Office of the Historian

321. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Policy Review Committee Meeting1

Washington, January 22, 1979, 4:15–6 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Summary of Conclusions: Mini-PRC on Pakistani Nuclear Matters

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
    • Thomas Pickering, Assistant Secretary for Middle East Affairs
    • Jane Coon, Director, Office of Pakistan/Afghanistan/Bangladesh Affairs

  • Defense

    • Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Estern, African, & South Asian Affairs
    • Cdr. Ronald Zwart (DOD/ISA)

  • Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

    • Spurgeon Keeny, Acting Director
    • Barry M. Blechman, Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation & Control Bureau

  • Joint Chiefs of Staff

    • Lt. Gen. William Smith
    • Lt. Col. Sheldon H. Cooper

  • Central Intelligence Agency

    • Dr. Robert Bowie, Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
    • John Despres, Nat’l. Intelligence Officer for Nuclear Proliferation

  • White House

    • David Aaron

  • National Security Council

    • Thomas Thornton
    • Jessica Mathews

Intelligence Background

It is increasingly clear that Pakistan is proceeding along a course that will enable it to achieve a nuclear explosive capability, possibly sometime between 1981 and 1984. Certain critical components in their efforts have very probably been imported since August 1977, the effective date of the Symington Amendment and this raises serious questions about its application. (S)

Congressional/Legal Aspects

The PRC considered the possibility of asking for changes in the Symington Amendment to bring it into line with the Glenn Amendment so that the President would have a broader waiver capability to permit continued cooperation with Pakistan while seeking to dissuade them [Page 748] from the nuclear option. It was decided, however, that we would, initially at least, approach key members of Congress (especially Senator Glenn and Congressman Zablocki) with a full explanation of the problem and our diplomatic strategy to cope with it. We would agree to keep them informed and to report back prior to the consideration of the foreign aid bill. In the interim we would not invoke the Symington Amendment on the grounds of our diplomatic efforts and the critical importance of Pakistan in the current circumstances of the area. (S)

State was also tasked to determine what agreements are up for signing in the next several months with Pakistan. (S)

Diplomatic Strategy

Ambassador Hummel has already been instructed to approach President Zia in general terms about the Pakistani nuclear program and to point out to him the implications for US-Pakistani relations. (The Congressional consultations will not take place until after Hummel reports on his meeting.)2 (S)

The PRC agreed that we should raise the issue with Deng Xiaoping. State Department will contact the Saudis and selected Europeans to enlist their support in dissuading Pakistan from its nuclear course. No special approach will be made to the Soviets although we will routinely mention Pakistan to them when we discuss general proliferation concerns. We will sound out Ambassadors Goheen and Hummel on the utility of having Goheen talk privately with Indian Prime Minister Desai about the possibility of a joint Indo-Pakistani agreement not to develop or use nuclear weapons. (This, if successful, could eliminate most of the motivation for the Pakistani program.) (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 82, MPRC 004, 1/22/79, Pakistan. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed at the upper right-hand corner of the summary.↩
  2. Hummel met with Zia on January 24. See Document 322.↩