Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

408. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 12, 1980, 3:30–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Agha Shahi

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
• David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Graham Claytor, Deputy Secretary of Defense
• Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
• Arthur W. Hummel, Ambassador to Pakistan
• Thomas P. Thornton, National Security Council
• Agha Shahi, Foreign Affairs Adviser, Pakistan
• Muhammad Sultan Khan, Pakistan Ambassador
• General Ghulam Jilani, Pakistan
• General Khalid Mahmoud Aref, Pakistan

The President met on Saturday, January 12, with Pakistani Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room, following meetings that Shahi had had with Dr. Brzezinski² and Secretary Vance.³ Various advisers were present on each side. (S)

The President opened by welcoming Shahi and noting that he had had a good series of communications with President Zia. President Carter noted that the Soviet invasion is a major adverse development, an ominous change in Soviet practice. He was pleased at the support that he had received from the American people for his responses, and from nations all around the world. The President recalled that we had again reaffirmed the validity of the 1959 agreement, and our recognition of the Durand line as the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.⁴ He pointed out that we had put together with great care a strong military and economic aid package, and that some of our top officials will be going to Europe in the next week to discuss sharing of the economic and military burden. He said that he believed the European leaders were already positively inclined and he would appreciate Agha Shahi’s guidance on the degree to which our efforts in all of these regards should be made public. He noted, of course, that the dimensions of our aid program will have to become public as soon as we present it to Congress. (S)

The President reviewed various measures that we have taken to increase our strength on a permanent basis, including the revitalization of NATO, the establishment of important relations with China, and measured development of Diego Garcia, where the British are now more willing to be forthcoming on expansion. He noted, however, that our relations with India have become difficult following the elections.⁵ He told Mr. Shahi that he had had a nonsubstantive telephone conversation with Mrs. Gandhi and that he was disconcerted, although not especially surprised by the speech which the Indian Permanent Representative had made on Afghanistan in the UN General Assembly.⁶ The speech sounded as if it had come from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, or North Vietnam. He told Shahi that we plan to send an emissary to India to attempt to convince Mrs. Gandhi of our attitude towards her country, and to point out that we will be making commitments to Pakistan.⁷ (S)

The President said we trust that Pakistan is determined to defend its territory. We will report back on matters of concern to you after we have talked to India and our European allies. The Chinese Foreign Minister will soon be visiting Pakistan and I hope you will share with us, to the proper extent, the results of that visit. (S)

We are talking not about a transient commitment. We value our relations and are aware of our interest in Southwest Asia. Our position on nuclear explosives is clear and I hope you will relay our concern to President Zia. Movement on this is not a prerequisite for cooperation, but our long-term relations will be substantially affected by the question of nuclear explosives. We hope that you could promise not to test during the administration of President Zia. Such a pledge could be kept confidential; we would share it only with a few Congressmen. It could, however, be a prerequisite to the granting of aid. A future explosion by Pakistan would be a matter of deep concern to the United States. The nuclear question, then, is no longer an insurmountable obstacle, but it remains important. (S)

Agha Shahi thanked the President for taking time to see him, and for reaffirming the American commitment under the 1959 Agreement. Mr. Shahi said that no matter how difficult the situation might be, it was always a pleasure to deal with Secretary Vance. (S)

Mr. Shahi agreed that there was a need to continue the discussion between the two sides. He referred to an Army-Air Force-Navy team which would meet with American counterparts to review the threat to Pakistan and discuss its requirements.⁸ He pointed out that the Pakistani requirements were large because their Western Frontier is nearly undefended. All the troops are in the East because Indian forces are massed along that border. (S)

Mr. Shahi said he had received fairly explicit and satisfactory reassurances about our security guarantee. He noted that in the past there had been some question of the applicability of these guarantees, and wondered if an executive agreement would be as effective as a treaty. He said that Secretary Vance had given him the benefit of his views and that he was glad to hear from the President that the American commitment to the region is permanent. He stressed that if Pakistan does face up to the Soviet threat, and once again is left high and dry by the United States, this would pose a great danger to the very existence of Pakistan. Pakistan is now a front-line state; its concerns are legitimate and its demands are not exaggerated. He hoped for some possible strengthening of the 1959 Agreement, particularly one that would be binding on future administrations. (S)

