176. Editorial Note
A status report prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, January 21, 1980, described weapons shipments destined for Afghanistan as part of the early stage of the covert action. The report noted that an unidentified insurgent group had already received 50 AK–47s and 50,000 rounds of ammunition. This information was elaborated on in an attached memorandum, January 6, [text not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, in response to Turner’s request for figures on arms deliveries to Pakistan. The report itemized several shipments. One shipment, delivered from [text not declassified] to Saudi Arabia and from there to Islamabad, contained 56,000 pounds of matériel, including 50 RPG–7 rocket launchers, 35 12.7mm HMGs, 500 AK–47s, 640,000 rounds of AK–47 ammunition, and approximately 2,000 pounds of explosives. Another shipment, delivered from Cairo to Dhahran, contained another 56,000 pounds of matériel, including 1,000 rounds of RPG–7 ammunition and 210,000 rounds of 12.7mm HMG ammunition. Regarding the first shipment, the memorandum reported that the equipment arrived in Islamabad January 4, and was received by the Pakistani Intelligence Service. The second shipment, the memorandum noted, contained Egyptian arms at a cost of $1 million to the United States; an additional 32,000 pounds of arms were en route from Dhahran to Cairo, delivered via [text not declassified] at Saudi request, so as to conceal Saudi and Egyptian involvement in the arms shipments. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C–367, 01 Jan–30 Jun 80)
The status report also noted that another load of weapons was in the process of being purchased from Egypt with Saudi money. An attached cable, prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency January 18, transmitted authorization from CIA Headquarters to the [text not declassified] to place the following order: 15,000 rounds of 14.5mm HMG ammunition, 250 anti-tank grenades, 1,700 Czech-made anti-tank mines, 4,000 hand grenades, 50 82mm mortars with 2,500 rounds of prepared, and 100 RPG–7 launchers with 500 rockets. The cable noted that the shipment should commence as soon as possible, with pickup in Cairo en route to Islamabad. [text not declassified] Regarding the Soviet detection of the source of the weapons, Headquarters advised that its depots contained weapons from several countries, but the operation should ensure that only identifiably Egyptian arms should appear in Afghanistan. (Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 82M00501R, Box 12, C–367, 01 Jan–30 Jun 80)
Finally, the status report noted that Egypt was willing to sell 15 SA–7s, and referred to an attached cable that authorized Pakistani [Page 502] acquisition of the SA–7s. That cable was not attached and not found, but a status report for Brzezinski’s trip to Pakistan, January 29, noted: “Regarding SA–7s, the Pakistanis would like American instructors to train six to eight Pakistani Pushtu and Dari speaking Paks in SA–7 operations in a secure Pak military area. They would later infiltrate into Afghanistan to work with the insurgents, employ the weapons, and further train Afghans in the SA–7.” The report further noted of the arms shipments: “We have some unilateral indications that the weapons are being distributed by the Pakistanis to various insurgent groups. The chief of Pakistan service is confident that under present conditions, these weapons can be infiltrated overland into most areas of Afghanistan, including the Hazarazat. The Pakistanis claim that the availability of these weapons and promise of distribution was instrumental in forcing the insurgents to establish at least a surface unity, which was announced at the recently concluded Islamic Conference.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 40, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: 2/1–5/80: Briefing Book I) On the Islamic Conference, see footnote 2, Document 184.