457. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
9533. Subject: Visit of President Zia-ul-Haq to US: What’s On His Mind?
1. (C) Entire text.
2. Summary: On his upcoming visit to the U.S. to meet with President Carter, President Zia-ul-Haq will be testing the depth of the U.S. [Page 1042] understanding of Pakistan’s concerns and the U.S. commitment to Pakistan’s security. Afghanistan is likely to be at the top of his agenda, but arriving in Washington just after representing the Islamic world at the UNGA, he is also likely to rehearse Pak and Islamic Conference concerns about the Middle East, especially as they affect the ability of the U.S. to defend Western interests in the region. Bilaterally, Zia will be interested in learning what the U.S. can do to assist Pakistan economically and possibly also what the prospects might be regarding the purchase of a major weapons system like a high performance fighter. End summary.
3. Pakistan’s security in South and Southwest Asia: In the context of what may be a developing siege mentality in Pakistan, President Zia-ul-Haq is likely to have security concerns uppermost in his mind during his Washington visit. It will be important to permit him to convey his personal assessment of the threat to Pakistan and the region, particularly the relative weight which he attaches to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and the problems of worsening relationships with both Iran and India. Pakistan feels very much alone at the moment and seeks reassurance—not only because it believes the West has let it down but also because its Islamic friends have not come through with much support. American determination to resist Soviet expansionism, and to help others to do so, should be explained to Zia at some length.
4. The Department should keep in mind that Zia’s views on these issues do not necessarily coincide with those of FonMin Agha Shahi, who, though he retains an essentially free hand in foreign affairs, is less favorably disposed toward the US than Zia is. Zia’s visit—he will undoubtedly be accompanied by Shahi—should provide an opportunity to determine nuances that exist in their respective views and preferred policies.
5. I believe that Zia personally is still tempted by the idea of a formal security relationship with the U.S. which—if it were substantial enough—could offset Afghan and Indian agreements with USSR. The kind of binding agreement—with built-in automaticity—he occasionally suggests is clearly not in the cards. Our problem will be to convince him of the credibility of our commitment to Pakistan’s continued independence and territorial integrity while pointing out that a new agreement on paper would potentially create more controversy and difficulties than it would enhance Pakistan’s security.
6. Zia is also likely to exhibit a new concern about developments in Iran and Iranian intentions toward Pakistan. Pak-Iranian relations have deteriorated; they have become a domestic issue in both countries, with suspicion growing in Pakistan of Iranian exploitation of Shia-Sunni issues here. Just as we hope for better relations with Iran, good [Page 1043] Pak-Iranian relations are in the U.S. interest, and Zia should be assured that we take no satisfaction out of the recent deterioration in their bilateral ties.
7. At the same time, we share Zia’s interest in close cooperation with Islamic moderates like Saudi Arabia, and we should use this opportunity to encourage continued Pak-Saudi-Kuwait cooperation. The Pakistanis face a delicate balancing act in dealing with the Iranians and the Saudis; we should be supportive and sympathetic.
8. All this said, it is clear that the Indian bogey still looms very large in Pakistani eyes. Zia must take that fact into account in all his security calculations. Pak-Indian relations have suffered a setback as a result of recriminations over communal violence in India. I believe that Zia sees the need to continue efforts at improving relations with India, however, and we should quietly encourage him in this regard, understanding that the road to cooperation is filled with potholes and diversions created by decades of distrust, hostility and mutual suspicion. We should be aware that Pakistanis, from Zia on down believe that we care more for India than we do Pakistan and that this consideration permits Indian considerations to limit what we do for Pakistan.
9. As for China, Zia would appreciate hearing the President’s views on our evolving relationship with Beijing. Pakistan still perceives China as its staunchest ally and vividly recalls its own pivotal role in facilitating normalization of U.S.–PRC relations. Nonetheless, China cannot meet Pakistan’s needs for modern and more sophisticated military equipment. We should seek Zia’s views on the role China can play in enhancing security in South and Southwest Asia.
10. It is possible that Zia may raise Pakistan’s urgent need for high-performance aircraft. We have offered to sell F–5Es; Pakistan would prefer a more capable, later-generation aircraft, which we have declined to supply, although we have held the door open for the F–X. My views on the importance of our being more forthcoming on this issue have been transmitted before,2 and if Washington is unable to come up with any new options, I hope that at least careful thought will be given to a thorough and convincing justification as to why we are unable to meet GOP needs in this area. It will not be easy to convince Zia that this is not the product of US concern for Indian relations.
