Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

454. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 7, 1980

SUBJECT

• Daily Report

Information

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

U.S.-Pakistan Politico-Military Dialogue: According to Ambassador Hummel, we are at a critical point in our effort to maintain a politico-military dialogue with the Pakistanis,² with attention currently focussing on U.S. decisions regarding the sale/provision of high performance aircraft as a gauge of our determination to be forthcoming and of our seriousness of purpose in helping nations defend themselves from an aggressive Soviet Union. The dilemma at present is that Pakistan does not want the F–5E, the type of aircraft we have offered, cannot wait for its follow-on—the F(X), and cannot afford the aircraft their air force believes it wants. Hummel proposes a “package approach” to this problem, one which introduces the idea of another aircraft into the mix, and one which has none of the painful association of those already mentioned regularly and prominently in our dialogue. Specifically, he recommends that we think in terms of a package aircraft deal, tied in the long-run to the sale of the F(X), whatever that turns out to be. Such a deal would involve sufficient numbers to meet Pakistani needs, probably three squadrons, and would be preceded by the sale or lease to the Pakistani air force of 2–3 squadrons of used F–4E aircraft which would be returned, re-sold, or used as the downpayment on the latter sale. Hummel urges that Washington resolve to make this package offer at the highest level, with full recognition of its political importance. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 30, 8/7/80–8/10/80. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Zbig, C.”
2. In telegram 7761 from Islamabad, August 5, Hummel reported his analyses and recommendations, which he explained were based on the views of “senior civilian and military officers.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800374–0530)