President Carter replied that both he and Dr. Brzezinski had publicly broadcast this commitment to the American people.⁹ In addition, it will be possible to send a message to Congress to this effect.¹⁰ (S)

Secretary Vance pointed out that such a reaffirmation of the 1959 Agreement would be included in the language of the assistance package. (S)

President Carter said that the material included in the legislation would be the same as in the letter that he had written to President Zia.¹¹ He said it would be impossible to put any treaty to the Senate before the SALT II Agreement was considered, and that was, of course, now deferred. (S)

Agha Shahi, turning to India, said that Pakistan had sought to normalize relations and had had considerable success with the previous administration. Indira Gandhi is now in office, however, and she is unpredictable. In the past she has adhered to her father’s vision of India’s greatness and even its hegemony in the region. While Pakistan would not argue with India’s legitimate aspirations, it could not accept the concept of regional hegemony. Mr. Shahi said Pakistan hoped to resume soon its dialogue with India; the Indian Foreign Secretary would be coming to Islamabad and he hoped to go to Delhi to have talks with his Indian counterpart, especially concerning the nuclear issue and what guarantees each side might be able to provide the other. Pakistan would like to receive assurances from India. It would not promote a quarrel with India, but if Mrs. Gandhi were to develop a Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis and engage in diplomatic pressures, Pakistan hopes that U.S. support would not be ended. (S)

President Carter observed that a newsman told him this morning that India had invited Pakistan to deploy its troops away from the eastern border, and to the West and that India would guarantee Pakistani security in the East. (S)

Agha Shahi said that he had not heard of this, having been away for awhile. In the past, at the official level, the Indians had reassured him that they would not create problems. (S)

President Carter asked if the Pakistanis would accept such an assurance and Agha Shahi replied that while they would welcome it, they would still want to be on their guard. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether the Indian military shared Indira Gandhi’s indifference to the strategic realities of Afghanistan. (S)

Mr. Shahi thought they probably did not, but pointed out that the Indian military had always been subordinated to civilian control and were unable to assert themselves or their views. The Pakistanis believe that Indian and Pakistani interests converge. It is possible, however, that Mrs. Gandhi might see some shortsighted advantage in an alliance with the Soviet Union, designed to dismember Pakistan and allow the Soviets to take over the oil fields. He recalled that in 1971 the Indians had promised not to cause problems in East Bengal, only later on to invade it and separate it from the rest of Pakistan. The situation that Pakistan now faces is one virtually of life and death. Once Pakistan makes a choice it will have no freedom of maneuver, and will have to place itself and its trust in the honor and good faith of the United States. (S)

President Carter observed that a move of Pakistani forces to the West would be a sign of Pakistani resolve. He said that the United States will be helpful in getting support for Pakistan from other countries and asked that Agha Shahi give Zia exactly the same message that had been given to him. We will stand with Pakistan. Pakistan is vital to United States’ security, and the 1959 Agreement is permanent. It is a pleasure to have Pakistan as a friend. We both now have an opportunity to repair the doubtful relations of the past. Please take to heart the American people’s concern about the spread of nuclear weapons; this concern is not directed particularly at Pakistan, but also a series of other countries who are at the nuclear threshhold. (S)

Thereupon the meeting ended. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 78, Sensitive X: 1/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
2. See Document 407.
3. See Document 410.
4. See Document 406.
5. See Document 165.
6. See footnote 1, Document 166. Carter and Gandhi spoke on the telephone from 10:42 to 10:46 a.m. on January 9. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
7. See Documents 169 and 170.
8. Defense and military officers from Pakistan and the United States met earlier in the day. The group decided to hold future meetings. See Document 409.
9. In a January 4 televised address, Carter promised: “Along with other countries, we will provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the north.” See Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, p. 24. For Brzezinski’s public comments, see footnote 3, Document 403.
10. In his January 21 State of the Union message to Congress, Carter argued that the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan “has eliminated a buffer between the Soviet Union and Pakistan and presented a new threat to Iran. These two countries are now far more vulnerable to Soviet political intimidation. If that intimidation were to prove effective, the Soviet Union might well control an area of vital strategic and economic significance to the survival of Western Europe, the Far East, and ultimately the United States. It is clear that the entire subcontinent of Asia and specifically Pakistan is threatened. Therefore, I am asking Congress, as the first order of business, to pass an economic and military aid package designed to assist Pakistan defend itself.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, p. 165)
11. See Document 406.