283. Memorandum for the Record1
SUBJECT
- NEA/CIA/INR Meeting of May 31, 1978
PARTICIPANTS
- NEA—Assistant Secretary Harold Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretaries William Crawford and Nicholas Veliotes; CIA—[2 names not declassified] (COS, Islamabad); INR—Bob Melone
Pakistan: Noting that he had had a blast from Agha Shahi, including a threat that Pakistan would have to adopt a policy of appeasement,2 Mr. Saunders solicited [less than 1 line not declassified] views on Pakistan’s fragility and the likely effects of such things as the nuclear reprocessing dispute and the Afghan coup on the country. [less than 1 line not declassified] that the Paks tend to panic. Ambassador Hummel and he had tried to reassure them, promising that the U.S. would watch the Afghan situation closely and keep them fully informed. [less than 1 line not declassified] felt there was no reason for us to become excited and suggested that it might even be wise to call Agha Shahi’s bluff.
[less than 1 line not declassified] remarked that the region chronically chooses the worst case hypothesis. On occasion, the worst comes true, at least as locally perceived. The Paks are now saying that after 20 years of U.S. reassurances that India did not intend to dismember the country, it did, the Paks totally disregarding our caveat that this would not happen unless Pakistan handed it to the Indians on a silver platter. [less than 1 line not declassified] prepared to believe that the Soviets knew about the Afghan coup beforehand, but not that they engineered it. [less than 1 line not declassified] that the Shah hadn’t helped with his statements that the U.S. was simply sitting back watching.
Replying to Saunders’ question about the degree of fragmentation, [less than 1 line not declassified] that Pakistan is fairly cohesive. [less than 1 line not declassified] only a very determined Soviet effort could split the country. [less than 1 line not declassified] doubted that the Soviets would make any such effort. Rather, they would try to woo the Pakistanis, but might threaten troubles in Baluchistan. [less than 1 line not declassified] that the Soviets will try to woo the Paks in order to break [Page 677] their Chinese connection. The Soviets also might try to revive their Asian collective security pact idea. [less than 1 line not declassified] the Chinese are concerned that we are not giving the Paks the reassurances they need. [less than 1 line not declassified] the Paks and the Shah may be considering whether the Soviets have determined that the U.S. won’t fight in view of our inaction in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan.
Saunders wondered whether the Afghan events had made the Pakistani military more or less united. [less than 1 line not declassified] that they were more united in face of the perceived threat, although the military is not too happy with Zia. Replying to Mr. Veliotes’ question, [less than 1 line not declassified] not think that the Iranians could be very helpful since the Paks do not trust them. [less than 1 line not declassified] that the Paks are aware of Iran’s financial support of Bhutto. He felt that the problem on the internal scene was that nobody thinks Zia is doing a good job. Disaffection started with the lawyers in Lahore, spread to civil servants, and now the generals are wondering. Reagan said that if Zia goes, he likely will be replaced by another general whose foreign policies would not differ significantly from his. Generals Chisti and Iqbal were mentioned as possible successors.
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]
- Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Tin: 980643000012, Box 6, NEA/CIA/INR Weekly meetings 1978–1980. Secret; Sensitive.↩
- Reference is to Shahi’s May 25 meeting with Vance, which Saunders attended. See Document 281.↩
- Melone initialed the memorandum over his typed signature.↩