Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

282. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State¹

Paris, May 30, 1978, 1120Z

17008. Subj: Pakistan Reprocessing Issue. Ref: State 135953.²

1. Summary: On May 29 Joseph Nye and EmbOff met with Andre Jacomet, Quai nuclear non-proliferation adviser, to review GOF current views on the reprocessing plant contract. Nye covered substance of reftel. Jacomet described a much more encouraging situation within the GOF: Co-processing had been dropped; most officials in GOF were pushing for a decision to go ahead or to cancel; Giscard would decide by June 6 (possibly the 15th); if the decision is to cancel, the GOF would welcome appropriate coordination with the USG on economic and military assistance programs for Pakistan. End summary.

2. The reported highlights of the Carter-Giscard meeting of May 26 relating to Pakistan were mentioned:³ Giscard had flatly said that he would not contribute to proliferation in Pakistan and he also said that the US and France should work together to help save face for Pakistan; and President Carter had mentioned USG limitations due to the Glenn Amendment. Jacomet said he had hoped more time would have been available for discussion between the two Presidents to permit some balanced actions on Pakistan and China—cancellation of Pakistan and approval of the reactor sale to the PRC.

3. Jacomet then summarized the current GOF position on the subject. The CEA had dropped the coprocessing proposal as it was too expensive to develop and not worth much applied to the Pakistan situation. Involved French industry officials were pressing for a decision—go or stop. Others in the GOF were joining the cry to make a decision, some urging to go ahead and others pressing cancellation. Jacomet said Giscard would make a decision soon. (Jacomet made some comment about June 6 and then said something had been slipped back to June 15. We assume he was referring to Giscard’s decision date on this subject.) If the decision was to cancel, then the GOF and the USG would need to consult on coordination of economic and military assistance programs for Pakistan.

4. Nye reviewed in detail the points covered in reftel. Jacomet indicated that the GOF shared the US view that the Afghan situation was a significant new element and made an early decision (particularly if to cancel) more necessary. He noted that export opportunities for France would be important in coping with internal GOF opposition to cancellation of the project. In addition, while the GOF/USG coordination of assistance programs was necessary to deal with Pakistan, the view to internal France must be that it was a GOF decision to cancel (if such is decided) and not a result of USG pressure. Jacomet had specific interest in USG views on how the coordination would be developed including the role of other countries, such as Iran. Nye emphasized that we would follow the French lead, but the GOF should keep in mind that at some point some members of Congress would need to be informed to some degree. Jacomet took particular note of our view that Iran would play a useful role. Nye corrected Jacomet on the aspect of military aircraft noting that we were considering F5E, not F15 or A7 aircraft.

5. At the conclusion of the subject, Jacomet appeared enthusiastic about the future of the matter. He seemed to indicate that he believed Giscard would decide to cancel and that the coordinated assistance could be sufficient to cause further work on the reprocessing plant by Pakistan to be dropped or at least delayed indefinitely. Jacomet promised to keep in close touch with the Embassy and to consult immediately when Giscard makes his decision.

6. Comment: Jacomet certainly provided a much more encouraging situation from the point of view of US interests. However, please note that Giscard has yet to make his decision. We hope that Washington will press ahead with its decisions on the assistance package (based on an assumed decision by Giscard to cancel the project) and that views from AmEmbassies Islamabad and Tehran will be available to permit our full and well considered advice to the GOF soon after a Giscard decision to cancel the plant.

7. Department please pass to Tehran and Islamabad.⁴

Hartman

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225–0965. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. In telegram 135953 to Paris, May 27, the Department authorized the Embassy to discuss the Pakistani reprocessing issue with French officials and suggested the following points be made: preventing Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons was now more critical because of the Communist takeover in Kabul; a possible U.S. aid package was an inducement for Pakistan against “going it alone on reprocessing;” and Iran had a role to play in both dissuading Pakistan from seeking nuclear capability and financing part of the aid package. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780224–1257)
3. From 5:55 to 9:01 p.m. on May 26, Carter met with Giscard and hosted a working dinner at the White House in his honor. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting was found. A memorandum from Aaron to Carter in preparation for the meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.
4. This telegram was repeated to Tehran and Islamabad as telegram 136074, May 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780225–1225)