11. Afghanistan: Zia’s meeting with the President provides us with an opportunity to sound Zia out on his medium and long-term analysis of the Afghanistan situation. We will want to get his views in particular on: (1) Soviet intentions within Afghanistan; (2) the ability of the Afghan resistance groups to continue fighting as well as possibilities for [Page 1044] improved cooperation among them; and (3) the longer term political, social and economic implications of the million-plus Afghan refugees (with more coming) in Pakistan. We should also express interest in Pakistan’s view of the diplomatic situation with regard to Afghanistan including efforts by the Islamic Conference and further steps which could be taken in multilateral forums to continue pressures on the Soviet Union to withdraw and to keep the conflict alive as an issue of international concern. We should underline our desire to consult and cooperate closely with Pakistan on policy towards Afghanistan and the Soviet invasion.
12. Middle East: Since the main purpose of Zia’s trip to the U.S. is to address the UNGA as spokesman for the Islamic Conference, we should anticipate that he will want to discuss Islamic concerns about U.S. policy towards the Middle East, particularly Jerusalem and Palestinian issues and is likely to argue that the US relationship with Israel will continue to be an irritant in US-Islamic ties and will become an increasingly important impediment to Islamic cooperation with us in playing a stabilizing role in the region. I believe Zia’s discussions of this subject will be moderate; in my talks with him he has accepted (but not agreed with) US policies toward Israel. I am confident he will not take a confrontational posture in his meeting with President Carter, whatever he may feel he must say on the floor of the UNGA.
13. Economic aid: Bilaterally, we would expect Zia to focus on possibilities for renewed economic assistance to Pakistan. I would hope we could give him a rather definite indication of the magnitude of our proposed commodity and other assistance for the next two fiscal years. He will probably express appreciation for U.S. willingness to consider debt rescheduling but may argue for a longer-term (3–4 years) commitment.
14. Nuclear issue: Discussion of resumed assistance will of course open the subject of Pakistan’s nuclear program. While Zia may not raise the topic himself, we assume we will want to make known our continuing concerns. While making clear the seriousness with which we regard Pakistan’s attempt to develop a nuclear capability, we should reaffirm our commitment to Pakistan’s security and try to reassure Zia that we are neither opposed to development of nuclear power for peaceful uses nor discriminatory against Pakistan in our non-proliferation policy.
15. Human rights: I would hope we can use the opportunity of the President’s meeting with Zia to explain candidly our basic human rights policy and our view that the stability of Pakistan—and its continued existence as an independent nation—can best be served by early restoration of representative institutions. This can be done by expressing an understanding for the problems Zia faces, an appreciation of the [Page 1045] important and constructive role Pakistan is playing, and a reaffirmation that we stand committed to Pakistan’s independence and territorial integrity. We would be remiss were we to avoid the issue and its importance for Pakistan’s future. We have reported on Zia’s new negotiations with political leaders, aimed at forming a civilian government before he departs for the U.S.3 It may be that Zia will be in a position to explain what he has accomplished in moving toward a civilian government and perhaps toward general elections.
16. Narcotics: There is an area in which we can and should compliment Zia—narcotics. The ban on opium cultivation in the Frontier and the subsequent precipitous decline in production deserves an acknowledgement from the highest levels of the USG. We can also point out that this is an area in which we are cooperating and can continue working together in spite of whatever other difficulties we have had.
17. Hostages: Zia’s concern re hostages in Tehran parallels ours, and he has voiced these concerns on a number of occasions with Iranian authorities. His ability to be helpful is very limited, but the President should acknowledge our appreciation for what he has done, which includes an early Zia-Khomeini letter and a demarche through FonMin Agha Shahi to Khomeini.
18. Zia has waited over three years for this chance to meet President Carter face-to-face. Following our inability to come to terms earlier this year, we should seek to use this meeting as a means of determining the parameters within which our relationship with Pakistan can be conducted. Without seeking to be dramatic, I believe it could be a watershed event in our relationship, taking place as it does against a background of Pakistani disillusionment and even bitterness with past U.S. support. To the extent we are able to convince Zia of the steadfastness of our resolve in defending our interests (and those of Pakistan) in this area of the world, we will open up possibilities for cooperation. To the extent that we fail to do so, we will encourage those tendencies within Pakistan who believe their country is at sea and can only survive—if at all—through acceptance of a Soviet fait accompli in Afghanistan and accommodation to Soviet pressures.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800446–1081. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to New Delhi, Jidda, Beijing, Moscow, London, Paris, USUN, Karachi, Peshawar (pouch), and Lahore (pouch).↩
- See Documents 447 and 454.↩
- In telegram 9279 from Islamabad, September 15, the Embassy reported on meetings that Zia had with various Pakistani political leaders and speculated on the make-up of Zia’s future Cabinet. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800439–0658)↩