Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

290. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, July 2, 1978, 1002Z

6400. Subject: Reprocessing, the Shah’s Role, and the Newsom Visit. Ref: A. Islamabad 6399;² B. Islamabad 6335;³ C. State 167550.⁴

1. We have attempted, briefly, to sort out for benefit of Under Secretary Newsom our impression of the mood he will face when he sets down here in Pakistan on the 14th (ref A). An important factor in this is Iranian-Pak tension.

2. We have also made a strong point of importance we attach to the Shah’s role in the delicate scenario for the Jacomet and Newsom visits during the next two weeks. (ref B).

3. It is with these points in mind that we were struck with the Department’s apparent assumption that the Shah won’t play unless and until the Bhutto drama is played out to his satisfaction (ref C). We find this especially disturbing in view of the long history of lectures we have received from the Shah about not paying enough attention to this area, etc. and the close cooperative role we have developed with him (and the French) on the non-proliferation question. Getting past the nuclear reprocessing issue is essential to our being able to provide the help he and we agree Pakistan needs. But our role is not enough; our package may not, by itself, carry the day. We need his contribution too.

4. It seems to me that we should not blandly allow him to sit this out, at this stage, without challenge and that this should be an important part of the Newsom message in Tehran.

5. Department please repeat to Tehran and Paris.

Hummel

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2284. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2. In telegram 6399 from Islamabad, July 3, the Embassy assessed the current attitude of Pakistani officials regarding U.S. policy concerns and strained Pakistani-Iranian relations. The Embassy warned: “Gen. Zia and other high GOP officials have told several diplomats here that the GOP is ‛convinced’ that the USG has decided ‛to scrap’ Pakistan in favor of India and Iran does not intend to react in any meaningful way to the GOP’s need for support against [garble] Afghan designs.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780273–1270)
3. In telegram 6335 from Islamabad, July 1, the Embassy responded to an inquiry from NEA in telegram 167501 to Islamabad, July 1, as to how the Embassy predicted the Pakistani Government would react if Jacomet informed the Pakistanis of the French decision to cancel the Franco-Pakistani reprocessing deal, and whether the Pakistanis would immediately go public and denounce the French decision in order to avert a possible leak to the PPP. The Embassy speculated that the Pakistani reaction depended on how categorically the French cancelled the reprocessing deal, and whether the Pakistanis perceived even a slight chance of future cooperation in building a reprocessing plant. According to the Embassy, if the Pakistanis saw no potential for future help from France, they would most likely go public immediately. The Embassy added: “It is also important that the Shah play his hand at this time, i.e. approve Iranian guarantee for the $300 million in commercial loans and pony up a sizeable sum for military equipment purchases. It would be preferable for the Shah to convey his good news after the French inform the GOP and before Newsom arrives here.” (Telegram 6335 from Islamabad, July 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2277. Telegram 167501 to Islamabad, July 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–2669)
4. In telegram 167550 to Paris, July 1, the Department expressed concern “that an overlap between Jacomet and Newsom in Islamabad could publicly symbolize to the Pakistanis what they already view as unwelcome collaboration between the French and Americans contrary to Pakistan’s security interests.” The Department noted that French coordination with Iran would be helpful in moderating Pakistan’s reaction to the French cancellation, but “the Shah is deeply concerned about how the Zia regime will handle the fate of Bhutto, and the possible consequences for Pak internal security if Bhutto is executed. Accordingly, he has taken a reserved position on the flow of Iranian aid until that issue is satisfactorily resolved.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–2672)