284. National Intelligence Estimate1
Pakistan—The Costs of Political Instability
[Omitted here is the table of contents.]
PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
It has been almost a year since General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq established the Martial Law Administration in Pakistan, but the country remains in a period of political uncertainty. This uncertainty could lead to serious instability in the coming months as Zia is obliged to reach decisions on the fate of imprisoned former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and on the establishment of a projected joint military and civilian government. Whatever actions Zia takes on these problems, he almost certainly will face continued political unrest, further erosion of popular support for his own regime, and gradually increasing discontent within the military.
These pressures may lead to further changes in Pakistan’s government and to additional damage to the country’s already enfeebled political institutions, but are not likely in the near term to result in the imposition of a radically different social or political order. We believe that basically conservative military or military-controlled government is likely to persist in Pakistan over the next two or three years, even if Zia is replaced by other senior Army officers or if civilian politicians are brought into the government. It is much less likely that an effective, all-civilian government will be established, or that radical military or civilian leaders will seize power and install an extreme nationalist or leftist regime.
Pakistan is an overwhelmingly Muslim state, but deep regional, cultural, and ethnic rivalries have strained the country’s political system since independence. Regionally based political groups in recent years have sought provincial autonomy rather than secession, but these strains persist, and may in fact intensify following the assumption of [Page 679] power in 1978 by what the Pakistanis consider to be a Communist-controlled government in Afghanistan. It is not yet clear what policy the new Afghan Government will follow concerning its conservative neighbors, but Afghanistan in the past has often given support to separatist political groups in Pakistan’s border provinces.
Continuing political uncertainty has joined with Pakistan’s enduring resource and population problems to militate against any significant early improvements in the country’s economy, which had deteriorated over the past several years as a result of adverse international economic developments, domestic political instability, and Bhutto’s economic policies. The military government has not taken aggressive action to deal with the country’s economic problems, but has exhibited interest in promoting agricultural productivity, private investment, and measures to improve the balance-of-payments position. The future economic well-being of Pakistan, which has considerable long-term economic potential, will depend heavily on such exogenous factors as good weather, worker remittances, and foreign assistance, as well as on more effective economic management and political leadership and stability.
The immediate challenge facing the current government is to restore economic growth and preserve public order without reverting to more repressive measures that would threaten such social justice and human rights as do exist in Pakistan. There is no doubt that General Zia wishes to right the economy, just as there was no question initially that he planned to hold fair elections, or that he still hopes to install a more representative government. There is growing doubt, however, that he will succeed.
Unlike several earlier periods of political instability in Pakistan’s 30-year history, the current uncertainty has not been caused by, nor is it likely to precipitate, a concomitant crisis in foreign relations and external security. Pakistan’s relations with its powerful neighbors, India and Iran, are now relatively good, and are likely to remain so for the next two to three years. Relations with Afghanistan, which in the recent past have been unusually warm, now are likely to return to their normal pattern of deep mutual distrust. Pakistan’s relations with the USSR—generally cool but stable—are likely to experience new strains as a result of increased Soviet assistance to, and presence in, Afghanistan. This expanded Soviet activity in the area may lead to further strengthening of the already close relations between Pakistan and China.
Although Pakistani leaders are aware of the country’s long-term regional insecurity and need for continued external support, Pakistan’s relations with the United States will be subjected to strains in the next few years. Differences will continue concerning Pakistan’s nuclear program, narcotics control efforts, human rights record, and need for foreign financial and arms aid. In the near term, the issue of Pakistan’s [Page 680] acquiring a nuclear reprocessing capability will continue to dominate all others in the bilateral relationship. This issue affects US global nonproliferation aims, and may limit or end our ability to support Pakistan’s economic development and security requirements. The United States has no critical political, economic, or military interests at stake in Pakistan at this time, but developments there do impact directly on wider US interests in the region and worldwide.
The ambitious nuclear program that Pakistan now is pursuing is intended to expand the country’s electric power output, but also, we believe, to provide the capability to develop a nuclear explosive device. Pakistan has a reasonable chance of acquiring a reprocessing capability—its foremost priority in nuclear matters—by the early 1980s, [2 lines not declassified] Pakistan probably will be capable of assembling a nuclear device in the early 1980s, although its decision on whether to do this, as well as whether to proceed toward a nuclear weapons program, will be determined largely by political and military considerations.
Pakistan’s conventional military capabilities, like its nuclear capabilities and potential, remain inferior to those of India. This imbalance in capabilities will grow, as Pakistan in the next few years will be unable to manufacture or purchase advanced arms—especially aircraft, mechanized equipment, and air defense weapons—on the same scale as India. Although the Pakistanis over the long term may pursue a nuclear weapons capability as a means of partially redressing this imbalance, Pakistan will not have a credible nuclear weapons option until at least the mid-1980s.
[Omitted here is the body of the estimate.]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 1–12/78. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract According to the title page (not printed), the CIA, the NSA, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, and Defense, as well as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force, participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence issued the estimate with the concurrence of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. Carter initialed the title page. Turner gave the NIE to Carter at a June 27 meeting; see Document 289.↩