446. Editorial Note
On June 11, 1980, Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner discussed with Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski a Pakistani request for SA–7s and RPG–7s. Turner informed Brzezinski that, as soon as details were addressed with the Department of Defense, “the DDCI would come to him with a memo proposing an SCC meeting to get a policy ruling on whether we wanted to support the Paks in one way or another. To get that ruling we would have to indicate the legal and other difficulties in going either the SA–7/RPG route or the Redeye/Dragon route. The former could be done on a clandestine basis; the latter would be done on an FMS basis and would have to be overt.” (Memorandum for the Record Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, June 11; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, Folder 43: [Page 1016] DCI/DDCI Memrecs/Memos/Agendas of Brzezinski/Aaron meetings January–December 1980) Pakistan’s initial request for arms was not found, but Ambassador to Pakistan Arthur Hummel discussed it in a June 30 message; see Document 447.
Later on June 11, after meeting with Brzezinski, Turner reported to President Jimmy Carter the Pakistani request for “some weapons for their own use in the border area” near Afghanistan. Turner continued: “A comment was made that they had probably been siphoning off all along. I said that was certainly possible, but the fact that they had come and asked us for some now would indicate they were being reasonably aboveboard.” Turner offered his opinion that Pakistan’s request was “perhaps an attempt to determine how serious we were about supporting them after all the confusion over the $400 million of aid; they were now trying to see through the clandestine side whether they could tell whether we were serious or not.” (Memorandum for the Record Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, June 11; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, Folder 49: DCI Memrecs/Memos/Agendas of Presidential Briefings January–December 1980)
During a June 17 conversation, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Frank Carlucci informed Brzezinski: “I could see only two ways of resolving the question of SA–7’s for Pakistan: FMS or a CA finding. We both agreed that a Finding was probably the best route, but he said it could not be signed until the President returned. I did get his concurrence to go ahead with a SCC(I) meeting under Aaron’s chairmanship to thrash out the policy issue and get SCC approval.” (Memorandum for the Record Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, June 17; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, Folder 43: DCI/DDCI Memrecs/Memos/Agendas of Brzezinski/Aaron meetings January–December 1980) Regarding Carlucci’s reference to President Carter’s absence from the White House, Carter left for Camp David at 2:02 p.m. on June 14, departed Camp David the same day for Spruce Creek, Pennsylvania, returned to Camp David on June 15, and returned to the White House at 2:36 p.m. on June 16. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)