322. Memorandum Prepared in the White House Situation Room1
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]
8. Zia Comments on Pakistan Nuclear Program: Ambassador Hummel took advantage of a meeting with Zia yesterday to privately raise the subject of Pakistani enrichment and nuclear explosives research. Zia reacted sharply, emotionally, and asked Hummel to report that he “not only contradicted the allegations, but said they are outright lies.” Hummel asked if there might be nuclear activities of which Zia was unaware. Zia replied that this would be impossible and requested specifics that he could check on to disprove the allegations. Hummel reports that he could detect no false note in Zia’s denials and recommends that we make absolutely sure of our assessments and consider the merits of having U.S. nuclear experts, with Zia’s approval, have a look at suspected sites. At a minimum, we could underline the seriousness of our concern. Hummel concludes that we should refrain from talking to other Pakistani officials until we decide whether such a quiet, unpublicized visit is the appropriate next step. (Islamabad 935 NODIS,2 PSN 38196) (S)
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 16, 1/16/79–1/2/1979. Secret. Carter wrote “Zbig, C” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.↩
- In telegram 935 from Islamabad, January 24, Hummel reported on his meeting with Zia. Regarding Zia’s behavior during the meeting, he commented: “I could detect no false note in his denials, but he could of course be a better actor than I have given him credit for. In any case, Dept should make absolutely sure of validity of our assessments, which I understand come [less than 1 line not declassified] from data on purchases of equipment, which could have multiple purposes.” Zia offered to allow Hummel to inspect any site where suspected enrichment and nuclear explosives research were taking place. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850074–1475)↩