Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

420. Memorandum From the White House Situation Room to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 29, 1980

SUBJECT

• Evening Notes

Zia’s Talking Points for Your Upcoming Meeting:² President Zia, in the face of the Soviet threat, recently instructed Pakistani [less than 1 line not declassified] to prepare a study of Pakistan’s defense needs aimed at Islamabad’s monetary and material needs from the U.S.³ [3 lines not declassified] has concluded that Pakistan faces a serious situation because:

—the U.S. is far away and has only one airborne division;

—the Soviets can quickly attack from Quetta or Peshawar and have 11 airborne divisions;

—Islamabad could not defend the key installations from Soviet air attacks;

—Pakistan needs $5 billion and 5 years to bring the current military formations to full strength; and

—Moscow cannot be trusted and alliance with the Soviets would anger China, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia; so, Pakistan must move closer to the U.S. (S)

[less than 1 line not declassified] concludes that in the upcoming discussions Islamabad must:

—obtain immediate “cast-iron” U.S. guarantees and support with no strings attached;

—point out the U.S. attempt to form a united front within Western Europe to assist Pakistan will probably not succeed;

—ask Washington to obtain assurances that India will not attack Pakistan over issuance of U.S. aid; and

—have the U.S. establish bases in Pakistan or Oman. (S)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 40, Brzezinski, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, 2/1–5/80: Briefing Book [I]. Top Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not declassified].
2. Brzezinski and Christopher met with Zia on February 2 and 3. See Document 423.
3. A CIA Intelligence Information Cable, January 29, reported information [text and 1 line not declassified] regarding a special report on Pakistan’s defense needs, prepared for Zia by the Pakistani Ambassador in Moscow, Yaqub Khan. The cable concluded that Pakistan would be unable to “meet a sustained military attack from the Soviets in the present state of readiness.” This shortcoming, according to the cable, could only be reversed by U.S. aid, and the “best possible” way to assure U.S. commitment to Pakistani security would be the establishment of U.S. military bases in Pakistan. (Washington National Records Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense Files, Accession No. 330–84–0056, Box 7, Pakistan)