419. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
596. Subject: Zia’s Interest in Defense Treaty With United States. Ref: Islamabad 564.2
1. (S) Entire text.
2. During my conversation with President Zia Jan 22 (reftel) he raised subject of 1959 agreement several times. Zia has not given up on idea that a formal treaty with U.S. would be a greater guarantee of Pakistan’s security than 1959 agreement. Zia said that while he accepts our assurances that 1959 agreement equally binding, there are no grey areas. He said Dr. Kissinger, in his recently published book (as was pointed out by Paks during Wash talks with Shahi), raises some questions about 1959 agreement,3 and many Pakistanis question U.S. [Page 947] response in 1965 and 1971 when there were hostilities with India. This is relevant, said Zia, since we are now in situation, given Soviet-Indian Treaty of 1971, where there needs to be clearer understanding of what U.S. will do in three contingencies: Soviet attack on Pakistan; Soviet-Indian collusion in attack; and situation in which Soviets encourage Indian attack. Under present circumstances, Pakistan unable to denude its Indian border forces to bolster defense of border with Afghanistan.
3. Zia went on to say that we all agree that situation has drastically changed with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan needs the kind of guarantees that will assure that it can hold out for some time against Soviet aggression. British have recognized the qualitative difference in situation. Although UK has never had mutual security agreement with Pakistan, Lord Carrington told Zia that there now is a clear cut case where West would have to come to Pakistan’s defense. Zia asked that DepSec Christopher be prepared to discuss three contingencies above.
4. I once again reviewed for President Zia the reasons why we did not favor seeking a treaty, including immediacy of problem and possible difficulties with Congress, particularly as a result of our differences over nuclear program. In our judgement 1959 agreement does everything for Pakistan that a treaty would do. Zia asked why could we not continue under 1959 agreement while administration sought ratification of a treaty in the Senate, even if this should take a long time. I emphasized to President Zia that I did not think that we were likely to find this as an attractive alternative to already satisfactory arrangement. However, DepSec Christopher would, of course, be willing to discuss this and any other ideas President Zia had for mutual security guarantees.
5. Comment: Zia has obviously been advised to try to extend U.S. commitments to Pakistan to include various forms of conflict with India. I assume Christopher will be prepared to respond that 1959 agreement does not cover that contingency, being focussed on Communist aggression. Paks will respond that they want to pose contingency (which Zia described as admittedly remote) that Indians will assist a Communist aggression, or act as Soviet surrogate. Paks tried to make this argument to us in 1971 war with India, and it would be useful for Dept to research USG responses at that time. As we will be pointing out in other messages, Zia needs to be able to assure the armed forces as well as the public of the adequacy of the U.S. offer and the degree of our commitment, against widespread doubts about both.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0677, N800002–0249. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- See Document 418.↩
- In White House Years, Kissinger wrote: “On December 2 [1971] Pakistani Abassador Raza delivered a letter from Yahya Khan to President Nixon invoking Article I of the 1959 bilateral agreement between the United States and Pakistan as the basis for US aid to Pakistan. The American obligation to Pakistan was thus formally raised. The State Department was eloquent in arguing that no binding obligation existed; it regularly put out its view at public briefings. It pointed out that Article I spoke only of ‛appropriate action’ subject to our constitutional processes; it did not specify what action should be taken.” Kissinger also noted: “State simply ignored all other communications between our government and Pakistan. The image of a great nation conducting itself like a shyster looking for legalistic loopholes was not likely to inspire other allies who had signed treaties with us or relied on our expressions in the belief that the words meant approximately what they said.” (Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 894–895) For Yahya Khan’s letter, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 219. For Nixon and Kissinger’s decision to send U.S. military aid to Pakistan via Iran, see ibid., Documents 222 and 265.↩