340. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
4544. Subject: (C) Gearing-Class Destroyers for Pakistan: Decision Awaited.
1. (C)–Entire text. This is an action message.
2. I am concerned that as we deal with the ramifications of our imposition of the Symington Amendment because of our concerns about the directions of Pakistan’s nuclear policies, we may lose sight of or postpone too long an urgent and necessary decision we have before us on the sale of four additional Gearing-class destroyers to Pakistan.
3. As Department will recall, original Pak request for Gearings was for six, two of which have already been overhauled, sailed the Pacific, and joined the Pakistan Navy. GOP has been officially informed that the four others would be available in time, two perhaps as early as 1980, and the Pakistan Navy has reaffirmed its interest in them. We know that all four are now projected to be available for transfer to the Pakistan Navy on 1 October 1979, if the Congress approves and the GOP agrees it can accept that many at one time. We understand the Pakistan Embassy has been so informed in Washington, and the CNO Admiral Hayward’s recent letter to the new Pakistan CNO restates this point.2 While we have not formally addressed the question in recent weeks with GOP officials, the impression we have from Pakistan Navy (PN) contacts is that the Paks would be prepared to receive all four this fall and to man two of them for immediate transit across the Atlantic (or Pacific) upon completion of a 2 to 4 week USN tender period for essential voyage repairs to ensure a safe ocean transit. The other two would be manned with skeleton crews to deal with upkeep and to wait the transit of the first two and return of additional crew members for [garble] second group transit. We understand the PN would take ships as is, where is, and would undertake major overhauls/refitting in the PN’s Karachi shipyard.
4. Finally, we understand that there are other potential claimants for these ships, that once the current batch is disposed of to other potential claimants there may not be any additional Gearings available for some time (or at all), and that if we do not make up our minds on [Page 804] notifying the Paks of their availability, verifying their willingness to take all four, and moving ahead with necessary congressional consultations, we may lose one or more of four ships now identified for the PN to other claimants.
5. I can understand a certain reluctance to put notice of our intent to sell these ships to Pakistan to the Congress so soon after the Bhutto execution and our unrelated aid cutoff. However, since Symington Amendment does not apply to such sales, since ship transfers are part of an on-going program, and since time is a-wasting in terms of availability, I strongly and urgently recommend that we take the decision to carry out the sale and begin the necessary consultations with the Congress at the earliest possible opportunity. Ideally, we should be in position to notify the GOP by no later than 10 May when Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi will be in the United States.3
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790178–0573. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to New Delhi and CINCPAC.↩
- Not found.↩
- In telegram 199305 to Islamabad, August 1, the Department informed the Embassy: “The question of additional destroyers for Pakistan is still under review. No decision has been made. You should be aware, however, that the matter is now further complicated by the uncertain availability of destroyers for foreign sale.” After outlining the Navy’s ship decommission schedule, the Department noted: “The foregoing planning has recently come into question as a result of congressional interest in naval reserve force destroyer programming. Essentially, the House Appropriations Committee believes that some of the ships should be retained in active service to support US Naval Reserve programs.” The Department explained that the issue “may have to wait for passage of the FY 1980 Appropriations Act. This probably will not occur before late September. The net effect of this on Pakistan is that the destroyers identified for possible transfer to Pakistan and other countries are not now available and are unlikely to be available before calendar year 80.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790347–1188)↩