170. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
2291. Subject: The Clark Clifford Visit: A Success in Jeopardy.
1. In my judgment Clark Clifford’s visit here represented a big plus for America. His personality and presence conveyed with eloquence and conviction both the President’s personal interest in India and the grave danger that we perceive in the Soviets’ takeover of Afghanistan. He could not have represented us better. The tone and manner of the GOI’s response, especially in the case of the Prime Minister herself, reflected their appreciation of his stature as an “elder statesman” and close advisor of the President. The easy candor and lack of rancor with which differences were aired also were designed to signal, I feel sure, a calculated decision to maintain open lines of [Page 450] communication with us and to show that India’s long-term friendship with the Soviet Union does not preclude—indeed, is counter-balanced by—a desire to have minimally abrasive relations with the U.S. if possible.
2. I must also, however, report considerable distress here at the extent to which Mr. Clifford’s credibility (and also mine) is being undercut by some of the news related to the Christopher-Brezinski mission to Islamabad.2 The press has got the news that the U.S. team has been trying to put together a $2 billion package of arms for Pakistan. While we have refused to confirm this and tried to brush the report off, it figured prominently in the Lok Sabha debate yesterday. Any U.S.-engineered arms package for Pakistan approaching these dimensions would of course conflict sharply with Clark Clifford’s instructions to emphasize to the GOI the limited and non-threatening nature and amount of arms that the U.S. has had in mind for Pakistan. Mr. Clifford’s credibility with the Indians will be further threatened by the Gwertzman article in the New York Times to the effect that the U.S. intends to enter a long-term military support relationship with Pakistan.3
3. The sooner we can clarify to the GOI our actual intent as to the amount and duration of the U.S. and/or U.S.-sponsored arms commitment to Pakistan, the better our chances of limiting the damage to our credibility in New Delhi and protecting the favorable impact of the Clark Clifford mission.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800058–0021. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Islamabad.↩
- See Document 423.↩
- See Bernard Gwertzman, “White House Seeks Long-Term Aid to Bolster the Defense of Pakistan,” New York Times, June 12, 1978, p. A6. According to the article, “The Administration originally thought of seeking only an emergency ‛one-time exemption’ from the law barring Pakistan from any American aid because of its reputed nuclear weapons program. But Congressional sources and Administration officials said that the Administration now planned to seek repeal of the ban on aid to Pakistan without any time limits.”↩