Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

407. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 12, 1980, 3–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting Between Dr. Brzezinski and Agha Shahi

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Agha Shahi, Pakistani Adviser

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting by recalling the previous time he had met with Shahi and there had been substantial areas of both agreement and disagreement.² The current meeting, however, is taking place in a different context.

Shahi responded that it was important now to have agreement on fundamentals. Pakistan is facing a grave situation and Shahi was glad to be able to come here to exchange views.

Brzezinski described the Afghan events as a regional problem with wide strategic significance. We do not know what the Soviet motives were in their move but the consequences are far-reaching, to the extent that the motives are irrelevant. There is a real possibility now of sustained pressure on both Pakistan and Iran; both military and political intimidation were possible though the latter is more likely. Therefore American interests are engaged. The ramifications of such pressure could not be confined to the region. The 1959 Agreement and other assurances are clear; aggression against Pakistan would engage the United States. We fought side by side with you in Korea and know the calibre of your people. We know that you will not be intimidated.

You do however need political and psychological support. If there is an incursion from Afghanistan resulting in a skirmish, Pakistan must be in a position to rebuff such an incursion. You have to be in a position to force the invaders either to withdraw or else to escalate to clear cut aggression in which case you would not be alone. Indeed, if the Soviets know that you are determined you are in a much better position to rebuff any skirmishing along the line.

The military package which we have offered is both a token of our support and a substantial help.³ We consider it to be the point of departure for a more sustained relationship, including help provided by other countries.

The United States recognizes that Pakistan does not want an excessive embrace nor do you want to be seen as responding too clearly to our overtures. You must however not be ambiguous in the position you take towards the Soviet Union. If you should make an alternate decision, not to stand up to the Soviets, that is certainly your sovereign right. If you do make a positive decision, however, you should know that you do not stand alone.

Agha Shahi reaffirmed that the Pakistanis certainly wanted to take a stand on independence and would not submit to Soviet intimidation. It was clear that this decision had already been made because of Pakistan’s efforts among the LDCs in the UN General Assembly and in the Islamic Conference. At the same time, however, it is necessary to understand the gravity of the threat. Pakistan has noted the 1959 Agreement and the subsequent statements made about it; it would however like to have a clear-cut assurance that, as time goes on—perhaps as the situation on the ground eases—your interest diminishes, there is perhaps a revival of detente—what would the impact of all of this be on American resolve?

Pakistan has chosen a non-aligned course but sees this as compatible with opposition to the Soviet Union. The modulation of American support, however, is a real problem. America’s commitment would have to endure despite changes both internal and external to Pakistan.

Brzezinski pointed out to Shahi that US Soviet arms control negotiations will probably resume. We see these in our interest and are seeking to compartmentalize them as much as possible from the general down turn in our relationship. Our decision to postpone consideration of SALT is not a punitive action against the Soviets but simple realism.⁴ There is no relationship whatsoever between our ties to Pakistan and SALT. Our concern about Pakistan is not derived or dependent upon a change in US-Soviet atmospherics. The situation in Southwest Asia is an abiding reality. We have a vital interest in the region and the Soviets are actively threatening that interest. This means we need to have good and secure relations with Pakistan and if possible with Iran (and anything you can do to help us there would be gratefully received). If Pakistan were to disintegrate American vital interests would be affected. This simple reality is much more important in judging our commitment than is any amount of rhetoric.

The internal policies of Pakistan are indeed germane to our commitment but they are certainly not overriding. Both countries share an interest in a strong Pakistani policy. Indeed the greatest threat to Pakistan is probably from subversion rather than direct attack, and vulnerability to subversion is a factor of domestic politics to a certain extent. Brzezinski reassured Shahi that the United States is not offering any prescription as to what Pakistan should do.

He also hoped that the nuclear impediment to a close continuing relationship could be removed. This was previously the central issue in our relationship with Pakistan; it is no longer. It must be realized, however, that when the immediate atmospherics of the current situation change, non-proliferation will return as an important political reality. The United States does not object to Pakistan having a nuclear program; it is specifics of that program that we object to.

Agha Shahi acknowledged that the United States had nuclear concerns but pointed out that Pakistan has told the United States the truth in this regard; it has received no outside financing; it is not engaged in a weapons program; and it would not transfer sensitive nuclear technology to other countries. It will review the nuclear explosives question, but this is an extremely sensitive issue for Pakistan domestically (Brzezinski noted that it was equally so for the United States). Shahi continued by observing that the concerns frequently expressed in the press were gross exaggerations.

