afghanistan this would be a matter of concern. We do not want the Soviets to misunderstand our position.

13. Clifford noted that we strongly support the modernization of India and Mrs. Gandhi’s efforts to bring it about. He spoke of the President’s interest in India and his desire to avoid actions which would be detrimental to India or misunderstood there. He stressed the President’s devotion to peace. He also noted that the US did not wish to upset India’s relationship with the Soviet Union, which brought certain benefits for the Indians. He hoped that India would be able to use its influence with Moscow to persuade the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan.

14. Replying to Mr. Clifford’s presentation, Mrs. Gandhi stated that India did not want to stand in the way of US relations with China or Pakistan. Though India had faced aggression and sustained hostility from both countries, it was seeking to develop friendship with them. She reviewed her own efforts, begun in 1972, to normalize Indo-Pak relations. She said that she sincerely believed that it was not to India’s advantage to have weak neighbors. It wants stable, strong, and independent countries in the region, provided that these do not interfere in India’s affairs. She declared that India poses no danger to its neighbors.

15. Discussing Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi said that Pakistan would be encouraged to use these arms acquired from the West against India. The quality or quantity of these arms is not important. Any arms that Pakistan acquires induces a dangerous attitude of mind. In the past, for example, there had been a hardening of Pak attitudes following arms shipments. Pakistan, she said, was unstable, even fragile. Zia was not a popular leader and the arms he receives will be used against the local people—the Baluchis and Sindhis. She said a situation similar to Iran would arise. There, too, the US backed one man even though he lacked popular support.

15. Mrs. Gandhi said she found it difficult to believe that the Soviets would enter Pakistan. She did not in any way wish to excuse their invasion of Afghanistan. Their argument, she said, was that the Pakistanis had been arming Afghan insurgents and undermining the Kabul government. In justifying their move, the Soviets also said that they feared a US move against Iran. The Soviet Ambassador had told her that Soviet troops were massed on the Pakistan and Iranian borders in order to prevent infiltrations by those trained to upset the present regime. She thought the Soviet position was understandable, since the Islamic fanatacism of the insurgent forces would cause problems for the Soviets in Central Asia were they to make progress in Afghanistan. She reiterated that India had made it clear to the Soviets that it does not approve of their troops being there. India took this position both for its own sake and also because the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan could lead to escalation of a cold-war atmosphere in the region.

16. Mrs. Gandhi observed that the Soviets seemed obsessed with China. She said they feared being surrounded. Afghanistan, she recalled, had been the happy hunting ground for many powers and India was afraid of the effect that any action there will have. The Soviet Ambassador had assured her that Soviet troops would not stay a long time. He had talked of weeks or months, but it was anybody’s guess how long they would stay. In her view they would remain until they felt sure that the government in Kabul was secure.

17. Mrs. Gandhi regretted that the Cold War atmosphere had returned and that detente appeared to be a thing of the past. She said that this was worrisome for India for if a Cold War escalates into a hot war it would be too close for comfort.

18. Turning to China, Mrs. Gandhi reviewed her efforts since 1966 to be friendly with the PRC. She complained of the potential for Chinese mischief-making in the northeast and in Nepal. She did not cite any current activities in the region. She declared that if China doesn’t wish to be friendly with India this could be a real threat, especially if China is closely tied to Pakistan. This is why people in India have become excited about Sino-Pak ties. Pakistan can’t conquer India or occupy Indian territory but the Chinese potential for causing trouble is considerable and this influences the Indian view.

19. Mrs. Gandhi insisted she wants good relations with the US. Although “some” American Presidents have tilted against India, she had never tilted against the US. She complained that the Western press had tried to develop an image of her as pro-Soviet and anti-American. This, she said, was not true. She maintained that she had great admiration for the US where “the talk is higher than anywhere else”. She was neither pro-Soviet nor pro-U.S., but pro-India.

20. Clifford observed that the US would be conscious of any misuse by Pakistan of arms we supplied it and these arms would be watched with great care. He raised as a personal suggestion the possibility of a mutual withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan forces from the Indo-Pak border. Mrs. Gandhi interjected to say that the “Indian Express” this morning reported Zia’s rejection of India’s longstanding offer of a no-war pact. She said that India wished further improvement in Indo-Pak relations. To her reiterated comparison of the Shah and Zia, Clifford said that we are not putting our imprimatur on the Zia government. We were supporting the nation of Pakistan and were reacting to the Soviets. Mrs. Gandhi then complained about Diego Garcia. She maintained that Soviet actions will be governed by what China and the US do. She feared escalation and complained that in the past India had not fit into US global strategy. When Mrs. Gandhi mentioned that Gromyko was coming to India on February 12, Clifford expressed the hope that Mrs. Gandhi would use the occasion to work for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. He pointed out that the decision to build up Diego Garcia was very recent and directly linked to the increased Soviet presence in the region. Concluding, he noted that the attention of the world was riveted on this part of the globe and that this attention was caused by the Soviets.

Goheen

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800077–1075, D800056–0643. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Beijing, Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kabul, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, London, Madras, Paris, Tokyo, CINCPAC, USUN, Bonn, USNATO, and Seoul. Repeated to Islamabad in telegram WH80141/Sitto 35, February 2. Aaron sent a copy of telegram WH180141/Sitto 35 to Carter under a February 2 note that reads: “Attached is Clark Clifford’s report of his conversations with Prime Minister Gandhi which he regards as ‛highly useful.’ I think when you read it, however, you will find out that Mrs. Gandhi’s position on virtually all issues of importance to us is unhelpful.” Carter initialed the telegram. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 1–3/80)
2. Telegram 2112 from New Delhi, January 31, 1980, reported Clifford’s January 30 meeting with Foreign Minister P.V. Nasarimha Rao. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800054–07670 An extract of telegram 2112 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 190.
3. Not found.
4. On January 7 and 8, Brown met with Chinese Vice Premier Geng Biao in Beijing. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Documents 290–292.
5. See Document 16.