Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

291. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• F–5Es for Pakistan

Pakistan has a strong interest in updating its aging fighter aircraft fleet, and we believe the question of an F–5E purchase may be raised by the Pakistanis during David Newsom’s July 14–17 visit.² Our policy continues to dictate that we will not, even if asked again by Pakistan, sell the A–7.

Our military analysts agree that Pakistan’s Air Force, compared with India’s, is outdated and ineffective. A persuasive military case can be made for Pakistan’s need for a modern, lightweight interceptor for legitimate air defense needs. They have formerly told us they would want approximately 110 F–5Es at a cost of about $700–800 million for aircraft only. We assume financing would come from wealthy OPEC friends.

There are a number of advantages to an F–5E sale. It would be a major sign of our interest in regional security in the wake of events in Afghanistan and Yemen. It would have the active and full support of Iran and Saudi Arabia and would help meet the concerns of those governments about our response to direct or indirect pressure on our friends from the USSR. There is a recognized military justification, and it would foster a sense of security among Pakistan’s leadership.

Furthermore, while the Pakistanis have never made an explicit linkage, they have said that if we want cooperation from developing countries on nuclear nonproliferation, we should be prepared to help them meet their legitimate defense needs through responsible sales of conventional military equipment. Finally, the purchase would not pose a threat to Indian military superiority and would not introduce a higher level of arms sophistication in the area. (India already has the MIG–21, a comparable aircraft.)

There are drawbacks to a sale, however. Our South Asian arms supply policy states we will not be a major supplier,³ and you told Desai our sales posture would be limited. Depending on the number of aircraft involved, a sale to Pakistan of F–5Es could make us a major supplier. It would also put additional pressure on our arms sales ceiling. In addition, the Indians may be concerned that the sale would signal a renewed “special relationship” with Pakistan. Finally, if the human rights record of the Pakistani Government does not improve or worsens, such a sale could be cited as inconsistent with our human rights policy.

David Newsom would not raise the F–5E issue in Islamabad and would respond only if the Pakistanis actively pursued the issue. We believe that if we respond positively to the Pakistanis, we should only agree in principle, with certain caveats. Newsom would say that our agreement would extend to no more than 40 aircraft, and he would not commit the U.S. to provide financing. He would also say that any sale would require Congressional approval. If the reprocessing issue is not resolved by the time of his visit, he would also note any sale would be contingent on Pakistan’s foregoing reprocessing.

In addition, Newsom would say that our agreement in principle would apply to F–5Es or “equivalent aircraft.” Mentioning “equivalent aircraft” would indicate that we would not oppose further French sales to Pakistan of Mirage aircraft which are rough equivalents of the F–5E. (You may recall that we previously told the French that we would not attempt to undercut their sale of Mirage aircraft to Pakistan but that if the Pakistanis asked us about F–5Es, we would respond on the merits.)

Recommendation

That you approve David Newsom’s responding, if asked by the Pakistanis, that, without making any commitment concerning the financing, we agree in principle to Pakistani acquisition of not more than 40 F–5Es or equivalent aircraft. He would not discuss the specifics of a sale, would note the need for Congressional approval, and, if reprocessing has not been resolved, would say that our approval would be contingent on Pakistan’s foregoing reprocessing.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P–14, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Pakistan I. Secret. Printed from a copy that Vance did not initial. A handwritten note at the bottom of the page reads: “As given to A.H. [Arthur Hummel], 7/6/78.”
2. See Document 293.
3. See footnote 2, Document 5.
4. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation, but in a July 10 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Vance of Carter’s approval (see Document 292) and added that Carter directed that financing for the aircraft “should be cash.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Entry P–14, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Pakistan I)