Returning to the Soviet threat, Shahi pointed out that Pakistan has stated in the earlier meetings its requirements for the Western front; it would not be possible to shift troops there from the East. Pakistan has to expect to confront some ten Soviet divisions there.

Pakistan appreciates the offer that the United States has made, but the members of the team that has come to Washington feel that this offer is not commensurate with the gravity and the size of the threat. These matters, however, will be discussed later.

Shahi recalled that in the past Pakistan had had some success in normalizing its relationship with India. There was now concern, however, because of the return of Mrs. Gandhi and the incredible speech that the Indian representative made on Afghanistan in the General Assembly.⁵ Pakistan is concerned that a Moscow-Kabul-Delhi access [axis] will be established. Karmal has had long and close ties with Indira Gandhi and Pakistan fears a concerted pressure, at sometime in the future, from Afghanistan and India, sponsored by the Soviet Union.

Brzezinski inquired whether the refugee camps along the Frontier are adequately protected with anti-aircraft weapons, for example, since it was quite possible that the Soviet/Afghan forces might make reprisal raids against them.

Agha Shahi said they certainly were not and that the troops in the West are all under strength.

Brzezinski pressed, asking whether the camps are not likely to be attacked either from the air or, less likely, on the ground. Would it not be a good idea to protect these camps?

Shahi agreed and noted that if there were an attack against the camps, the Pakistanis would have to retaliate against the Soviet/Afghan forces inside Afghanistan, if domestic morale were to be maintained. But, he wondered, in 3 to 6 months from now how would the United States react to a possible concerted pressure from Afghanistan and India? We have been told before that the 1959 Agreement is not applicable against India. We need to have the defensive capability against India.

Brzezinski countered that it was important to think strategically about this question. Pakistan is receiving advanced aircraft from the French and the United States has demonstrated its willingness to help with supply of other weapons and resources. In the future perhaps we will be able to improve our relations with Iran. Pakistan and Iran are already able to work together and the United States and China are strengthening their ties. This fabric, in its totality, would provide a neutralizing effect to any concerted pressure of the kind that Shahi suggests. He cautioned Shahi that the United States will not enter into an alliance against India. We suspect, incidentally, that the Indian military also does not want to succumb to Soviet domination. The statement that was made in the United Nations yesterday is perhaps not the last word on the subject.

Brzezinski reiterated three points:

1. We must be sure that our bilateral relations are strong;

2. Pakistan must make unambiguously clear that if attacked it will fight. The Soviets always try to intimidate countries and usually, if they encounter resistance, withdraw. It is important that Pakistan react very strongly in skirmishing along the border;

3. We will attempt to create a wider framework with others. We have increased our Naval strength in the Indian Ocean and our presence there will grow. The Saudis and the Europeans will cooperate with us and this would offset a Moscow-Kabul-Delhi access [axis]. That kind of an alignment of course is not in our interests. New Delhi should have an option to get out from under Soviet control. Finally, he observed, the Soviets should not find the digestion of Afghanistan too easy.

Agha Shahi noted that if Pakistan helped the refugees, the Soviets will react. Would the United States then stand full square with Pakistan?

Brzezinski replied that if there is Soviet aggression we will be engaged. If there is a skirmish, Pakistan should be able to resist to the point of aggression. Recapitulating, Brzezinski said that if the Soviets commit aggression they will engage the United States. Pakistan should be able to fight skirmishes and not be intimidated. Pakistan should also make very clear its will to fight. Brzezinski in this context recalled the situation of Yugoslavia in 1949. Tito had no security guarantees at that time but because of his demonstrated willingness to fight, the Soviets did not commit aggression against them. Soviet planners may know that they can take Afghanistan in 4 weeks or take Czechoslovakia in 4 days. If they cannot they would be extremely cautious in planning any moves against Pakistan.

Agha Shahi indicated that he understood these points but questioned the magnitude of the assistance that the United States was offering.

Brzezinski told him to consider the fact that we, in just two weeks, have made a very impressive beginning and a long step over the situation that attained the last time the two men spoke.

Thereupon the party left to join the President.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 78, Sensitive X: 1/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.
2. See Document 274.
3. The details of the offer were discussed earlier that day. See Document 409.
4. Postponement of congressional consideration of SALT was discussed at the January 2 NSC meeting, along with other U.S. actions in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For the minutes of the meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XII, Afghanistan, Document 135.
5. See footnote 1, Document 166.