Office of the Historian

435. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter1

Washington, April 3, 1980

SUBJECT

  • Daily Report

Information

Stemming the Deterioration in U.S.-Pak Relations: Ambassador Hummel believes we should begin consideration of the best ways of limiting the long-term effects of the seemingly inevitable deterioration in our relations with Pakistan while working toward achievable goals.2 He adds that our objective should be to stem the downward slide at a point where relations can bottom-out and hopefully later turn upward. [Page 992] Specifically, Hummel recommends we refrain for the time being from further full-scale consultations with the Pakistanis about our plans and intentions; proceed with a debt rescheduling regime in a context of multilateral support and structural reform; and press ahead with military-to-military discussions of the results of the U.S. military team visit.3 (S)

[Page 993]

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 26, 4/1/80–4/4/80. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.↩
  2. Telegram 3062 from Islamabad, April 2, transmitted Hummel’s analysis and recommendations for handling U.S.-Pakistani relations. Hummel based his view that bilateral relations would continue to worsen on four assumptions: “A. It is now problematical whether the Congress will agree to lay aside the Symington Amendment ban which is a prerequisite to appropriating even $100 million in economic aid in ’81; B. We will not be seeking congressional reaffirmation of the 1959 executive agreement; C. There is no economic assistance money available from the ’80 budget, and at most $100 million in economic aid in ’81; D. The Paks will continue to reject FMS credits and a closer military relationship with the U.S.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0476)↩
  3. See footnote 7, Document 426.↩