418. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
564. Subject: Meeting With President Zia.
1. (S) Entire text.
[Page 945]2. President Zia was unable to receive me Jan 21, the day of my return to Islamabad, and consequently, we passed message to Zia that day through Shahnawaz so that he would be aware that we were delaying congressional presentation of assistance legislation temporarily and that Secretary’s meeting with SFRC would be in closed session.2 Shahnawaz had expressed appreciation for this move.
3. I met with President Zia this evening, January 22, for more than an hour, and this message summarizes points that will be of immediate interest to Washington. A fuller account of conversation will follow.3
4. I opened the meeting by stressing directly to Zia the importance of not denigrating US assistance. The President quickly replied “I had to do that once or twice, but I won’t be doing it again.” Later in conversation, Zia explained that when $400 million figure leaked in Washington, there had been a flood of telegrams and letters from Pakistanis criticizing amount and urging government not to accept. Only strenuous use of press censorship had prevented this from becoming major issue here.
5. President Zia would be pleased to receive Deputy Secretary Christopher any time from February 1 on. Islamic Conference ends January 28 and Australian Foreign Minister Peacock visiting Pakistan January 29–31. Military team could accompany Christopher if we wished, but Zia thought it would make more sense to have team come immediately after Christopher visit.
6. Government of Pakistan has no present intention of releasing text of President Carter’s letter to Zia on Jan. 114 unless we do so. In future GOP would release letter only after consulting us.
7. Zia again raised question of possibility of our considering formal treaty in place of 1959 agreement. I will cover this subject more fully in a separate message. Suffice it to say here, that I reviewed the reasons why we thought this would not be the best course, including problem of our disagreement over Pakistan’s nuclear program. I also reminded Zia that we would need, even in reaffirming 1959 agreement, some nuclear assurances from Pakistan, as discussed with Agha Shahi in Washington.
8. [5 lines not declassified]
9. On question of military and economic assistance from other countries, Zia expressed strong desire for estimate of total inputs so that Pakistan could make a better judgment of whether it was going [Page 946] to be able to secure the resources to meet the Soviet challenge. I explained that he should press ahead with the Japanese, West Germans and Saudis on the basis of the spade work we had already done, to ascertain their plans.
10. Other subjects discussed will be covered in separate messages tomorrow in addition to elaboration of some of topics summarized above.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870097–0680, N800002–0232. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- In his February 5 statement before the Committee, Vance again postponed the aid request for Pakistan. (Department of State Bulletin, March 1980, pp. 40–43)↩
- See Document 419.↩
- See Document 406.↩