323. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State and the Embassy in India1
2413. New Delhi for Deputy Secretary Christopher. Subject: (S) Pakistan Nuclear Program: Technical Team Visit. Ref: (A) Islamabad 0935;2 (B) Islamabad 1622.3
1. (S) Entire text.
2. Summary: Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz called me in February 27 to convey GOP decision not to permit U.S. team to inspect Pak nuclear facilities. DCM and MFA notetaker sat in. Rationale for refusal carefully constructed on basis of Indian refusal to accept similar inspections, and included offer to permit bilateral reciprocal Indo-Pak inspection, with or without U.S. participation. I expressed deep regret that GOP was now reversing offer twice affirmed by Pres. Zia (Jan 24 and Feb 9); noted that serious discrepancies remained between our information about Pak nuclear programs and GOP assurances thereon, which could have serious impact on our relations if unresolved; and said I would report and seek instructions from Washington.
3. Shahnawaz opened conversation with reference to “curious” Feb 8 letter from Desai to Zia in which former noted reports of Pak activity in sophisticated nuclear technology and in effect urged Pakistan not to undertake anything which could upset balance for peace in area.4 According to Shahnawaz, who read selected phrases from letter, Desai asserted Indian nuclear program was exclusively for peaceful purposes and that GOI remained firmly against weapons proliferation. Shahnawaz said reply had been drafted but not yet sent. He said letter was puzzling in view of India’s nuclear explosion, existence of three unsafeguarded facilities in India, its rejection of South Asia nuclear free zone, and its failure to sign NPT.
4. Shahnawaz then pulled out Vajpayee Feb 3 “Blitz” interview5 and quoted FM’s remarks to effect that India will resume nuclear [Page 751] explosions when it is persuaded these are necessary for research on peaceful uses and his reminder to interviewer that he is from party which had favored development of nuclear weapons.
5. Shahnawaz concluded that in view of Pakistan’s historical stance of past 15 years against discrimination in nuclear matters and against unilateral submission to inspection, Pakistan could not accept U.S. inspection team unless it also applies to India. He argued that any appearance Pakistan was permitting outside inspection while India refuses would be unacceptable to public opinion in Pakistan. Shahnawaz added that GOP was prepared to agree to reciprocal Indo-Pak inspection bilaterally or in collaboration with India.
6. In response, I noted that GOP appeared to be repudiating clear, unequivocal, and repeated offer by Pres. Zia, to which Shahnawaz replied that Zia’s offer had been conditional on full consideration of full implications of unilateral inspection. He added that there had been no communication from Desai at that point, and that sudden Indian interest in Pak nuclear programs is disturbing in view of history of GOI rejection of Pak proposals for nuclear free zone and reciprocal inspection, and of GOP’s offer to sign NPT same day India signs it.
7. I then expressed my deep regret at this decision and said I saw no connection between Desai letter and inspection which Zia had twice affirmed his willingness to accept. Noting that purpose of proposed inspection was to clear up discrepancies between our information and GOP assurances about its nuclear programs, I said that continuance of these discrepancies will have effect on U.S. attitudes toward Pakistan and that applicable U.S. law might have to be implemented. Finally, I said I would report conversation and seek instructions.
8. For New Delhi, Deputy Secretary: We are sending by septel our thoughts on how you should deal with nuclear issue in view of this development during your visit.6
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780469–0121. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 322.↩
- In telegram 1622 from Islamabad, February 9, Hummel reported on his February 9 meeting with Zia regarding inspection of Pakistan’s nuclear program, during which Zia “accepted technical team visit, but asked for postponement for couple of weeks due to internal problems.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2668, N790002–0015)↩
- See footnote 4, Document 143.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 125.↩
- In telegram 2411 from Islamabad, February 27, the Embassy suggested that during his upcoming meeting with Zia, Christopher should urge Zia to reconsider his refusal to allow U.S. nuclear inspection teams to visit Pakistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850027–2663) For an account of Christopher’s March 1 meeting with Zia, see Document 325.↩