339. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
4345. Subject: Discussion With President Zia on Intelligence Matters. Ref: Islamabad 4344.2
[Page 802]1. (S) Entire text: Protect FGI.
2. This should be read in conjunction with septel reporting on my talk with President Zia April 12.
3. President Zia referred to points I had made April 9 on instructions in paras 12 and 13 of State 85585.3 Zia said that GOP wants to continue intelligence cooperation, and would welcome even higher level of dialogue, perhaps at the Ambassadorial level. He said carefully that it would not, however, be possible to have special USG equipment on Pak territory.4 I said I would so report, and pointed out that my intell officer was waiting for an appointment with Gen. Riaz Khan of ISID to discuss internal Afghan insurgency situation and I believed that discussion should take place before we move to any addition to the existing liaison relationship. Zia agreed and said that as soon as Gen. Riaz returns to Islamabad, he would receive my officer. In response to Shahi comment I agreed that Embassy would continue periodic briefings of MFA on Afghan situation.
4. [8 lines not declassified]
- Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Tin: 980643000018, Box 13, Islamabad 1971–1979. Secret; Roger Channel.↩
- See Document 338.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 337. Paragraph 12 of telegram 85585 to Islamabad, April 6, reads: “(If raised by Zia) We appreciate the significance of current developments in Afghanistan including the actions of the Afghan insurgents, directed as they are against a Soviet-maintained regime. The questions that you have raised on this question in other channels are being studied, and we will react through the same channels. We believe that the repercussions of the insurgency in Afghanistan, and the Soviet involvement there could most usefully be discussed by the team that we propose to send to Islamabad.” Paragraph 13 of telegram 85585, reads: “We hope to be able to continue and strengthen our cooperation in the intelligence area. We will be in touch with you separately on those matters. We would try to keep this issue, as well as our support for you against the Soviet threat, as separate as possible from the legally binding consequences on us of our differences over nuclear matters.”↩
- [text not declassified]↩